

IMPULSE FÜR DEN DONAURAUM

IMPULSES FOR THE DANUBE REGION

10 JAHRE EUROPÄISCHE DONAU-AKADEMIE
5 JAHRE DANUBE SCHOOLS

Dokumentation und Ausblick

Mit Beiträgen der Teilnehmer_innen und Referent_innen
der Danube School-Reihe 2018

*With contributions of participants and speakers
of the Danube School Series 2018*

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Publikationen der Europäischen Donau-Akademie (EDA) in Ulm

Die Publikationen in der Reihe *EDITION DONAU - Studien und Materialien zu Südosteuropa* der Europäischen Donau-Akademie basieren auf Konferenzen, Symposien und Sommerschulen zu wissenschaftlichen, ökologischen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Themen sowie aktuellen und historischen Entwicklungen im Donauraum. Die Veröffentlichungen dienen der kritischen Betrachtung dieser Themen im Donauraum und zur Unterstützung des europäischen Kooperations- und Integrationsprozesses in Mittel- und Südosteuropa. Die Arbeit der Akademie beruht auf den Prinzipien Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit, der Achtung der Religionsfreiheit und dem Willen, jede Form von Nationalismus und Extremismus zu bekämpfen.

Die Europäische Donau-Akademie lebt von der Aktualität ihrer Themen und ihrer Nähe zur alltäglichen Wirklichkeit der Menschen in den Städten und Regionen entlang der Donau. Durch ihre Arbeit will die Akademie fruchtbare Dialoge zwischen Wissenschaftlern und Experten aus Verwaltungs-, politischen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Einrichtungen zugunsten der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung im Donauraum fördern.

Christof Hußmann

Geschäftsführer

Prof. Dr. Harald C. Traue

Wissenschaftlicher Leiter

Publications of the European Danube Academy (EDA) in Ulm

The publications of the series *EDITION DONAU - Studies and Material on Southeast Europe* of the European Danube Academy are based on conferences, symposia and summer schools concerning scientific, environmental, economic and cultural topics as well as current and historical developments in the Danube Region. The publications serve to critically reflect these issues concerning the Danube Region and to support the European cooperation and integration process in Central and Southeast Europe. The academy's work rests on the principles of democracy and rule of law, respect for religious freedom and the will to oppose every form of nationalism and extremism.

The European Danube Academy thrives on the topicality of its issues and its proximity to the everyday reality of the people in the cities and regions along the Danube. Through its work, the academy wants to promote fruitful dialogs between scholars and learned people from administrative, political, economic and cultural institutions for the benefit of societal development in the Danube Region.

Christof Hußmann
Executive Director

Prof. Dr. Harald C. Traue
Scientific Director

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Gerhard Mayer

Paul F. Langer

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INHALT

Gunter Czisch: Grußwort.....	11
10 Jahre Europäische Donau-Akademie; 5 Jahre Danube Schools	12
Reinhard Johler: Die Zukunft der Donau. Gemeinsamkeiten und Differenzen im Donaauraum als verbindende Potentiale	13
Ulrich Klemm: Eine Bildungsvision für den Donaauraum	29
Peter Langer: 10 Jahre Europäische Donau-Akademie	35
Tanja Salzmann-Reißer: Projektförderung im Donaauraum.....	42
Márton Méhes und Paul F. Langer: CultPlatForm_21	57
Gerhard Mayer: 5 Jahre Danube Schools - ein zentraler Baustein der EDA-Strategie.....	64
Paul F. Langer: The DS Series - A Best Practice Case for Modular Education Programs in Macro-Regional Cooperation	72
Danube School-Reihe 2018	81
Tanja Salzmann-Reißer: Danube School 2018 in Ulm/Neu-Ulm "Migration & Innovation in the Danube Region"	82
Tanja Salzmann-Reißer: BRÜCKEN BILDEN! Jubiläumsveranstaltung im Rahmen des 11. Internationalen Donaufestes Ulm/Neu-Ulm	86
Blagovesta Tsenova: Danube School in Ruse 2018 - HOPE	89
Fanni Elek: Sommeruniversität 2018 at the Andrassy Universität Budapest.....	93

Aleksandar M. Gajic: Danube International Weekend 2018.....	95
Contributions of Speakers and Participants of the Danube Schools 2018	98
Mirko Savić: Migration and Demographics in the Danube Region	99
Pavle Sekeruš: Tradition and Innovation - Changing Roles of Universities in an Interdependent World.....	115
Mimi Kornazheva and Krassimir Kornazhev: What Could Be the Added Value of the Danube Region Strategy for the Western Balkans?	125
Jan C. Weyerer and Paul F. Langer: Smart Cities in the Danube Region	157
Paul F. Langer: Ein brutales architektonisches Erbe.....	170
Bernadette Gruber: European Regionalism and European Identity.....	183
Marko Radić: Croats into <i>Gastarbeiter</i> : The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973.....	194
Marina Kyosya and Eva Parvanova: Unlocking the Potential of the Danube Region Strategy for Europeanization of Moldova	232
Stefan Ditrih: Inland Waterway Transport and Sustainable Development.....	251
Tijana Stanisavić: From Ulm to Banat – The Beginning of German Migrations to Banat	270

Kristina Radović: Public-Private Partnerships as an Instrument of Alternative Financing of Cultural Heritage in Serbia	288
Aleksandra Ždero and Aleksandar Rudić: A Comparative Analysis of Gender Studies Representation in the Faculties for Political Science across the Danube Region	311
Aleksandar M. Gajić: Trajan’s Bridge and the Danube River in the work of Count Marsili.....	332
Project Proposals of the Danube School 2018	342
Blagovesta Tsenova, Aleksandra Toroman, Josip Humjan: Enhancing Knowledge of the Danube Region	343
Radmila Arambašić, Nataliia Osipova and Annika Thöt: The Danube Youth Radar: Putting Student Research in the Spotlight.....	352
Marko Radić, Ana Momčilović, Iulia Ishanova, Stefan Ditrih: The ReDanube Project.....	367
Jelena Ristic, Loredana Surdu, Dimitri Eskidarov: The “Danube Friend”	372
Herausgeber*innen	378

Gunter Czisch

Grußwort

Europa verdankt seine längste Friedensperiode der Europäischen Union. Die Europäische Donau-Akademie fördert das europäische Projekt entlang der Donau, denn die Donau schafft Identität, ist Symbol für die verflochtene Geschichte und Zukunft der Anrainerstaaten. Seit ihrem Anfang vor zehn Jahren hat sich die Akademie erfolgreich entwickelt. Sie bringt Akteure zusammen, verbindet Institutionen und verwirklicht Ideen.

Im Rahmen der Danube Schools vernetzt die Akademie junge Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler. Im gegenseitigen Austausch und Diskurs werden die Beziehungen der Regionen und Länder intensiviert. Dabei ist es ein erfreuliches Zeichen, dass sich das Format ausgehend von der ersten Summer School in Ulm 2014 als feste Reihe an verschiedenen Standorten etabliert hat.

Das vorliegende Buch eröffnet einen grenzüberschreitenden Blick. Die Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer der Danube Summer School 2018 beleuchten die gemeinsame Geschichte und die Potenziale einer gemeinsamen Zukunft. In diesem Sinne möge das Buch uns anspornen, uns weiterhin für eine gute Nachbarschaft zwischen unseren Regionen und Länder einzusetzen. Denn Frieden und Freiheit sind keine Selbstläufer, sondern ein kostbares Gut.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Gunter Czisch', written in a cursive style.

Gunter Czisch

Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Ulm

10 JAHRE EUROPÄISCHE DONAU-AKADEMIE
5 JAHRE DANUBE SCHOOLS

Reinhard Johler

Die Zukunft der Donau. Gemeinsamkeiten und Differenzen im Donauraum als verbindende Potentiale

*Prof. Dr. Reinhard Johler ist stellvertretender Direktor des Ludwig-Uhland-Instituts für Empirische Kulturwissenschaft und wissenschaftlicher Leiter des Instituts für donauschwäbische Geschichte und Landeskunde.
reinhard.johler@uni-tuebingen.de*

Am 24. Juni 2011 hat der Europäische Rat die „EU-Donauraumstrategie“ verabschiedet (Stratenschulte/Setzen 2011). Mit ihr wurde die Bedeutung des Donauraums als einer für die künftige Entwicklung der EU wichtigen Region unterstrichen. Diese umfasst 14 Staaten (EU- und Nicht-EU-Mitglieder) mit einer Bevölkerung von rund 115 Millionen Menschen. Die Donau von ihrem Ursprung in Baden-Württemberg bis zu ihrer Einmündung ins Schwarze Meer ist dabei das „blaue Band“, das diese Großregion verbindet und das die politischen, wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Entwicklungen in der Region wesentlich geprägt hat.

In der Region, die die Donau verbindet, werden mindestens 20 unterschiedliche Gulaschsorten zubereitet, es werden zehn unterschiedliche Computer-Tastaturen verwendet, drei Weltreligionen sind hier zuhause und es wird eine große Zahl von unterschiedlichen Sprachen und Dialekten gesprochen. Der Donauraum ist daher nicht allein als Region von wirtschaftlicher, verkehrstechnischer und ökologischer

Bedeutung zu betrachten, sondern auch als ein historisch geprägter kultureller Kommunikationsraum.

Gewachsene regionale Besonderheiten in diesem politisch geplanten „Europa Danubiana“ (Reinhard o.J.), die ihren kulturellen Ausdruck in unterschiedlichen, sich voneinander abgrenzenden und wiederum eng miteinander verflochtenen Geschichten, Sprachen, Religionen und Mentalitäten finden, erweisen sich bis in die Gegenwart als besonders wirkungsmächtig. Kultur und Geschichte sind damit nicht als bloßes „folkloristisches Beiwerk“ eines neuen ökonomischen Kooperationsraumes aufzufassen, sondern sie stellen vielmehr Kernelemente für das Zusammenleben, für gemeinsames Wirtschaften und soziales Handeln in dieser Region dar.

Diese Vielfalt gilt es daher verstärkt als Potential für die gemeinsame Zukunft entlang der Donau zu entdecken – und zu nutzen. Denn es ist zum einen eben diese enorme Vielfalt, die das Gemeinsame des Donauraums ausmacht. Und zum anderen kann das große Europa der EU in vielfältiger Weise vom „kleinen Europa“ entlang der Donau lernen. Und um eben dieses Lernen im Rahmen der Zivilgesellschaft entlang der Donau – und im Kontext der Donauraumstrategie – soll es in diesem Beitrag gehen. Dabei wird argumentiert, dass erst durch eine intensiv betriebene „kulturelle Alphabetisierung“ – mit anderen Worten: durch den Erwerb eines gemeinsamen Wortschatzes – ein fruchtbares, gegenseitiges Kennenlernen und damit ein produktiver und zukunftsweisender Umgang miteinander möglich sein wird. Gelingt dies aber in nachhaltiger Weise, dann ist der europäische Nutzen vielfältig und hoch. Aber: Dieses Gelingen der Donauraumstrategie ist nicht nur eine Angelegenheit der Politik, sondern noch mehr eine Sache der Zivilgesellschaft und auch der (Kultur)Wissenschaft (Johler 2012). Denn diese müssen „Relaisstationen“

Reinhard Johler:

Die Zukunft der Donau. Gemeinsamkeiten und Differenzen im
Donauraum als verbindende Potentiale

(zum Begriff: Schlögel 2005: 261 ff) des Austausches bauen, um so – auch in Verlängerung von Geschichte in die Gegenwart – aus dem Donauraum einen kulturellen „Raum des Vertrauens“ in Europa zu schaffen. Ein solcher Raum aber bedarf der konkreten Orte des gemeinsamen Handelns und Denkens.

Ulm/Baden-Württemberg

„Von Ulm aus“ – so hat Claudio Magris in seinem „Donau“-Buch geschrieben (Magris 2007: 84) – „fuhren auch auf alten Barkassen, bekannt unter der Bezeichnung ‚Ulmer Schachteln‘, Scharen von Deutschen, die ‚Donauschwaben‘, die sich im Banat angesiedelt und dort über zwei Jahrhunderte – von Maria Theresia bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg – einen grundlegenden, wiewohl ausgelöschten Beitrag zur Kultur des Donauraums geliefert haben. Meine Reise entlang der Donau ist insbesondere eine Reise in das Banat, auf den Spuren einer nunmehr verschwundenen Expansion, die sich vom Exodus des Zweiten Weltkriegs bis in unsere Tage in einem Rückzug, den deutschen Exodus aus Südosteuropa verkehrt hat.“

Damit angesprochen ist zunächst eine über dreihundertjährige, gemeinsame, wenngleich auch konfliktreiche Donau-Geschichte. Denn die ehemaligen deutschen Auswanderer in das alte Königreich Ungarn (u.a. Banat, Sathmar, Ofener Bergland, Schwäbische Türkei, Batschka) – sie wurden erst nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg als „Donauschwaben“ bezeichnet – wurden nach Kriegsende von ihren Heimatstaaten Ungarn, Rumänien und Jugoslawien entweder vertrieben oder sie siedelten in der Folge selber meist unter Zwang wieder nach Deutschland zurück. Diese Geschichte ist daher eine Geschichte von Gewalt (Schlögel 2001), aber

ebenso eine von Migration, Diversität und Erinnerung.¹ Oder anders gesagt: Die Geschichte der Donauschwaben ist auch eine Geschichte eines langandauernden – und z.T. bis heute noch gepflegten – Kulturaustausches im Donauraum, der erst das „Land an der Donau“ (Schödl 2001) geschaffen hat. Zu diesem „Land an der Donau“ gehören alle Anrainerregionen – auch Baden-Württemberg.

Es ist daher richtig, dass Baden-Württemberg – und zwar nicht nur ökonomisch, sondern auch kulturell begründet – in der EU-Donauraumstrategie aktiv ist. Und dies umso mehr, als Ulm nicht nur in dieser gemeinsamen Donau-Geschichte als historische Auswanderungsstadt (Hauke 2012) wichtig war, sondern symbolisch hoch aufgeladen (Beer 2012), sogar zu dem baden-württembergischen Donau-Ort geworden ist, von dem aus die EU-Donauraumstrategie – und somit das gemeinsame Leben an der Donau – nicht nur praktisch, sondern auch visionär gedacht werden kann (Konrad 2008).

Ulm kann daher mit seinen vielfältigen Donau-Aktivitäten und -initiativen zu einer „Relaisstation“ des (südost)europäischen Austausches werden.

Das große EU-Europa und das „kleine Europa“ in Südosteuropa

EU-Europa, das ist allseits bekannt und besprochen, ist in der Krise – ökonomisch, wegen der Währungsturbulenzen, politisch, wegen fehlender demokratischer Legitimation und kulturell, wegen mangelnder

¹ Diversität, Migration und Erinnerung sind auch die Leitbegriffe eines eben in Tübingen begründeten „Zentrums für die Erforschung deutscher Geschichte und Kultur in Südosteuropa“. Dieses Zentrum soll in wissenschaftlicher Manier den hier vorgestellten Überlegungen nachgehen. Es hat seinen Sitz am Institut für donauschwäbische Geschichte und Landeskunde.

Reinhard Johler:

Die Zukunft der Donau. Gemeinsamkeiten und Differenzen im Donauraum als verbindende Potentiale

Identifikation. EU-Europa scheint zu groß, zu unüberblickbar, zu abstrakt, aber auch zu vielfältig zu sein, um seinen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern Orientierung geben zu können. Die EU-Donauraumstrategie – und mit ihr mögliche EU-Erweiterungen in Südosteuropa – scheinen auf den ersten Blick diese Krise nur weiter zu verschärfen. Man kann die EU-Donauraumstrategie aber auch anders sehen: Der Donauraum ist ein geographisch und verkehrstechnisch zusammenhängender, aber durch eine gemeinsame Geschichte auch kulturell nachvollziehbarer und somit konkreter Raum. Er kann daher langfristig zu einem europäischen „Raum des Vertrauens“ wachsen – und er kann so für EU-Europa sogar noch eine besondere Bedeutung erlangen.

Die Geschichte der Europäischen Union kann hier vorausgesetzt werden (Johler 2012). Wichtig ist aber, dass sich diese ab den 1970er Jahren zunehmend zu einem ständig größer werdenden, gemeinsamen Wirtschafts-, dann aber auch Rechts-, Politik- und Kulturraum gewandelt hat. Aus einem Projekt der politischen Eliten ist sie so zu einem Vorhaben der Menschen in Europa geworden. Dies hat aber dazu geführt, dass die Legitimation, ein Stück weit damit auch Identifikation mit Europa beim Bürger gesucht werden musste. Diese Entwicklung hat in den 1980er und 90er Jahren – mit dem Höhepunkt der Unterzeichnung des Maastrichter Vertrages 1992 – zu vielfältigen Programmen geführt, die auf ein „Europa der Bürger“ zielten und dabei die europäische „Unity in Diversity“ betonten (McDonald 1996).

Seither gibt es eine Europahymne und eine Europaflagge, unzählige Programme versuchen Europa zu propagieren, aber eine tatsächlich bestehende, gemeinsame europäische Kultur bzw. eine verbindende europäische Identität ist durch diese Initiativen nicht wirklich entstanden. Im Gegenteil: Die Vielfalt in Europa und die Behauptung lokaler, regionaler

und nationaler Unterschiede scheint im Moment sogar eher noch zuzunehmen.

Kein Wunder daher, dass die EU zur „kulturellen Frage“ Europas seit Jahren keine wirklich neuen Initiativen mehr setzt, und es ist insoweit auch nur verständlich, dass sie ihre Donauraumstrategie technisch-bürokratisch-ökonomisch konzipiert hat – und weitgehend „kulturlos“ projiziert. Dagegen ist aber zu argumentieren, dass eine kulturell aufgefüllte und (kultur)wissenschaftlich begleitete Donauraumstrategie zu einer Problemlösung beitragen könnte. Denn der Donauraum ist in der Vergangenheit – zuerst das alte Ungarn, dann die ganze südost-europäische Region – von vielen Beobachtern wegen seiner kulturellen Vielfalt als das „kleine Europa“ (Csaplovics 1829) bezeichnet worden. – Von diesem „kleinen Europa“ aber und der dort historisch wie auch gegenwärtig so präsenten „Einheit in der Vielfalt“ kann die große EU mit ihrer „Unity in Diversity“ nur lernen (und dann auch profitieren).

Die Donau

Es gehört zu den Königsfragen unter Historikern bzw. Geographen, ob die Geschichte (und somit der Mensch) den Raum oder umgekehrt der Raum (die Geographie also) die Geschichte (und somit die Kultur) bestimmen würde (Cherubin 1897). Auf unseren Punkt gebracht: Schafft die Donau die sie umgebende Kultur oder kreieren erst diese Kulturen langfristig die Bedeutungen und Nutzungsweisen des Flusses? Und konkret weiter gefragt: Trennt die Natur – hier also der Fluss – eher oder verbindet die Donau? Unabhängig von den an dieser Stelle zu gebenden Antworten, kann aber doch dreierlei festgehalten werden: Flüsse haben zum einen eine starke metaphorische Bedeutung, werden sie doch von der Quelle bis zur Mündung gemeinsam gedacht. Zum zweiten wird Flüssen – wie auch

Reinhard Johler:

Die Zukunft der Donau. Gemeinsamkeiten und Differenzen im
Donauraum als verbindende Potentiale

der Donau – eine „Biographie“ (Magris 2007) oder ein „Lebenslauf“ (Trost 1968) zugeschrieben. Und schließlich scheint es offensichtlich, dass Flüsse – wie etwa die Donau, der Rhein (Febvre 1995), die Oder (Schlögel 2010) oder die Wolga (Schlögel 1995) – im Laufe der Geschichte ganz unterschiedliche Realitäten geschaffen haben (Zögner 1993; Guldin 2011).

Für die Donau scheinen mehrere – hier nur kurz zusammen gefasste – Charakteristika zuzutreffen: Die Donau umfasst erstens seit dem Altertum (bis in die Gegenwart) ein Einzugsgebiet, das Raum für die Wanderung und die Begegnung zahlreicher Völker bot. Sie war und ist daher ein klassischer Migrationsraum. Die Donau war deswegen – aus vielerlei Gründen – zweitens so etwas wie ein Experimentierfeld der Geschichte: Sie schuf und vermischte auf ihrem 3000 km langen Weg in vielfältiger Weise Kulturen, Religionen und Völker. Diese Vielfalt förderte drittens ganz unterschiedliche Minderheiten, die z.T. bis in die Gegenwart existieren. Roma und Sinti gehören ebenso dazu wie Juden, Armenier oder die Donauschwaben. Die Donau steht daher viertens im historischen Längsschnitt nicht für klare Grenzen, sondern für Vielfalt und Unterschiedlichkeit. Sie war daher auch lange nicht ein national trennender Fluss (wie etwa der „deutsche“ Rhein), sondern verband dauerhaft kulturelle Pluralität. Die Donau steht so fünftens auch für die Begegnung europäischer Großreiche (Deutschland, Russland, Österreich-Ungarn, Osmanisches Reich). Sie verbindet die Mitte Europas mit dem Osten – und schafft somit erst Mitteleuropa. Und sechstens hat die Donau nie – sieht man einmal von der Donaumonarchie Österreich-Ungarn (1867 bis 1918) ab – zu einer staatlichen Vereinheitlichung geführt. Denn: Die Donau fließt, wie Hölderlin dies einmal festgehalten hat, nach Europa und zugleich darüber hinaus (Reder/Klein 2008).

Beides aber macht die Donau zu einem europäischen Fluss. Sie ist ein großer Wanderungs-, Transport- und Verkehrsraum. Doch gleichzeitig ist ihre Besonderheit, dass sie Pluralität bündelt und entlang ihrer Ufer vielfältige kulturelle Unterschiede präsent sind. Kein Wunder daher, dass die dominante Beschreibungsform der Donau bis heute der Reiseführer mit seiner Betonung der landschaftlichen Schönheiten und der kulturellen Vielfalt insbesondere Südosteuropas ist (Gauß 2010).

Südosteuropa

Historiker, wie etwa der Berliner Südosteuropaforscher Holm Sundhaussen, betonen erhebliche Unterschiede zwischen dem Westen und dem Südosten Europas. Sie verweisen dabei auf Katholizismus und Protestantismus auf der einen und auf die Orthodoxie auf der anderen Seite. Sie betonen die Bedeutung der Aufklärung für den Westen und der langen türkischen Herrschaft für den Südosten Europas. Und sie sehen diese durch eine lange historische Dauer entstandenen Unterschiede im „Eisernen Vorhang“ des 20. Jahrhunderts noch ein weiteres Mal verstärkt.

So sehr diese Sichtweise auch wissenschaftlich umstritten ist (Todorova 1999), lohnt es sie doch – auch weil sie in der europäischen Öffentlichkeit immer wieder behauptet wird – etwas näher zu betrachten. Sundhaussen sieht für Südosteuropa zunächst eine langandauernde Instabilität der Siedlungsverhältnisse und der ethnischen Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung. Der Raum sei zudem geprägt zum einen vom osmanisch-islamischen Erbe, das zu einer ökonomischen Rückständigkeit geführt habe. Zum anderen dominiere in der Region – mit Ausnahme von Kroatien und Ungarn – das byzantinisch-orthodoxe Erbe. Südosteuropa sei darüber hinaus von einer späten Nationsbildung geprägt, was über lange Zeit hindurch politische Instabilität und die Abhängigkeit von den

Großmächten bedeutet habe. Gerade deswegen aber hätten historische Mythen in der Selbstwahrnehmung eine hohe Bedeutung. Und zuletzt würden Mentalitäten bis in die Gegenwart weiterwirken, wie etwa die hohe Bedeutung der Familie, der Verwandtschaft und der informellen Netzwerke.

Natürlich müssten diese Punkte im Einzelnen näher und kritischer betrachtet werden. An dieser Stelle aber reicht es darauf hinzuweisen, dass entlang der Donau mit erheblichen – hier mit Südosteuropa auf den Punkt gebrachten – Differenzen zu rechnen ist. Diese betreffen zuallererst die ökonomische Ungleichheit, aber ebenso etwa die unterschiedliche Bedeutung der Religion, der Familie, des sozialen und politischen Engagements, des Vertrauens in die Verwaltung usw.

Die Betonung der Differenzen sollte aber nicht den Blick auf vielfältige Gemeinsamkeiten und Anpassungsprozesse der Gegenwart etwa im Konsum verdecken (Kaelble 2007). Denn die Menschen sind in Europa in den letzten Jahrzehnten in vielem aufeinander zugegangen, haben begonnen gemeinsame Erfahrungen zu machen. Globalisierung wäre dafür ein Stichwort, Europäisierung ein zweites. Und zunehmend müssen Menschen in Europa mit gemeinsamen Problemen zurechtkommen: mit der ökonomischen Krise, dem Älterwerden der Gesellschaft, mit Umweltproblemen, dem Tourismus, mit der Angst vor dem Fremden, mit Migration.

Der Blick auf Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede sollte allerdings nicht aus dem Auge verlieren, dass das Wohlstandsgefälle – und damit die ökonomischen Entwicklungsunterschiede – im Donauraum erheblich sind. Doch genauso wichtig ist es zu betonen, dass die kulturellen Differenzen entlang der Donau auch Entwicklungspotentiale in beide Richtungen enthalten.

Vom Nutzen von kultureller Vielfalt

Seit einiger Zeit werden – meist angeregt von us-amerikanischen Forschungen – die Potentiale und Chancen untersucht, die kulturelle Vielfalt im globalen Wettbewerb eröffnet. Denn während der „amerikanischen Traum“, wie kürzlich der amerikanische Politikwissenschaftler Jeremy Rifkin argumentiert hat, ein assimilatorischer sei, setze der „europäische Traum“ auf die Anerkennung von und den produktiven Umgang mit kultureller Vielfalt und sei gerade deswegen im globalen Zeitalter besser vernetzbar, will heißen: zukunftsfähiger. Europa könne damit das kulturelle, in Konsequenz aber auch – wenngleich im Moment ein wenig unrealistisch scheinend – das ökonomische Gesellschaftsmodell der Zukunft sein (Rifkin 2004). Denn die erfolgreiche Gestaltung und die Integration von kultureller Vielfalt stellt, so ist dies von Richard Florida im Jahre 2004 in seiner Studie „The Rise of the Creative Class“ belegt worden, einen wichtigen Erfolgsfaktor von Wirtschaftsstandorten weltweit dar. Dabei besäße – so Florida – aber gerade Europa wegen seiner langen Tradition des Umgangs mit kultureller Vielfalt über einen entscheidenden (und im Moment noch gar nicht richtig genutzten) Standortvorteil gegenüber anderen Weltregionen (Florida 2004).

In einer weiteren Studie hat Richard Florida zusammen mit Irene Tingali allerdings eine deutlich skeptischere Bilanz gezogen. Denn auch wenn im internationalen Vergleich der europäische Grad an Toleranz relativ hoch sei, sei doch gleichzeitig die europäische Idee einer „Einheit in der Vielfalt“ im sozialen Alltag der Menschen erst ansatzweise bereits Realität geworden. Damit dies aber geschehe, damit das 21. Jahrhundert „das Jahrhundert Europas“ werden könne, dafür bedarf es nach Florida – auf der privaten, der kommunalen und der staatlichen Ebene – vielfältige Formen des geregelten europäischen Austausches, der kontinuierliche

grenzüberschreitenden Kommunikation und der omnipräsenten (und damit im Alltag geübten) Bereitschaft zum kulturellen Verstehen der Anderen (Florida/Tingali 2006). Und eben darum geht es, wenn ein zivilgesellschaftlicher Nutzen der EU-Donauraumstrategie angesprochen wird.

Die Zivilgesellschaft

„Differenz als Potential“ zu sehen, ist für das im Entstehen begriffene „kosmopolitische Europa“ (Grande 2007) nichts Neues mehr. Es in die Tat umzusetzen, somit ein „Daheim an der Donau“ (Daheim an der Donau 2009) zu schaffen, ist dagegen anspruchsvoller. Denn dafür sind Fähigkeiten nötig, die man mit dem Begriff der „Donau-Mentalität“ zusammenfassen kann. Damit ist gemeint, was der Banater Dichter Róbert Reiter (Franz Liebhard) einmal in einem Interview folgend ausgedrückt hat: „Ich habe gelernt“, so Reiter, „im Sinne von mehreren Völkern zu denken.“ (zit. n. Magris 2007: 344). Der Erwerb dieser Fähigkeit hat im Donauraum Jahrhunderte in Anspruch genommen, ist aber im 20. Jahrhundert weitgehend – aber eben nicht vollständig – wieder verloren gegangen. Heutzutage kann man sich daher auf diese historischen Vermittler – auf „Übersetzer zwischen den Kulturen“ – berufen und somit die Gegenwart an die Vergangenheit anschließen.

Trotzdem müssen in der Gegenwart eigene wissenschaftliche wie zivilgesellschaftliche „Relaisstationen“ des kulturellen Austausches geschaffen werden. Denn das Leben in und mit mehreren Kulturen ist anstrengend, auch überfordernd, aber es funktioniert doch meistens recht gut. Und es funktioniert noch besser, wenn eine verlässliche Infrastruktur, wenn institutionelle Schaltstellen des interkulturellen Austausches bestehen – so wie etwa in Ulm das „Donau-Büro“, die „Europäische

Donau-Akademie", das „Donaufest“, das „Donauschwäbische Zentralmuseum“, und – ganz in der ersten Reihe – die vom ZaWiW organisierten „danube networkers“. Sie alle erst zusammen ermöglichen es gemeinsam mit anderen „Relaisstationen“ entlang der Donau, dass aus dem Potential – aus den Differenzen und den Gemeinsamkeiten im Donauraum – ein konkreter zivilgesellschaftlicher Nutzen für die europäische Gesellschaft entstehen kann.

Zur Umsetzung habe ich den Begriff der „kulturellen Alphabetisierung“ geprägt und damit folgendes gemeint: Die EU-Donauraumstrategie eröffnet für die Bewohner des Donauraums vielfältige, aber erst in die Tat umzusetzende Möglichkeiten. Diese Möglichkeiten sind primär ökonomisch und verkehrstechnisch ausgerichtet, aber sie bestehen ebenso im kulturellen Bereich. Denn nach vielen Jahre der Trennung wird erstmals möglich, den Donauraum von verschiedenen Seiten aus – von der Quelle bis hin zur Mündung – zu „entdecken“. Diese Entdeckung – und auch die daran anschließende „Nutzung“ – aber sollte man nicht ausschließlich den Politikern (der EU und der Nationalstaaten) überlassen. Im Gegenteil: Der Donauraum ist so etwas ein „kleines Europa“ (freilich im Moment am Rande von Europa). Es ins Zentrum zu rücken, ihm somit Geist und Seele einzuhauchen, damit überhaupt erst „Nutzen“ nachhaltig ziehen zu können, bedarf aber der Kultur, der Wissenschaft und der Zivilgesellschaft – und damit der tools des Umgangs miteinander. Diese Werkzeuge ermöglichen einen gemeinsamen Wortschatz und ein verbindendes, auf Neugierde setzendes Verständnis voneinander.

Die Geschichte bietet uns für eine solche „kulturelle Alphabetisierung“ einige Anknüpfungspunkte. Man denke aus deutscher Sicht nur an die Donauschwaben. Noch mehr aber gibt die Geographie uns inhaltliche Vorlagen. Denn die Vorstellung der Donau als verbindendes „blaues Band“

Reinhard Johler:

Die Zukunft der Donau. Gemeinsamkeiten und Differenzen im
Donauraum als verbindende Potentiale

hilft den Donauraum vom Anfang bis zum Ende – eben von der Quelle bis zur Mündung – gemeinsam zu denken. Das Denken aber sollte das angeleitete Erfahren – so wie hier in Ulm – befördern. Und dieses Erfahren wiederum kann hin und wieder zum Handeln Anlass geben. Wenn wir aber soweit sind, dann ist der Donauraum die verbindende Lebenswelt für seine Bewohner und somit ein europäischer „Raum des Vertrauens“ geworden.

Fazit

Der Donauraum ist einerseits von einer unvergleichbaren kulturellen Vielfalt, andererseits von einer enormen ökonomischen und sozialen Ungleichheit geprägt. Ungleichheit bedarf der ökonomischen Entwicklung. Vielfalt dagegen bildet ein erhebliches Potential für die Zukunft. Sie zu verstehen und zu nutzen, muss daher zentraler Gegenstand eines europäischen diversity managements werden. Die „Vielgestaltigkeit Europas“, so hat der Schweizer Schriftsteller Adolf Muschg (2005) argumentiert, mache zwar die politische „Schwäche Europas“ aus, zugleich sieht er im europäischen „Anders- und Verschiedensein“ das „Teuerste“, das unser Kontinent zu bieten habe, ja, es sei eigentlich auch die einzige Vision, die der EU überhaupt noch geblieben sei.

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Ulrich Klemm

Eine Bildungsvision für den Donauraum

Prof. Dr. phil. Ulrich Klemm ist Honorarprofessor für Weiter- und Erwachsenenbildung an der Universität Augsburg und vertrat zwischen 2010 und 2012 die Professur für Kompetenzentwicklung und Lebenslanges Lernen an der Universität Leipzig. Er ist Gründungsmitglied der Europäischen Donau-Akademie gGmbH (EDA) und war ihr Geschäftsführer von 2010 bis 2016. Seit 2013 ist er Geschäftsführer des Sächsischen Volkshochschulverbandes und Vorsitzender des Leipziger Instituts für angewandte Weiterbildungsforschung (LIWF).

Der Internationale Postgraduierten-Studiengang „Master of Danube Studies“

Vorbemerkung: In einem intensiven Planungs- und Kooperationsprozess arbeitete die EDA in den Jahren 2011 bis 2013 zusammen mit verschiedenen universitären und außeruniversitären Partnern im Donauraum an der Realisierung eines postgraduierten Masterstudiengangs „Master of Danube Studies“ (Siehe dazu auch EDITION DONAU Band 6: Ulrich Klemm / Paul F. Langer / Gerhard Mayer (Hg.): Kompetenzentwicklung im Donauraum - Initiative zur Errichtung des Studiengangs Master of Danube Region Studies, Stellenwert und Wirkung (2016)). Letztendlich konnte diese Bildungsvision in diesem Zeitraum jedoch nicht nach dem vorgesehenen Plan umgesetzt werden, was letztlich in einer Änderung der EU-Förderrichtlinien begründet war. Andererseits wurde aber auch deutlich, dass die Idee eines „Master of Danube Studies“ als ein akademisches Qualifizierungsprogramm auf Resonanz stieß und ein Bedarf vorhanden ist. Vor diesem Hintergrund sind

an der Andrásy Universität Budapest, der Universität Wien als auch der Universität für Bodenkultur Wien Masterstudiengänge aufgebaut worden, die sich mit speziellen Aspekten des Donauraums befassen und damit Teile des damaligen Konzeptes umgesetzt haben.

Aus dem anfänglichen Plan zu Einführung eines "Master of Danube Studies" wurde schließlich erstmals 2014 eine „Danube School“ von Gerhard Mayer und Paul F. Langer konzipiert und in Ulm und Neu-Ulm von der EDA umgesetzt, die heute, 2019, in das fünfte Jahr geht. Die Danube Schools haben sich als flexibles und modulares Bildungsformat als passendes Weiterbildungsprogramm für den Donauraum dargestellt.

Im Folgenden soll die ursprüngliche Idee des Masterstudiengangs dargestellt werden, wie sie Anfang der 2010er-Jahre vorgesehen war und wie sie den Grundstein für die Danube School-Reihe legte.

Europa und die Donau

Die EU-Donauraumstrategie ist eine große Chance, Europa konkret für die Bürgerinnen und Bürger erfahrbar zu machen. Durch die Schaffung einer europäischen Makroregion vom Schwarzwald bis zum Schwarzen Meer, durch die bewusste Gestaltung eines Entwicklungsraums entlang der Donau, durch die gemeinsame Bewältigung von Umwelt-, Wirtschafts- und Verkehrsproblemen, durch kulturelle und wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und vor allem durch die Begegnung, den Austausch, die Bildung und Zusammenarbeit der Menschen kann das Gemeinsame betont und entwickelt und europäisches Bewusstsein gebildet werden.

Ziel des von der EDA 2010 erstmals angedachten und konzipierten Projekts war die Entwicklung eines Curriculums für den tertiären Bildungssektor, um Absolventen verschiedener beruflicher Abschlüsse für die Stärkung der wirtschaftlich und politisch miteinander verbundenen

europäischen Makroregion entlang der Donau zu qualifizieren. Es galt, die von der EU-Kommission auf den Donaauraum fokussierten Projekte und Förderprogramme systematisch nutzbar zu machen und den Prozess der Umsetzung der Donaustrategie offensiv zu begleiten. Daraus ergaben sich vielfältige Aufgaben, deren Bewältigung dringend qualifiziertes Personal erforderte. Der Donaauraum war und ist in diesem Sinne ein beispielhaftes Erfahrungsfeld für Völkerverständigung und die Entwicklung einer europäischen Identität.

Projektbeschreibung

Kernziel des Projekts war die Entwicklung und der Aufbau des Postgraduierten-Studiengangs „Master of Danube Studies“ in Zusammenarbeit mit Universitäten aus dem Donaauraum. Ziel war es, jungen Akademikern mit einem ersten universitären oder Fachhochschul-Studium, z.B. mit einem Bachelor-Abschluss, ein weiterführendes Masterprogramm anzubieten, das sich in Theorie und Praxis am Donaauraum orientiert. Es ging darum, eine *endogene Managementkompetenz* in den Donauländern zu generieren, damit *vor Ort* und mit *regionalen Fachleuten* der gesellschaftliche Transformationsprozess geleistet werden kann (Donau-Kompetenzmanagement). Voraussetzung für die Zulassung zum geplanten Studiengang „Master of Danube Studies“ war eine akademische und fachliche Grundausbildung. Darauf aufbauend ging es um Kompetenzen in Management, Kenntnisse der politischen und gesellschaftlichen Strukturen und kulturellen Besonderheiten für unterschiedliche Disziplinen und Berufe in unterschiedlichen Anwendungsfeldern. Der Studiengang sollte für Mediziner ebenso geeignet sein wie für die Fachrichtungen Technik, Naturwissenschaften, Jura oder BWL.

Auf der Basis einer akademischen Grundausbildung sollte ein praxisorientiertes Masterstudium stehen, das die Absolventen befähigen sollte, Projekte in unterschiedlichsten Feldern zu entwickeln und zu leiten. Dazu sind Kompetenzen in folgenden Bereichen notwendig, die in dem Studiengang mit dem akademischen Abschluss „Masters of Arts“ (vier Semester in zwei Jahren als Vollzeitstudium oder berufsbegleitend) vermittelt werden sollten:

- Internationale und europäische Finanzierungsstrategien und -konzepte,
- EU-Recht und nationales Recht,
- Projekt- und Regionalmanagement,
- Neuere Geschichte des Donaoraumes,
- Ökologie und Wasserwirtschaft des Donaoraumes,
- Makroökonomie und wirtschaftliche Verflechtung der Donauanrainerstaaten,
- Kulturgeschichte des Donaoraumes,
- Probleme der Korruption und ethischer Entscheidungen,
- Politische und demokratische Strukturen in Südosteuropa,
- Soziale Netzwerke und gesundheitliche Versorgung im Donaoraum (Public Health),
- Strukturen der Bildung im Donaoraum,
- Naturraum und Tourismus im Donaoraum,
- Migration und Mobilität im Donaoraum,
- Südosteuropäische und internationale Sprachkompetenzen,
- Internationale, transnationale und europäische Entwicklungsstrategien,
- Schlüsselqualifikationen (Verhandlungsstrategien, Soft Skills).

Der Studiengang sollte dazu befähigen, vor Ort Vernetzungen zwischen Politik, Verwaltung, Wirtschaft und der EU-Donaustrategie herzustellen. Einige Beispiele dazu: Aufbau eines Krankenhausmanagements, Aufbau

von Gesundheitsversorgungsstrukturen in Grenzregionen, Erschließung von Gewerbegebieten und Ansiedlung internationaler Firmen, konkrete Projekte an der Schnittstelle zu Politik und Wirtschaft (z.B. Ausbau des Schiffsverkehrs auf der Donau durch Beseitigung von Schiffswracks aus dem II. Weltkrieg); international vernetzte Projekte zur inneren Sicherheit, Erschließung des Donaaraums für regionale Erholung und Tourismus, Aufbau von IT-gestützten Bildungssystemen, Steuerung und Förderung der beruflichen Mobilität, Change Management in vorhandenen Betrieben; Personal- und Organisationsentwicklung in Behörden, Entwicklung von nationalen und internationalen Finanzierungsstrategien für konkrete Projekte. Ziel war es auch, jungen Akademikerinnen und Akademikern aus der Donauregion berufliche Perspektiven in ihren Heimatländern zu ermöglichen und der Abwanderung einer intellektuellen und akademischen Elite entgegenzuwirken.

Der Studiengang wäre länderübergreifend angelegt und stellte für den südosteuropäischen Donaauraum ein Novum dar. Er orientierte sich an den europäischen Standards des Bologna-Prozesses für Universitäten und Hochschulen und hätte in diesem Sinne auch zertifiziert werden müssen. Ein wichtiger Bestandteil des Studiengangs wäre ein Stipendien-System für die Studierenden gewesen. Hier wäre es darum gegangen, sowohl vorhandene nationale als auch EU-Möglichkeiten zu erschließen.

Die erste internationale Kontaktaufnahmen und positive Rückmeldungen erfolgten bereits im 1. Halbjahr 2011 mit dem Institut für den Donaauraum und Mitteleuropa (IDM) Wien, dem Donau-Institut für interdisziplinäre Forschung der Andrassy-Universität Budapest (Ungarn), der Universität Novi Sad (Serbien), der Universität "Angel Kanchev" Ruse (Bulgarien) und dem World Trade Institute Bukarest (Rumänien). Die Leistungen der Europäischen Donau-Akademie lagen dabei in vier Bereichen:

1. Entwicklung einer ersten Arbeitsgrundlage für
Rahmencurriculum, Studienordnung, Prüfungsordnung,
2. Vernetzung der Partner entlang der Donau,
3. Realisierung der Startphase entlang der Donau,
4. Beitrag zur Gestaltung eines vernetzten europäischen
Hochschulraumes an der Schnittstelle des Bologna-Prozesses
und der EU-Donaauraumstrategie.

Verlauf des vorgesehenen Studiums

1. Semester	2. Semester	3. Semester	4. Semester
1 Standort	2-3 Standorte zur Auswahl (z.B. Passau, Ruse)	Praxissemester (im Donaauraum) + Pflichtblockver- anstaltung in Brüssel	1 Standort
Grundmodule + Fremdsprache	Vertiefungsmodule je nach Fachrichtung (Kultur/Wirtschaft/ Verwaltung/Politik/ Technik) + Fremdsprache	Praktikum + Blockveranstaltung in Brüssel + Blockseminar Wissenschaftliches Arbeiten	Kompetenzmodule „Soft Skills“ z.B. Konflikt- management Teamarbeit Verhandlungs- strategien
Am Ende: Ent- scheidung über Fachrichtung	Am Ende: Anmeldung Praktikum	Am Ende: Anmeldung Masterarbeit + Praktikumsbericht	Masterarbeit

Peter Langer

10 Jahre Europäische Donau-Akademie

***Peter Langer** ist Kulturmanager und Dozent. Er gründete und leitete das Ulmer Kulturzentrum ROXY, das Internationalen Donaufest und das Donaubüro Ulm/Neu-Ulm. Er ist Mitgründer der Europäischen Donau-Akademie, deren Leiter für internationale Zusammenarbeit und arbeitet an verschiedenen Projekten im Rahmen der EU-Strategie für den Donauraum. 2017 wurde er Gastprofessor an der Wirtschaftsuniversität Bukarest.*

Die Europäische Donau-Akademie (EDA) arbeitet seit über zehn Jahren erfolgreich an der Zusammenarbeit in Wissenschaft, Kultur, Bildung und Politik im Donauraum. Mit ihrem Netzwerk und ihren Projekten trägt sie zur Völkerverständigung mit den südosteuropäischen Ländern bei und fördert damit den europäischen Integrationsprozess.

Die Europäische Donau-Akademie entwickelt und koordiniert Projekte und Studienangebote in Zusammenarbeit mit wissenschaftlichen und kulturellen Institutionen - insbesondere Universitäten und Hochschulen - in den Donauländern und organisiert Fachtagungen und Konferenzen - auch im Auftrag Dritter. Diese Aufgaben stehen im Zusammenhang mit den Donau-Aktivitäten der Städte Ulm und Neu-Ulm und der Donauraumstrategie der Europäischen Union (EUSDR) und finden in der Regel in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Rat der Donaustädte und -regionen (RDSR), der Stadt Ulm, dem Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kunst Baden-Württemberg, der Baden-Württemberg Stiftung sowie weiteren privaten und öffentlichen Partnern statt.

Die EDA wurde am 5. Juli 2008 im Rahmen des 6. Internationalen Donaufestes in Ulm gegründet; 2010 erhielt sie die Rechtsform einer gemeinnützigen GmbH. Gesellschafter sind 17 Ulmer und Neu-Ulmer Persönlichkeiten aus Politik, Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und Kultur.

Die EDA versteht sich im Rahmen der EU-Donauraumstrategie als bürgerschaftliche Nicht-Regierungsorganisation (NGO) und arbeitet überwiegend projektorientiert.

Projekte und Vorhaben

1. Danube Schools

Eines der zentralen Themen der EDA ist die **Förderung und Qualifizierung von angehenden Führungskräften sowie des wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchses im Donauraum**. Die EDA hat deshalb in Kooperation mit Hochschulen in Ulm und Neu-Ulm und Universitäten entlang der Donau (Krems, Budapest, Novi Sad, Ruse) ein wissenschaftliches Netzwerk aufgebaut, in dessen Rahmen eine jährliche **"Danube School"** für Studierende und junge Wissenschaftler aus den Donauländern in Ulm und in Illertissen (Hochschulzentrum Vöhlinschloss) stattfindet. Geleitet wird sie von Prof. Gerhard Mayer (Hochschule Neu-Ulm) und Paul F. Langer MSc; Dozenten sind renommierte Professoren verschiedener Fachrichtungen und "Donau-Experten". Die "Danube Summer School" dient der Förderung und Qualifizierung des wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchses im Hinblick auf Managementkompetenzen - eine zentrale Aufgabenstellung im Rahmen der EU-Donauraumstrategie. Sie versteht sich als qualifizierter Beitrag gegen den "Braindrain", die immer noch vorherrschende Abwanderung der jungen Eliten aus den südosteuropäischen Donauländern und eines der zentralen Themen der EU-Strategie für den Donauraum.

Die "Danube Summer School" hat sich seit inzwischen fünf Jahren zu einem Vorzeige-Projekt mit großem Zuspruch aus dem Donaauraum entwickelt. Inzwischen haben sich auch erfolgreiche Nachfolge- und Partner-Institutionen gefunden: die "Danube Winter School" des "Danube Area Research Centers" in Novi Sad, die "Sommeruniversität" an der Andássy-Universität Budapest und die Donaauraum-Tagung in Ruse gemeinsam mit der "Angel Kanchev" Universität Ruse und der NGO „European Initiatives without Limits“.

Insbesondere dieser Bereich - die projektorientierte Ausbildung und Vernetzung des wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchses aus den Donauländern - soll im Rahmen der Weiterentwicklung und Verstetigung der Ulmer und Neu-Ulmer Donauaktivitäten ausgebaut werden.

2. Integration und Förderung der Roma

Die Integration und Förderung der Roma-Gemeinschaften ist eine der größten Herausforderungen in den südosteuropäischen Donauländern und eine zentrale Aufgabe der EU-Strategie für den Donaauraum. Etwa 80% der 12 Millionen europäischen Roma leben in Rumänien, Bulgarien, der Slowakei, Ungarn und Serbien - vor allem in den ärmeren und entlegeneren Gebieten - unter z.T. immer noch menschenunwürdigen Verhältnissen und mehr oder weniger offen diskriminiert. Durch die Armutsmigration sind auch die Regionen an der oberen Donau wie Baden-Württemberg davon betroffen. Im Grundsatz geht es auch darum, die Ursachen dieser Migration langfristig durch eine Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse der Roma in den Herkunftsländern zu bekämpfen.

Die Europäische Donau-Akademie hat 2015 unter dem Titel "**DUNA ROMANI LUMA (Die Welt der Roma an der Donau)**" ein mehrteiliges Roma-Inklusionsprogramm auf den Weg gebracht: ein langfristig angelegtes interkulturelles und intergenerationelles Bildungsprojekt, das

mehrere Maßnahmenbereiche integriert und bisher erfolgreich durchgeführt wurde. Dabei geht es im Kern um lebensbegleitende Kompetenzentwicklung und damit verbunden um Formen des Dialogs zwischen Roma und Nicht-Roma. Finanziert wird das Projekt vom Staatsministerium Baden-Württemberg; weitere Partner sind u.a. der Rat der Donaustädte und -regionen, die Baden-Württemberg Stiftung und die Stadt Ulm. Ziel ist der Aufbau einer nachhaltigen Projektplattform zur Förderung von Ausbildung und Beschäftigung der Roma-Gemeinschaften.

Im Rahmen dieses Projektes fand 2017 ein erfolgreiches Schüleraustausch-Programm zwischen dem Gandhi-Gymnasium in Pécs/Ungarn und dem Anna-Essinger-Gymnasium in Ulm statt; für 2018ff ist eine Fortführung und Ausweitung des Programms vorgesehen.

2017 wurde unter Leitung der EDA an der Andrassy-Universität in Budapest eine Fachkonferenz "Suche nach Zukunft - Zur Situation der Roma im Donauraum" durchgeführt, die der Vernetzung und Entwicklung von gemeinsamen Strategien lokaler und zivilgesellschaftlicher Roma-Initiativen im Donauraum diente. Damit verbunden war ein Wettbewerb für Roma-Projekte; unter 43 Bewerbern wurden fünf Projekte aus Ungarn, Serbien, Kroatien, Rumänien und Bulgarien ausgezeichnet.

Im Rahmen des Projekts wurde auch die Initiative "Hilfe für Kinder in Osteuropa e.V. (BuKi)" im rumänischen Cidreag unterstützt; dort werden Roma-Kindern eine tägliche Bleibe, gesunde Ernährung und pädagogische Betreuung angeboten, womit sichergestellt wird, dass die Kinder motiviert sind, auch zur Schule zu gehen, und die Eltern von der Sinnhaftigkeit des Schulbesuchs ihrer Kinder überzeugt werden. (www.dunaromaniluma.eu).

In den Jahren 2018/19 wird dieses Projekt unter der Bezeichnung "DunaRomaLuma 2.0" - gefördert durch das Staatsministerium Baden-

Württemberg - fortgesetzt. Mit Fokus auf den kulturellen Dialog zwischen Roma und Nicht-Roma zum Abbau von Vorurteilen sind unter anderem Roma-Kulturtage im September 2019 in Ulm geplant.

3. Die historische Kulturentwicklung im Donaauraum

"Geburt der Weltkultur an Donau" ist eine von der EDA entwickelte Wanderausstellung zur herausragenden archäologischen Bedeutung des Donaaraums für die Besiedelung Europas. Dazu gehören beispielsweise auch die Funde im Lone- und Achtal in der Region Ulm wie der "Löwenmensch". Eine zentrale Zielgruppe dieser Wanderausstellung sind junge Menschen.

Diese Projekt-Ausstellung, die in Zusammenarbeit mit internationalen Wissenschaftlern und der Universität Ulm unter Leitung von Prof. Dr. Harald Traue entstand, wurde bisher in Novi Sad, Wien, Regensburg und Ulm gezeigt.

Weitere Ausstellungen sind 2019 in Ruse (Bulgarien) und Bukarest geplant. Die aktive Vermarktung von "Geburt der Weltkultur an Donau" wird fortgesetzt.

4. Die Danube Culture Platform

"Danube Culture Platform: A new spirit for cultural cooperation in the Danube Region" ist ein Projekt im Rahmen der EU-Donaauraumstrategie und dient der Entwicklung, Vernetzung und Finanzierung einzelner kultureller Vorhaben im Donaauraum. Es wird mit einem Gesamtvolumen von 1,6 Mio € aus dem "Danube-Program" (INTERREG V B) finanziert. Schwerpunkte sind die Förderung des künstlerischen Nachwuchses und der Roma-Kultur. Partner der EDA sind das Bundeskanzleramt der Republik Österreich (Abt. für Internationale Kulturbeziehungen), das Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und

Kunst Baden-Württemberg (MWK) und das Danube Cultural Cluster mit Sitz in Wien; die EDA ist im Auftrag des MWK baden-württembergischer Partner für das Projektmanagement. In diesem Zusammenhang lud die EDA am 8. Dezember 2017 zu einer Stakeholderkonferenz nach Ulm ein, an der baden-württembergische Kulturschaffende und -institutionen, die sich im Donauraum engagieren, und Partner aus den Donauländern teilnahmen. Im Rahmen des Projektes fand die 7. Internationale Donau-Kulturkonferenz vom 7. bis 9. Juni 2018 in Linz / Oberösterreich statt. 2019 sind weitere Veranstaltungen, Workshops und Netzwerktreffen vorgesehen - so auch die nächste Donau-Kulturkonferenz in Regensburg. Die Kulturplattform wird in einem separaten Beitrag in dieser Publikation vorgestellt.

5. "Brücken Bilden!"

Im Rahmen des 11. Internationalen Donaufestes 2018 und aus Anlaß des fünften Jahrs der Danube School-Reihe und des zehnjährigen Bestehens der Europäischen Donau-Akademie fand am 12. Juli 2018 unter dem Titel **"Brücken Bilden!"** eine gemeinsame Veranstaltung mit der Baden-Württemberg Stiftung in Ulm statt. Hier trafen sich Vertreter der Universitäten in Tübingen, Budapest und Novi Sad, der Partnerinstitutionen der EDA und "Donau-Akteure" zu einem Dialog über Probleme und Chancen der wissenschaftlichen, kulturellen und politischen Zusammenarbeit im Donauraum.

6. "Das Blaue Sofa"

Wiedererstarkender Nationalismus, Rechtspopulismus, Flüchtlingskrise und die Zukunft der jungen Generation - das gemeinsame europäische Projekt steht zurzeit gerade auch im Donauraum vor einer großen Herausforderung. In Erinnerung an das legendäre "Rote Sofa" im ROXY und in Anknüpfung an "Pulse of Europe" hat die Europäische Donau-

Akademie in Zusammenarbeit mit der Europa-Union unter dem Titel "**Das Blaue Sofa**" im Ulmer Kulturzentrum ROXY in Ulm eine Veranstaltungsreihe zu europapolitischen Themen gestartet, die 2018/19 fortgesetzt wird. Eingeladen werden bekannte Persönlichkeiten aus Politik, Kultur und Gesellschaft, befragt von renommierten Europa-Experten und Journalisten. Den Anfang machte EU-Kommissar Günther Oettinger gemeinsam mit dem Ulmer OB a.D. Ivo Gönner.

Die Europäische Donau-Akademie leistet einen nachhaltigen Beitrag, um Ulm/Neu-Ulm durch Synergien der Institutionen und Initiativen vor Ort und in Kooperation mit den Partnerstädten, -regionen und -institutionen entlang der Donau dauerhaft als Zentrum für wissenschaftliche und kulturelle Kompetenz, Projektentwicklung und soziale Innovation im Donauraum zu etablieren. Damit dient die EDA auch der Förderung des regionalen Wirtschafts-, Bildungs- und Wissenschaftsraumes. Diese Arbeit wird die EDA auch 2019 und in den folgenden Jahren engagiert fortsetzen.

Tanja Salzmann-ReiBer

Projektförderung im Donauraum

Tanja Salzmann-ReiBer ist Lehrbeauftragte und Doktorandin am Ludwig-Uhland-Institut für Empirische Kulturwissenschaft und arbeitet freiberuflich als Projektreferentin für die Danube Schools bei der Europäischen Donau-Akademie in Ulm. t.salzmann-reisser@danubeschools.eu

Die Donauraumstrategie

Die Donauraumstrategie wurde als eine der makroregionalen Strategien der Europäischen Union von der Europäischen Kommission erarbeitet und vom Europäischen Rat im Juni 2011 gebilligt. Mit dieser „European Strategy for the Danube Region“ (EUSDR) soll die grenzüberschreitende, bi- und multilaterale sowie transnationale Zusammenarbeit von Akteuren im Donauraum in vier Themenfeldern (die sich in insgesamt 11 Schwerpunktbereiche aufgliedern) gestärkt werden, um so durch Projekte den Donauraum und damit auch die EU voran zu bringen. Eine wichtige Grundlage der Strategie sind die drei NO's: für die Umsetzung der Strategie sollten keine zusätzlichen EU-Gelder bereitgestellt werden, keine zusätzlichen EU-Rechtsvorschriften erlassen werden und keine zusätzlichen EU-Strukturen entstehen. Zur Förderung von Donauprojekten gibt es demnach im Rahmen der Strategie keine neuen EU-Mittel, vielmehr sind projektverantwortliche Akteure auf bestehende EU-Mittel, nationale, regionale oder lokale Zuschüsse oder weitere private oder öffentliche Quellen als Fördermittel angewiesen (vgl. Setzen 2013, S. 5ff, S. 17). Denn „in Zeiten knapper Kassen ist ein besseres Kosten-

Nutzen-Verhältnis wichtig. Der makroregionale Ansatz hilft bei der Koordinierung von EU-Programmen, so dass diese zusammen auf wichtige gemeinsame Ziele hinarbeiten. Das Fehlen zusätzlicher EU-Mittel zwingt die Projektträger zu einer aktiveren Suche nach Mitteln." (Europäische Kommission 2013, S. 6).

EU-Förderung

Die Implementierung der EUSDR 2011 fiel in die vorherige EU-Förderperiode von 2007-2013. Dieser Zeitpunkt in der Mitte des Finanzierungszeitraums machte eine „Kohärenz mit bestehenden Maßnahmen und Programmen zuweilen problematisch" (Europäische Kommission 2013, S. 8). Zwar gibt es auch in der darauffolgenden, aktuellen EU-Förderperiode von 2014 bis 2020 keinen neuen EU-Fördertopf zur Umsetzung der EU-Donauraumstrategie. Doch gab es erfolgreiche Bestrebungen, bereits bestehende Förderprogramme in der neuen Förderperiode gezielt auf den Donauraum auszurichten und auch die Ziele der Förderprogramme und der EUSDR in Einklang zu bringen. „Dies gilt vor allem für das Programm INTERREG B. Dort wurde der alte Programmförderraum Südosteuropa um Bayern und Baden-Württemberg erweitert, so dass seitdem der Donauraum der EUSDR 1:1 deckungsgleich ist mit dem neuen INTERREG B-Förderraum Südosteuropa, der seitdem 'Donauraum' heißt. Auch die nationalen operationellen Programme im Rahmen der Struktur- und Kohäsionsfonds der EU haben in der neuen Förderperiode vielerorts stärkeren Bezug auf die Ziele der EUSDR genommen" (Homepage Donauraumstrategie).

So berichtet die Europäische Kommission am 16. Dezember 2016 an das Europäische Parlament, den Rat, den europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss und den Ausschuss der Regionen zur Durchführung makroregionaler Strategien der EU: „In Anbetracht des Grundsatzes 'keine

neue EU-Gesetzgebung, keine neue EU-Finanzierung und keine neuen EU-Institutionen' passen MRS in bestehende Initiativen sowie in den politischen Handlungsrahmen der EU (z.B. TEN V¹). Sie bedürfen spezifischer Maßnahmen statt neuer politischer Initiativen. Sie können über Programme im Rahmen der europäischen Struktur- und Investitionsfonds (ESI-Fonds), einschließlich Interreg, unterstützt werden. Zudem sollten weitere Finanzierungsinstrumente der EU auf gemeinsame Ziele ausgerichtet werden." (Brüssel 2016, S. 2 f.).

Die Führungsposition in der Koordination und Überwachung der makroregionalen Strategien (MRS) der EU liegt bei der Europäischen Kommission. Der Erfolg einer Makroregion hingegen hängt von den „initiatives and projects that produce tangible results“ (Kaiser 2011, S. 59) ab, also von Akteuren unterhalb der EU-Ebene, die auf Projektgelder angewiesen sind.

Was bedeutet dies konkret für Akteure und Projektideen in der Praxis? Und worin besteht der Mehrwert makroregionaler Strategien, die keine gesonderten Gelder für Projekte bereitstellen, vielmehr bestehende Fördermöglichkeiten bündeln und zugleich die nationalen, regionalen und lokalen Ebenen stärker in die Verantwortung nimmt?

Zivilgesellschaftliche Projekte

Projekte, insbesondere solche aus dem zivilgesellschaftlichen Bereich, sind sehr häufig an eine begrenzte Projektfinanzierung gebunden. Dies gilt zwar auch für größere Kooperationsprojekte, beispielsweise zwischen verschiedenen Universitäten, zwischen Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft oder für eine öffentlich-private Partnerschaft als Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem öffentlichen Sektor und privatwirtschaftlichen Unternehmen. Diese

¹ Transeuropäischen Verkehrsnetze (TEN-V)

verfügen jedoch im Gegensatz zu den meisten Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs) über eine beträchtlich höhere Planungssicherheit, da Personal, Infrastruktur und Startkapital bereits durch bestehende Strukturen und Finanzierungen gedeckt sind. Für kleinere NGOs und zivilgesellschaftliche Initiativen gilt dies so nicht, sie agieren nicht selten zunächst auf ehrenamtlicher Basis, um dann, wenn Fördergelder vorhanden sind, auch Mitarbeitende finanzieren zu können. Dies in Vorleistung zu erbringen ist eine Herausforderung, insbesondere dann, wenn Nichtregierungsorganisationen auf keine Unterstützung geschweige denn eine strukturelle oder finanzielle Förderung durch den jeweiligen Staat oder das Bundesland zurückgreifen können. Viele Mitarbeitende von NGOs sind zudem in Teilzeit oder rein ehrenamtlich in der jeweiligen NGO tätig und haben, vor allem wenn es sich um ehrenamtliches Engagement handelt, häufig keine professionelle Ausbildung hinsichtlich NGO-Management, Finanzmittelakquise oder Verwaltung.

Interreg V

Das bereits kurz erwähnte Programm Interreg V ist eines der wichtigen EU-Förderprojekte für Akteure im Donauraum. „Interreg, oder wie es offiziell heißt, die 'europäische territoriale Zusammenarbeit', ist Teil der Struktur- und Investitionspolitik der Europäischen Union. Seit mehr als 20 Jahren werden damit grenzüberschreitende Kooperationen zwischen Regionen und Städten unterstützt, die das tägliche Leben beeinflussen, zum Beispiel im Verkehr, beim Arbeitsmarkt und im Umweltschutz" (Homepage Interreg. Was ist Interreg)

Es wird dabei in drei Schwerpunkten umgesetzt, Ausrichtung A beinhaltet die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit (Weiterentwicklung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Zusammenarbeit in benachbarten

Grenzregionen), Ausrichtung C die interregionale Zusammenarbeit (Kooperationsnetze und Erfahrungsaustausch, um die Wirksamkeit bestehender Instrumente für Regionalentwicklung und Kohäsion zu verbessern) und die für Akteure im Donauraum hauptsächlich relevante Ausrichtung B, die transnationale Zusammenarbeit als Zusammenarbeit zwischen nationalen, regionalen und kommunalen Partnern in transnationalen Kooperationsräumen, um die territoriale Integration dieser Räume zu erhöhen (vgl. Homepage Interreg. Was ist Interreg). „Die Erfahrung zeigt“, so die Europäische Kommission in ihrem Bericht aus der letzten Förderperiode, „dass Programme der Europäischen Territorialen Zusammenarbeit die wichtigste Finanzierungsquelle sind“ (Europäische Kommission 2013, S. 9).

Im EU-Förderlotsen des Ministeriums für Finanzen und Wirtschaft Baden-Württemberg, herausgegeben zu Beginn der aktuellen Förderperiode, findet sich neben Interreg eine Aufstellung verschiedener weiterer EU-Programme, die für die Wirtschaftsunternehmen in Baden-Württemberg relevant sind. Dabei wird von Erfahrungs- und Durchschnittswerten aus der Förderperiode 2006-2013 sowie den ersten Aufrufen der aktuellen Förderperiode ausgegangen. Vorgestellt werden die drei soeben skizzierten Programme Interreg V A und Interreg V B, sowie Horizont 2020, das KMU-Instrument sowie Eurostars 2, wobei die letzteren drei nur für kleine und mittelständische Unternehmen (KMU) relevant sind. Die Dauer allein für die Antragsvorbereitung wird für Projekte in Interreg B je nach Erfahrung der antragstellenden Akteure mit ca. 6–12 Monaten veranschlagt (vgl. Ministerium für Finanzen und Wirtschaft Baden-Württemberg 2014, S. 22). Diese Vorleistung von 6-12 Monaten erfolgt ohne jegliche Sicherheiten bezüglich einer möglichen Projektförderung. Zu diesem Risiko der Ablehnung eines Antrages kommt die Menge an Eigenmitteln: „Insgesamt stehen bis zum Jahr 2020 ca. 202 Millionen Euro EU-Fördermittel für den Donauraum zur Verfügung. Um EU-Fördermittel

zu erhalten, müssen von Antragstellern 15% der gesamten Projektkosten getragen werden. Gefördert werden u.a. Personalkosten, Veranstaltungskosten, Reisekosten, Investitionen." (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung im Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung 2014, S. 6 f.).

Zwar gibt es die Möglichkeit für antragstellende Leadpartner, ihre unbezahlte Vorbereitungszeit sowie die Eigenmittelfinanzierung durch das Bundesprogramm „Transnationale Zusammenarbeit“ bezuschussen zu lassen. „Das Bundesprogramm richtet sich an deutsche Projektpartner in der transnationalen Zusammenarbeit aus allen sechs Interreg B-Programmen mit deutscher Beteiligung. Die geförderten Vorhaben müssen sich mit Themen beschäftigen, die für den Bund von besonderem Interesse sind. Eine weitere Voraussetzung ist, dass die Projekte dabei mit integrierten Ansätzen der Raumordnung arbeiten. Nicht ein spezieller Themenbereich, sondern die nachhaltige Entwicklung von Regionen muss im Vordergrund stehen." (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung, 2016, S. 2). Nichtregierungsorganisationen gehören in diesem Bundesprogramm Transnationale Zusammenarbeit zur Zielgruppe, wenn auch nicht zur Hauptzielgruppe: „Prinzipiell sind alle Organisationen mit Sitz in Deutschland förderfähig. Hauptzielgruppe der Förderung sind Behörden, Einrichtungen des öffentlichen Rechts sowie Einrichtungen in öffentlicher Trägerschaft („public-equivalent bodies“). Im Einzelfall kann auch eine Förderung privater juristischer Personen wie z.B. Verbände, Vereine und Unternehmen erfolgen". (Bundesministerium des Inneren, für Bau und Heimat 2018, S. 6).

Johanna Specker vom Danube Contact Point in Stuttgart ergänzt, dass auch die Interreg Programme bei einer erfolgreichen Projektauswahl eine Pauschale für die Vorbereitungskosten bieten, die nach dem ersten Report ausbezahlt wird. Im Danube Transnational Programme beläuft sich diese

Pauschale, so Specker, auf 17.500 EUR für das gesamte Projektkonsortium. (vgl. Emailkorrespondenz Specker, 04.01.2019).

Diese kurze Einführung in mögliche Projektfinanzierung auf Europäischer Ebene zeigt, dass diese Projektanträge Kompetenz und Qualifizierung erfordern. Das zeigt sich auch an Daten zur Antragstellung bei Interreg B Projekten im Donauraum. Betrachtet man beispielsweise die Ergebnisse des zweiten Aufrufs zur Projektantragsstellung, dessen Ergebnisse im Frühjahr 2018 veröffentlicht worden waren, zeigt sich folgendes Ergebnis: „Concerning the partners, 250 institutions are involved in the 22 approved projects. Romania, with 35 partner institutions; Hungary with 32 and Serbia with 26 institutions: are the countries of origin with the highest number of partner institutions. In regard to the Lead Partners, Slovenia (6), Hungary (5) and Germany (4) are the countries gathering more partner institutions leading the projects. According to the Call regulations, the LP can only be chosen among the ERDF partners (EU member states).“ (Homepage Interreg: 22 projects approved with conditions in the 2nd call). Leadpartner sind in der Regel jeweils größere Institutionen mit personellen Kapazitäten. Sie dürfen keine gewinnorientierten oder privatwirtschaftlichen Institutionen sein, müssen aus einem der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten stammen und haben in vielen Fällen auch bereits Erfahrung mit Interreg Projekten. (Vgl: Homepage Interreg: List of approved projects 2nd call, DTP Managing Authority/Joint Secretariat 2018, S. 8 f.).

Aus diesen Zahlen lassen sich, so Specker, keine grundlegenden Schlussfolgerungen über Bekanntheit und Erfolg des Programms in den einzelnen Ländern ableiten. In Bulgarien, Ungarn und Rumänien gibt es beispielsweise „eine automatische staatliche Finanzierung des Eigenanteils von 15%, was zu einer höheren Zahl an Anträgen führen kann. Deutschland wiederum hat im Vergleich zu anderen Ländern nicht sehr

viele Antragssteller in absoluten Zahlen, jedoch ist die Bewilligungsquote relativ hoch. Dies kann u.a. auch daran liegen, dass wir die Antragssteller auch inhaltlich sehr eng in der Phase der Antragsstellung begleiten (können). Dies kann in anderen Ländern durchaus auch anders gehandhabt werden." (Emailkorrespondenz Specker, 04.01.2019).

Lokale Förderstrukturen

Für Nichtregierungsorganisationen in Deutschland bleiben noch andere Fördermöglichkeiten offen. Für gemeinnützige Einrichtungen aus Baden-Württemberg beispielsweise das Programm „Perspektive Donau: Bildung, Kultur und Zivilgesellschaft“ der Baden-Württemberg Stiftung, das nachhaltige Projekte im Donauraum fördert (Homepage Baden-Württemberg Stiftung: Perspektive Donau: Bildung, Kultur und Zivilgesellschaft). Der Zugang zum Förderprogramm ist dabei deutlich niedrigschwelliger als bei Interreg B, sind hier doch explizit Organisationen aus dem gemeinnützigen Bereich und nicht aus Wirtschaft und hochrangiger Forschung angesprochen - allerdings ausschließlich aus Baden-Württemberg.

Ebenfalls in Baden-Württemberg gibt es die Möglichkeit, beim Staatsministerium Gelder zu beantragen. „Die Zusammenarbeit im Donauraum ist einer der Schwerpunkte der Landesregierung in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit. Um die in der EU-Donauraumstrategie angestrebten Ziele und Aktionen durch konkrete Maßnahmen und Projekte zu verwirklichen, stellt Baden-Württemberg 2018 590.000 Euro zur Verfügung“, verkündete die Staatsministerin. Die Fördergelder setzen sich zusammen aus den regulären 500.000 Euro Projektmitteln des Staatsministeriums sowie 90.000 Euro an Fraktionsmitteln. 'Wie 2017, bilden auch 2018 Maßnahmen des sogenannten Capacity Building – also Maßnahmen zur Erhöhung der Problemlösungskompetenz – einen

Schwerpunkt unserer Förderung', so Schopper." (Homepage Staatsministerium Baden-Württemberg).

Förderprogramme ohne speziellen Donaubezug

Es bleiben noch weitere Fördermöglichkeiten, die meist nicht den Schwerpunkt Donau haben, sondern eher breiter gefächerte Förderprogramme sind, in denen sich Projekte im Donaauraum thematisch unterbringen lassen. Eine Möglichkeit insbesondere für Projekte im Bereich Jugend, Bildung und Sport ist das Programm ERASMUS+ der Europäischen Union.

„In Erasmus+ werden die bisherigen EU-Programme für lebenslanges Lernen, Jugend und Sport sowie die europäischen Kooperationsprogramme im Hochschulbereich zusammengefasst. Erasmus+ ist mit einem Budget in Höhe von rund 14,8 Mrd. Euro ausgestattet. Mehr als vier Millionen Menschen werden bis 2020 von den EU-Mitteln profitieren. Das auf sieben Jahre ausgelegte Programm soll Kompetenzen und Beschäftigungsfähigkeit verbessern und die Modernisierung der Systeme der allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung und der Kinder- und Jugendhilfe voranbringen." (Homepage Erasmus+). Auch hier sind die Zugangsbarrieren niedriger und eine Antragstellung ist aus allen Ländern der EU möglich, zudem sind im Programm auch alle Länder des Donaauraums als sogenannte benachbarte Partnerländer vertreten (vgl. Homepage Europäische Kommission. Erasmus+ Programme Guide).

Schulen und außerschulische Bildungsträger haben zudem die Möglichkeit, sich im Bereich Internationaler Jugendaustausch bei Europeans for Peace, angesiedelt bei der Stiftung EVZ, zu bewerben. Auch hier handelt es sich allerdings nicht um ein donauraumspezifisches Programm, vielmehr können Projekte aus Mittel-, Ost-, Südosteuropa, Israel und Deutschland gefördert werden. (vgl. Homepage Stiftung

Erinnerung Verantwortung Zukunft. Europeans for Peace). Universitäten, Hochschulen und außeruniversitäre Einrichtungen wie Forschungsinstitute und Bildungseinrichtungen können im Jahr 2019 zudem Mittel beim Bundesinstitut für Kultur und Geschichte der Deutschen im östlichen Europa im Programm "Vielstimmige Erinnerung - gemeinsames Erbe - europäische Zukunft: Kultur und Geschichte der Deutschen und ihrer Nachbarn im östlichen Europa" beantragen (vgl. Bundesinstitut für Kultur und Geschichte der Deutschen im östlichen Europa). Weitere Fördermöglichkeiten sind Ministerien wie das für Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kunst Baden-Württemberg oder verschiedenen Stiftungen. Auch hier handelt es sich nicht um explizite Förderprogramme für Projekte im Donauraum, weshalb diese hier nur kurz erwähnt werden und keine vollständige Übersicht darstellen.

Fazit

Im Vergleich zur ersten Förderperiode von 2007-2013, in der die EUSDR implementiert wurde, wurden wie dargestellt in der zweiten aktuellen Förderperiode erhebliche Verbesserungen hinsichtlich einer Projektförderung im Donauraum durchgeführt. Dennoch ergeben sich zwei Handlungsstränge für ein noch effektiveres Nutzen bereitgestellter Fördermittel im Donauraum.

Zum einen ist es von zentraler Bedeutung, dass Mitarbeitende in NGOs und zivilgesellschaftlichen Initiativen und Strukturen, aber auch in der Verwaltung des öffentlichen Sektors, Wissen und Kenntnisse über ein Fördermanagement erwerben und sich fortbilden. Ansätze hierzu könnten Formate wie die Danube School-Reihe sein, in der bestimmte Förderprogramme, wie 2018 das Danube Transnational Programme als ein INTERREG V B Programm, vorgestellt und Zugänge und Voraussetzungen erläutert werden. Darüber hinaus lernen die Teilnehmenden in den

Summer Schools, wie Projektmanagement von der Idee bis zur Budgetplanung eines internationalen Donauprojektes funktionieren kann. Beides sind erste Ansätze, die die Teilnehmenden in ihren Fähigkeiten, leichter an Projektfördermittel zu kommen, unterstützen können.

Der zweite Handlungsansatz betrifft die Förderprogramme selbst. Neben den transnationalen Förderprogrammen gibt es in den verschiedenen Donauländern zusätzliche nationale Förderprogramme, die ebenfalls zur (Teil-)Finanzierung von Projekten im Donauraum geeignet wären, die jedoch in keiner Übersicht dargestellt werden und vielen Akteuren und Organisationen nicht bekannt sind. Diese müssten transparenter kommuniziert werden.

Sehr begrüßenswert ist es hingegen, dass es im zentralen Förderprogramm für den Donauraum, dem Danube Transnational Programme, Beratungs- und Informationsangebote gibt, wie beispielsweise den Danube Contact Point, in dem deutsche Programminteressierte informiert und beraten werden. Zudem gibt es verschiedene Workshops zur Antragstellung in verschiedenen Städten entlang der Donau, wie im Dezember 2018 in Bukarest, Prag und Stuttgart und im Januar 2019 in Bratislava. Dennoch zeigt sich deutlich, dass insbesondere für zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen aus dem NGO Sektor auch über die Grenzen Baden-Württembergs hinaus mehr niedrigschwelligere Fördermöglichkeiten geschaffen werden müssten. Es bleibt zu hoffen, dass sich dies in der neuen Förderperiode 2021-2027 widerspiegeln wird. Denn nur, wenn sich die Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten der Europäischen Strategie für den Donauraum auch für den zivilgesellschaftlichen Bereich verbessern, wird auch auf dieser Ebene eine nachhaltige Kooperation möglich sein. Und auch nur so ist ein Erfolg der Donauraumstrategie in der Europäischen Union möglich.

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Márton Méhes und Paul F. Langer

CultPlatForm_21

Dr. Márton Méhes (Wien), ehem. Kulturdiplomat, internationaler Kulturmanager und Berater; managt im Auftrag des MWK Baden-Württemberg und der EDA das INTERREG-Projekt „Kulturplattform Donaauraum“

Paul F. Langer (Mannheim), arbeitet als wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Deutschen Universität für Verwaltungswissenschaften in Speyer und managt gemeinsam mit Márton Méhes im Auftrag des MWK Baden-Württemberg und der EDA das INTERREG-Projekt „Kulturplattform Donaauraum“

Im Rahmen des ersten Calls des INTERREG Donauprogramms entstand das Projekt „Kulturplattform Donaauraum“ (Kürzel: CultPlatForm_21) mit dem kulturell-touristischen Ziel, kulturelle Angebote durch Donaauraumkooperation zu unterstützen und zu erweitern. Das Augenmerk richtet sich darauf, verborgenes kulturelles Erbe neu zu entdecken und historische Orte und Ereignisse mit Hilfe zeitgenössischer Kunst und neuer Technologien einem internationalen Publikum zu vermitteln. Das ehrgeizige, von der EU finanzierte Projekt steht unter dem Motto „Kulturplattform Donaauraum – Kreative Orte des 21. Jahrhunderts“.

Im Laufe der Geschichte hat der Donaauraum eine wechselvolle Vergangenheit durchlebt. Damit entstand eine kulturhistorisch reiche, aber fragmentierte Identität. Die Donauregion hat den Untergang der Imperien, Tragödien der Menschheit wie den Ersten und Zweiten

Weltkrieg, schreckliche Verbrechen wie den Holocaust und den Krieg auf dem Balkan erlebt. Zwei politische und wirtschaftliche Systeme haben zu deutlichen territorialen Ungleichgewichten beigetragen. Unser Kulturerbe ist das teils unsichtbare Zeugnis davon. Ziel des CultPlatForm_21-Projekts ist es nun, touristische Routen so zu erweitern, dass dieses reiche kulturelle Erbe sichtbar wird.

Das Projekt baut auf eine Zusammenarbeit von Kultur und Tourismus. Im Rahmen der internationalen Kooperation werden kultur-historische Orte definiert und Strategien für Europäische Kulturrouten im Donauraum basierend auf dem Thema „Hidden Heritage“ entwickelt. Das Europäische Institut für Kulturrouten ist ein wichtiger strategischer Partner, neue oder wiederentdeckte Orte können mit bestehenden Routen verlinkt werden. Der Interpretation dieser „verborgenen Orte“ kommt besondere Bedeutung zu. Das Projekt arbeitet an der zeitgemäßen Vermittlung historischer Orte und Ereignisse und der Erfahrung von Kultur im Donauraum. Damit wurde das Projekt auch von der Europäischen Kommission als Projekt zur Kultur- und/ oder Kreativwirtschaft für das Europäische Jahr des Kulturerbes 2018 ausgezeichnet. Das Projekt wird vom österreichischen Bundeskanzleramt – Sektion Kunst und Kultur als Lead-Partner geleitet.

Das Projekt in Zahlen

- 2.857 km Donau mit 10.000 Jahre Geschichte
- 8 involvierte Länder
- 9 Partner & 10 assoziierte Partner
- Stakeholder aus allen 14 Ländern der Europäischen Donauraumstrategie

- 16 Städte: Luxemburg, Stuttgart, Ulm, Regensburg, Linz, Wien, Ljubljana, Dunakeszi, Budapest, Pécs, Novi Sad, Belgrad, Drobeta Turnu Severin, Bukarest, Vidin und Sofia
- 2,5 Jahre Laufzeit → 30 Monate
- 5 Arbeitspakete
- Zahlreiche Arbeitsmeetings, Newsletter, Pressemitteilungen, Poster
- 7 Workshops und 5 Konferenzen
- 140 verborgene Kulturerbestätten
- 15 spezielle Themen für die verborgenen Kulturerbestätten an der Donau
- 9 Pilotprojekte
- Zahlreiche involvierte KünstlerInnen, ExpertInnen, StudentInnen und Interessenten aus den Donauländern
- 1,6 Mio. Euro Gesamtbudget, 85% von der EU kofinanziert

Hidden Heritage Hot Spots

Der wohl spannendste Punkt des Projekts ist, unentdeckte Kulturerbestätten („hidden heritage hot spots“) und historische Ereignisse entlang der Donau zu erforschen und mit künstlerischen Mitteln zu visualisieren. Kunst - Kultur - Tourismus: Diese drei Begriffe bilden eine enge Definition der Eckpfeiler des Projekts. Die europäische Geschichte bildet das Fundament. Die kulturellen Spuren mit ihren bekannten und noch zu entdeckenden, verborgenen oder auch zerstörten Orten werden zu neuen Kulturrouten verbunden. Mit dem Europäischen Institut für Kulturrouten ist es dem Projekt gelungen, einen renommierten und strategisch wichtigen Partner zu gewinnen.

Die Studie „Mapping of places of history“ bildete die wissenschaftliche Grundlage des Projekts. Es beinhaltet eine Kartierung von Kulturrouten und interessanten historischen Orten mit wichtigen Daten. Das Banner der Pilotprojekte der Kulturplattform Donau lautet „Heritage reloaded“: Im

Fokus stehen Hightech und digitale Visualisierung, aber auch zeitgenössische Kunst und klassische Ausstellungsformate, die mit Film oder Animation angereichert werden können. Da die versteckten Kulturstätten ein Schwerpunkt des Projekts sind, erscheint das Konzept der Sichtbarmachung des Unsichtbaren besonders relevant.

Was bedeutet in diesem Zusammenhang unsichtbar? Es geht um Orte, die unbekannt sind, weil sie sich unter der Erdoberfläche befinden, zerstört oder aus politischen oder gesellschaftlichen Gründen unterdrückt werden.

Diese Orte, wie z.B. ein römisches Badehaus in Oberösterreich oder die verfallene Synagoge von Vidin in Bulgarien, werden durch 3D-Visualisierungen digital rekonstruiert oder durch künstlerische Interpretation neu belebt. Andere wiederum werden mit Hilfe von künstlerischen Interventionen sichtbar gemacht und gleichzeitig auch interpretiert, wie z.B. die interaktive Installation des einstigen Schwarzen Turms in Regensburg. Im Rahmen des kollaborativen Pilotprojekts Studio DAHD (Danube Artistic Heritage Development) arbeiteten 6 Projektpartner, sowie ProfessorInnen und Studierende der Kunstakademien Ludwigsburg (Baden-Württemberg), Linz und Novi Sad zusammen. Das Ziel war, im Rahmen einer donauweiten Kooperation und bei ständigem Austausch unbekanntes materielles wie immaterielles Kulturerbe zu identifizieren und Konzepte für die Sichtbarmachung zu erstellen. So werden – um nur eines der spannenden Beispiele zu nennen – unkonventionelle Museen und Sammlungen gezeigt (das Golfmuseum in Regensburg, das Dachshund-Museum in Passau, das Pharmazie- und das Flippermuseum in Bratislava oder das Zahnmuseum in Linz), die in traditionellen Reiseführern kaum zu finden sind, da sie das kulturelle Erbe aus einer speziellen Perspektive aufbereiten.

Das EU-Projekt „Kulturplattform Donaauraum“ läuft seit Beginn des Jahres 2017 und wird seinen Abschluss bei der Kulturkonferenz in Regensburg im Mai 2019 finden. Auf dieser Projektkonferenz werden alle Ergebnisse zusammengefasst und neue Modelle für innovative Kulturprojekte im Donaauraum vorgestellt.

Die Rolle der Europäischen Donau-Akademie besteht darin, operativ und beratend dem Baden-Württembergischen Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kunst zur Seite zu stehen. Dabei wurden von Seiten der EDA – in steter Zusammenarbeit mit den lokalen Partnern – die Kulturkonferenzen in Pécs, Linz und Regensburg inhaltlich konzipiert, Aktivitäten in Baden-Württemberg organisiert und schließlich ein Konzept für ein Kleinprojektfonds entwickelt, der künftig niedrigschwellig und effizient Kulturprojekte im Donaauraum finanzieren soll.

Website

<http://www.interreg-danube.eu/approved-projects/cultplatform-21>

Partner

Name	Type	Land
Bundeskanzleramt Österreich, Sektion II: Kunst und Kultur	Lead partner	Österreich
Kulturabteilung des Landes Oberösterreich, vertreten durch die OÖ Landesmuseen und das OÖ Kulturquartier Linz	ERDF partner	Österreich

Name	Type	Land
Kulturministerium der Republik Bulgarien	ERDF partner	Bulgarien
Tourismusministerium der Republik Bulgarien	ERDF partner	Bulgarien
Stadt Regensburg	ERDF partner	Deutschland
Zsolnay Heritage Management Non-Profit Ltd.	ERDF partner	Ungarn
Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kunst Baden-Württemberg	ERDF partner	Deutschland
Ministerium für Kultur und nationale Identität Rumäniens	ERDF partner	Rumänien
Danube Competence Center	IPA partner	Serbien
Academy of Arts Novi Sad, University of Novi Sad	Associated partner	Serbien
Gemeinde Vidin	Associated partner	Bulgarien

Name	Type	Land
Hungarian Limes Association	Associated partner	Ungarn
Akademie Schloss Solitude	Associated partner	Deutschland
Ministerium für Kultur und Medien der Republik Serbien	Associated partner	Serbien
Europäisches Institut für Kulturrouten	Associated partner	Luxemburg
WGD Donau Oberösterreich Tourismus GmbH	Associated partner	Österreich
Danube Cultural Cluster – Verein für die engere kulturelle Zusammenarbeit der Donauländer	Associated partner	Österreich
Cultural Network Lower Austria	Associated partner	Österreich
Kulturnetzwerk Niederösterreich	Associated partner	Slowenien

Gerhard Mayer

5 Jahre Danube Schools - ein zentraler Baustein der EDA-Strategie

Prof. Gerhard Mayer ist Leiter und Mitbegründer der Danube School-Reihe und Akademieratsvorsitzender der Europäischen Donau-Akademie. Seit 1980 ist er Geschäftsführer eines mittelständigen Familienunternehmens.

Zwei Ereignisse im Jahr 2018 im Raum Ulm bieten Anlass, die Entwicklung der Donauaktivitäten auf dem Bildungssektor im letzten Jahrzehnt näher zu betrachten:

2008 wurde im Rahmen des Donaufestes die Europäische Donau-Akademie (EDA) gegründet, ein Ereignis, das während des Donaufestes 2018 mit einer Jubiläumsfeier und vielfältigem Tagungsprogramm festlich begangen wurde. Im selben Jahr 2018 fand die 2014 ins Leben gerufene Danube School- Reihe der EDA ihre 5. Auflage.

Haben beide Ereignisse zunächst keinen unmittelbaren Zusammenhang, so wird doch schnell deutlich, dass beide Jubiläen eng verknüpft sind: Ohne die Trägerschaft der EDA wären die Danube Schools der letzten Jahre nicht umsetzbar gewesen. Umgekehrt gilt aber auch, dass mit der Danube School-Reihe ein Vorhaben eingelöst wurde, das schon in der Gründungsphase der EDA zentral war, nämlich, ein Netzwerk und einen Austausch von Hochschulen im Donauraum zu schaffen, mit der

Gerhard Mayer:

5 Jahre Danube Schools - ein zentraler Baustein der EDA-Strategie

Zielsetzung, ein donauraumspezifisches Studien- und akademisches Weiterbildungsangebot zu entwickeln.

Die vier Ideengeber der Gründungsphase der EDA – neben den Repräsentanten der Stadt Ulm, unter deren Regie dann das Projekt umgesetzt wurde – verfolgten von Beginn an ein ambitioniertes Bildungskonzept:

Neben Prof. Dr. Harald C. Traue, Donaubeauftragter der Universität Ulm, und Peter Langer, langjähriger Leiter des Ulmer Donaufestes, die bereits im Rahmen früherer Donaufeste Symposien und wissenschaftliche Tagungen veranstaltet hatten, waren mit Jürgen Dangel, dem damaligen Vorsitzenden des Hochschulrates und Senator der Hochschule Ulm, und Prof. Gerhard Mayer, seinerzeit Hochschulratsvorsitzender der Hochschule Neu-Ulm, gut vernetzte Initiatoren der Hochschullandschaft Ulm/Neu-Ulm in das Projekt eingebunden.



Dieses Quartett hat zusammen mit OB Ivo Gönner und Kämmerer Gunter Czisch die Donau-Akademie angeschoben (v. l.): der frühere Dasa-Chef Jürgen Dangel, der Neu-Ulmer Unternehmer und Hochschullehrer Professor Gerhard Mayer, der Ulmer Uni-Professor Harald Traue, Donaubiuro-Leiter Peter Langer. FOTO: MARIA MÜSSIG

Quelle: Südwest Presse Ulm 22.3.2017

Das war wichtig, galt es doch an hochschulpolitische Voraussetzungen und Gegebenheiten im Raum Ulm/Neu-Ulm anzuknüpfen. So hatten beispielsweise die Hochschulen Ulm und Neu-Ulm in Absprache mit der regionalen Wirtschaft gerade ein Cluster und gemeinsames

Studienkonzept Logistik entwickelt. Eine Idee war nun, die Forschung über innovative Logistikkonzepte im Donauraum zu einem wissenschaftlichen Schwerpunktthema dieses Fachbereiches auszubauen. Dafür wurden seinerzeit von Seiten des bayerischen Wissenschaftsministeriums nicht unerhebliche Mittel für ein Forschungsprojekt an der Hochschule Neu-Ulm zur Verfügung gestellt.

Der neugegründeten EDA war die Aufgabe zugedacht, Wissenschaftlern unterschiedlicher Forschungsgebiete relevantes Wissen zur historischen und aktuellen Entwicklung der einzelnen Donauländer zu Verfügung zu stellen und länderübergreifende Kontakte zu fördern. Insbesondere sollte der Austausch zwischen Universitäten im Donauraum angeregt werden.

Von Beginn an und über all die Jahre, konnte sich die EDA dabei auf zwei namhafte Unterstützer verlassen: Neben der Baden-Württemberg Stiftung, vertreten durch deren Geschäftsführer Christoph Dahl, sowie den Fachbereichsleiter Dr. Weber, war dies das Ludwig-Uhland-Institut (LUI) für empirische Kulturwissen an der Universität Tübingen in Person dessen Leiters, Prof. Dr. Reinhold Johler. Ohne die wissenschaftliche und finanzielle Begleitung der Programme durch diese beiden verlässlichen baden-württembergischen Partner, wären die im letzten Jahrzehnt umgesetzten Projekte, insbesondere die Danube School-Reihe, nicht umsetzbar gewesen.

Mit der Verabschiedung der Donauraumstrategie im Jahr 2011 durch die Europäische Union und verstärkt durch das Programm „Perspektive Donau“ der BW-Stiftung im Jahr 2014 war es von Seiten der EDA folgerichtig und konsequent, ein innovatives, donauraumspezifisches Studienangebot zu entwickeln. Zielsetzung war von Beginn an, qualifizierte Nachwuchskräfte für die Umsetzung der EU-Donauraumstrategie auszubilden. Dieses zentrale Anliegen wurde auch

Gerhard Mayer:

5 Jahre Danube Schools - ein zentraler Baustein der EDA-Strategie

seitens wichtiger Repräsentanten der Europäischen Union formuliert, da für die Umsetzung von EU-Förderprogrammen auf gut ausgebildete, mit den EU-Richtlinien vertraute junge Führungskräfte zurückgriffen werden muss.

War zunächst von Seiten der EDA an die Etablierung eines Masterstudienganges für Danube Studies an unterschiedlichen, renommierten Universitäten im Donauraum gedacht, so hat sich in der Folge gezeigt, dass ein modular aufgebautes Studienangebot von Danube Schools eine weit breitere und bessere Resonanz finden würde, als ein zweijähriges Vollzeitstudium. Dies vor allen Dingen auch deshalb, da so eine weit höhere Anzahl an Studierenden weiterqualifiziert werden konnte. Darüber hinaus verfügte die überwiegende Anzahl der Interessenten für donauraumspezifische Weiterbildungsangebote bereits über einen Master-Studienabschluss und war an einem weiteren Vollzeitstudium nicht interessiert. Aus diesem Grund wurde durch das spätere Leitungsteam der Danube School-Reihe (Prof. G. Mayer, Paul F. Langer, M.Sc.) entschieden, ein zentrales Modul des angedachten Studienganges – die Danube Summer School – als eigenständiges Format anzubieten.



Teilnehmer der ersten Danube Summer School 2014 in Ulm/Neu-Ulm

Die erste im September 2014 im Raum Ulm angebotene Danube School wurde begeistert aufgenommen. Aus dem Kreis der daran teilnehmenden

23 Studierenden gründete sich unmittelbar im Nachgang zur Veranstaltung eine Initiative von Absolventen und Absolventinnen aus Novi Sad, mit dem Ziel, ein der Danube School in Ulm vergleichbares Angebot in Serbien zu realisieren. Die von dieser Gruppe gegründete Organisation DAREC richtete in Kooperation mit der Universität Novi Sad bereits im Folgejahr eine wissenschaftliche Tagung zu donauräum-relevanten Themen aus und organisiert seit 2016 eine jährliche Danube School in Serbien.

Mit einer jeweils in den Sommermonaten stattfindenden Summer University hat die Andrassy Universität Budapest seit 2016 ein eigenständiges Projekt aufgelegt, das im Jahr 2018 ebenfalls im Rahmen der Danube School-Reihe angeboten wurde.

Erstmals im Herbst 2018 kam auch in Ruse, Bulgarien in Kooperation mit der Universität Ruse und dem BRIE-Institut ein Symposium der Danube School-Reihe zur Durchführung. Auch diese Initiative ging von Studierenden der Danube School in Ulm aus. Ein weiterer Beweis dafür, dass wichtige Impulse von den Veranstaltungen angestoßen wurden.

Als Resümee der dargestellten Entwicklung der Danube School-Reihe über die letzten Jahre lässt sich zusammenfassend festhalten:

Im Zeitraum 2014 – 2018 wurden im Raum Ulm, Budapest und Novi Sad 10 vergleichbare Veranstaltungen der Danube School Reihe abgehalten. Insgesamt haben weit über 200 Studierende aus allen Donauländern und angrenzenden Regionen – einige zwei- und sogar dreifach - an Danube Schools teilgenommen. In den Gruppen wurde informiert, diskutiert, gelegentlich auch sehr kontrovers gestritten, über Politik, die Bedeutung der Religionen, über Tendenzen und Entwicklungen im Donauraum, über den „brain drain“, die Perspektiven junger hochqualifizierter Nachwuchskräfte. In länderübergreifenden Arbeitsgruppen haben die

Gerhard Mayer:

5 Jahre Danube Schools - ein zentraler Baustein der EDA-Strategie

Studierenden anspruchsvolle Projektideen entwickelt und im Nachgang der Danube Schools teilweise schon begonnen, diese umzusetzen: Touristik- und Jugendaustauschprojekte, Kontaktbörsen, Buchideen, Initiativen für den Erhalt des kulturellen Erbes und vieles mehr.

Einige der TeilnehmerInnen der Danube Schools haben eine darauf aufbauende berufliche Perspektive gefunden, in geförderten Donauprojekten oder auch in Ministerien der Donauländer. Die Ergebnisse der Danube Schools wurden detailliert in fünf Publikationen im Rahmen der von der Europäischen Donau-Akademie herausgegebenen EDITION DONAU (Bände 5 bis 8 und 10) dokumentiert. Neben dem Programmablauf der Danube Schools sind dort die Veranstaltungsinhalte dargestellt und zahlreiche Beiträge der Referenten, Teilnehmer und Veranstalter zu finden.



Autorenteam zu Band 8 der EDA-Reihe EDITION DONAU

Im Verlauf der fünf Jahre wurde das Grundkonzept für die Danube School weiterentwickelt und verfeinert. Wesentliche Qualitätskriterien dieser Veranstaltungsreihe wurden herausgearbeitet und benannt. (siehe dazu: Beitrag „Was eine Danube School ausmacht“; EDITION DONAU; Band 8, S.12-17)

Eine Besonderheit der Danube School-Reihe liegt in der Verknüpfung eines wissenschaftlich geprägten Teils mit einem intensiven Meinungsaustausch unter Einbeziehung von politischen Akteuren der Donaunraumstrategie. Dabei spielt ebenso die Auseinandersetzung mit globalen Wirtschaftsraumkonzepten und den EU-Förderprogrammen eine zentrale Rolle, wie auch die Umsetzung von Initiativen und Projekten in speziell ausgewählten Regionen und Ländern.

Bei den zwischenzeitlich gewonnenen Erfahrungen und organisatorischen Standards war das Format einer Danube School immer offen für Anpassungen und Veränderungen. Um dies auch für die Zukunft zu garantieren, wurde im Rahmen der bereits zitierten Jubiläumsveranstaltung am 12.7.2018 in Ulm ein Beirat zur Danube School-Reihe gegründet (Anlage), der sich zur Aufgabe gesetzt hat, die Danube School-Reihe gemäß den Erfordernissen im Donaunraum und vor dem Hintergrund der zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel fortzuführen und weiterzuentwickeln.

Ein besonderer Dank gilt an dieser Stelle den Beiräten und Unterzeichnern der Beschlussfassung über die Errichtung eines Beirates, für deren persönliches Engagement und die Bereitschaft, wichtige Ressourcen und das Renommee ihrer Universitäten einzubringen, um die im Rahmen der Danube School-Reihe gewachsenen und erfolgreichen Kooperationen fortzusetzen und ein Zeichen für das Zusammenwachsen des Donaunraumes und damit auch der Europäischen Union zu setzen.

Gerhard Mayer:
5 Jahre Danube Schools - ein zentraler Baustein der EDA-Strategie



*Vortrag des Ulmer Oberbürgermeisters Gunter Czisch;
BRÜCKEN BILDEN! Jubiläumsveranstaltung,
12. Juli 2018, Sparkassenforum Ulm*

Paul F. Langer

The DS Series - A Best Practice Case for Modular Education Programs in Macro-Regional Cooperation

*Paul F. Langer is researcher at the German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer, Germany and co-founder of the Danube School Series.
paul.langer@donauakademie.eu*

Among the EU's four macro-regional strategies, the strategy for the Danube region is particularly heterogeneous in terms of income, culture, EU membership and, last but not least, political positioning, e.g. on the refugee issue. In our experience, however, there are also many similarities and a strong interest in exchange between the people along the Danube. In view of the current scepticism about the EU - not only in "old" and comparatively wealthy member states, but especially in "young" EU countries - commonalities, common values and possibly a common identity must first be found and/or made aware. The Danube Region has overcome the multitude of major conflicts in its recent history, not least because of its common location in Europe. This realization seems to be less and less present. In this respect, it is all the more important to revive this knowledge and to tackle the issue of nationalism and xenophobia, especially in the difficult border regions of the Balkans and Ukraine, rather than sitting out and keeping quiet.

There are also some very concrete challenges that the Danube region has in common:

Paul F. Langer:

The DS Series - A Best Practice Case for Modular Education Programs in Macro-Regional Cooperation

1. Brain drain - the migration movement to the West: Many young and well-educated people from regions of the lower Danube have left their homeland or are still interested in working in regions in the upper Danube basin. At the same time, the upper Danube Region, mostly Austria and Germany benefit from the immigrating labour force.
2. Demographic change is having a strong impact on all regions in the Danube basin. In regions with an emigrating society and hardly any immigration, the consequences are even more drastic.
3. Institutional weakness: The absorption rate of EU funding is still far below the potential in the countries of the lower Danube. There is a considerable lack of institutional capacity to apply for and administer EU funds.
4. Strengthening of national and identitarian movements: In many countries of the Danube region, nationalistic movements are gaining strength. In Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia and Bulgaria (as well as in other Danube countries), such parties are active in parliaments and partly in government, thus shaping the political agenda and jurisdiction.
5. Our experience to date has shown that many people still do not see the Danube Region as a common region and also see the Danube as a border between their countries.

The Danube School Series takes up these common challenges with young academics and potential future decision-makers in order to discuss reasons, results and potential solutions. This is done initially with learning and discussion units, but also practically with the development and design of own projects and media publications.

The Danube School Series qualifies and sensitises students and young professionals from the entire Danube region with workshops and lectures on the many special aspects, challenges and opportunities in the region. In terms of content, the Danube Schools provide the basis for stimulating

thought processes, finding solutions and developing project ideas themselves, in particular through contributions from teachers from partner universities of the European Danube Academy (EDA). The Danube Schools are thus deliberately not "only" classical educational and networking events, but also workshops that train and support the participants as project developers.

Reference to the EU Strategy for the Danube Region

The Danube Schools relate to most topics and priorities of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR). Creation of prosperity, exchange in science and education, good governance, environment, culture and infrastructure. The EUSDR includes investment in education and skills, research and innovation and the targeted promotion of networking initiatives. A particular focus lies on poverty reduction and job creation, which is also part of the content of the Danube School series. With regard to the priority topic of "good governance", solutions are to be identified and implemented through the exchange of experience on good administrative practice and the fight against corruption. Finally, environmental protection is to be strengthened and modern infrastructure built up. The project workshop of the Danube School series is particularly important here, as practical projects are designed and partly implemented accordingly.

Target group

The aim is to reach students and young professionals with an interest in the development of the Danube region, especially those in postgraduate programs (age group 20-30 years, heterogeneous study background, participants from all Danube countries).

Paul F. Langer:

The DS Series - A Best Practice Case for Modular Education Programs in Macro-Regional Cooperation

This target group is addressed, as these can be considered the future decision-makers in the Danube region. In the various positions - whether in public or private institutions - they are to promote Danube cooperation in the sense of European values. In particular, the opportunities, challenges and responsibilities in the Danube region are to be worked out during the schools. One of the aims is to keep these "young potentials" in the Danube Region by showing them opportunities for self-realization in the Danube Region through European cooperation (program against the "brain drain"). The selection procedure is designed to enable the widest possible variety and range of participants. In this context, it is desirable to include participants from minority or migrant backgrounds in order to reflect and integrate their perspectives in discussions and project work.

In the past, the participants presented themselves as adaptable, flexible, intelligent and curious - which was certainly due to the careful selection. In principle, one can assume that the participants have a rather liberal, open, tolerant and European attitude compared to the respective average in the country of origin - the expected ability to speak English well alone is often already an indication of interest in international topics. Despite the openness described above, there are always minor conflicts over political issues. In 2017, for instance, there were participants from Eastern Ukraine and Western Ukraine who had very different opinions about the political situation in their country and therefore did not want to cooperate to jointly present their country. In the past years there have been similar situations with Kosovars and Serbs, Bosnians from different population groups etc. These small conflicts authentically reflect the situation of the Danube region and can also be discussed during the Danube Schools in a neutral place. Political differences of opinion regarding the integration of minorities (Roma, homosexuals, and refugees) are also part of the political reality and are intensively discussed during the schools.

In addition to the political conflicts, the challenges faced by the target group are certainly marked by dissatisfaction with the situation in their own country (corruption, unemployment, low incomes and emigration of the elites). The participants themselves are often confronted with the dilemma that they themselves have less income opportunities in their own environment than in nearby European countries, but at the same time do not want to leave their own homeland. This topic is taken up and discussed in detail in all Danube Schools. Nevertheless, the participants usually do not belong to a particularly disadvantaged group of people in their own country. The students are privileged in many respects in their countries and see this as a challenge as their own country does not offer them and their peers, friends and family sufficient opportunities or inadequate infrastructure; and they do not wish to be associated with these structural challenges.

The Danube School series offers a whole range of networking and training opportunities for participants. First, the "Young Potentials" are networked internationally. This networking creates a Danube region-wide network of young potential decision-makers, which has already led to various joint cross-border projects (e.g. the HOPE event in Ruse, Bulgaria, held for the first time in 2018). The Danube Schools give the participants (also through the project workshop) the opportunity to tackle their own and the country-specific challenges by networking during the school and get to know best practice projects and funding opportunities. In addition, the often-intangible problems are concretized, discussed in detail and solutions developed.

The Danube School series is consciously aimed at the "young potentials" of the Danube region. These individuals are of particular importance in their further work, as they can be a counterweight in a region characterized by brain drain, low birth rates and nationalistic structures.

Paul F. Langer:

The DS Series - A Best Practice Case for Modular Education Programs in Macro-Regional Cooperation

The region needs well-trained, networked and regionally responsible decision-makers. Many of the "young potentials" are unaware of the Danube macro-region and only become aware of this region, its connections and its potentials through the Danube Schools. With the Danube Schools, a network of future Danube Leaders is created who are aware of the manifold opportunities in the Danube region and who know the local challenges and want to solve them. Through their involvement, the participants also become ambassadors of the Danube Region, because they know the context, belong to the network and feel responsible for this region. Thus, in addition to concrete work on projects that help the Danube Region, they also create a network for the region and strengthen the political and cultural identity in this important European region.

Other actors (external target group)

Participants and Danube School alumni are ambassadors and multipliers of the idea of a common and well-connected Danube Region. They not only strengthen the Danube region by implementing projects in their professional careers, but also involve other participants. Thus, there is a multiplier effect on people who have not been involved before. In addition, there are a number of events aimed directly at external audiences. In particular, the political events within the Danube Schools should be mentioned, which are opened to external audiences. It should also be mentioned that the informal political exchange during the political days is also an important platform. The press and media are also important channels for informing society in the cities of the schools about the work and thus also about the challenges and opportunities in the Danube region. Another multiplication medium to be mentioned are the publications that give non-participants the opportunity to learn from the results of the Danube School series. At last, speakers and lecturers of the

participating universities are counted as important actors of multiplication as they spread knowledge and awareness for the Danube School goals within their universities and institutions.

Relevance of the objectives for the direct target group

In the past seven Danube Schools (five in Ulm, four in Novi Sad, three in Budapest, and one in Ruse / Bucharest) we first received feedback in evaluation talks as well as in online evaluation, which we also use for the corresponding follow-up projects. It has already become clear that the project workshop and the identification of project financing play a particularly important role. In addition, there are political issues that are of particular interest and controversial discussion. The Danube Schools are planned according to these interests as well as current challenges. In addition, the interests of the target groups are already being examined during the application process. The adaptation of the programme with regard to the preferences of the target group ensures that relevant topics are dealt with. The projects are then aligned with these topics and thus initiate the relevant changes.

Long-term changes in the direct target group

The participants improve their intercultural and communication skills within the framework of their participation. Furthermore, they acquire knowledge about the Danube basin and build up a sustainable network of like-minded people. A special feature of Danube Schools is their focus on project planning. During the Danube Schools the participants work on projects that address very concrete challenges of the Danube Region. The participants are trained in project management, budget planning and ideation concepts. Following the Danube School, the participants have the skills to better solve problems in their country with the help of the

Paul F. Langer:

The DS Series - A Best Practice Case for Modular Education Programs in Macro-Regional Cooperation

structures now known in the Danube Region and the methods learned. Also, the contentwise argument with the challenges in their countries helps the participants much more specifically to understand and change the Danube region in their scientific and vocational life.

Project results

First of all, it should be mentioned that the Danube School Initiative emerged from the idea of a Danube Region Master's programme, which was introduced at some universities in a similar format to that envisaged by the EDA in 2013. The Danube School series, however, has proved to be a flexible and interdisciplinary format, as it is more suited to mobile, flexible and often time-stressed academics than a protracted university course and can network a wide range of different people from the Danube region. Thus, there are also the many and substantial results of the 12 predecessor meetings

- Danube Summer School 2014 in Ulm
- Danube International Seminar 2015 in Novi Sad
- Danube Summer School 2015 in Ulm
- Danube Winter School 2016 in Novi Sad
- Summer University 2016 in Budapest
- Danube Summer School 2016 in Ulm
- Danube Spring School 2017 in Novi Sad
- Summer University 2017 in Budapest
- Danube Summer School 2017 in Ulm
- Danube International Weekend 2018 in Novi Sad
- Summer University 2018 in Budapest
- Danube School 2018 in Ulm
- Danube International Seminar 2018 in Ruse

Probably the most important result is the emergence of a Danube Region-wide network, which also meets after the events, continues to network and

jointly take the Danube Region as a region. In addition to this important general result, however, there are also concrete results that can be presented: The Danube Summer School series of the EDA has developed into an important platform for Danube Region-wide exchange. This recognition of the format can be seen in the steadily growing number of applicants. Moreover, a large number of potential speakers (ten this year alone) are interested to make a contribution once again.

Apart from the development of the format itself, the Danube Schools have brought about successful initiatives: What emerged as a project idea in the first Danube Summer School is now a project partner of the EDA for the implementation of the Danube School in Novi Sad. The sister institution DAREC was founded by 4 alumni of the Danube School 2014 and has already initiated several projects of its own. The same applies to an NGO in Ruse and the project team of the Danube Autumn School in Bucharest 2018.

Political anchoring

The Danube School series is strongly linked to the political level, as each school implements at least one political event in which high-ranking political decision-makers address and discuss current political challenges in the Danube region with the participants. Thus, the series of events is also known in political circles and has already been incorporated into corresponding declarations of intent to support the format. This is the case, for example, with the Baden-Württemberg-Serbian Government Commission, which considers the Danube School series to play an important role in the cooperation between the two countries.

DANUBE SCHOOL-REIHE 2018

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Danube School
Ulm/Neu-Ulm, Germany
October 2018

Brücken Bilden! - Veranstaltung
Ulm, Germany, July 2018

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Danube International
Weekend 2018, Novi Sad, Serbia
March 2018



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Budapest, Hungary
July 2018



Danube Conference HOPE
Ruse, Bulgaria
October/November 2018



Tanja Salzmann-ReiBer

Danube School 2018 in Ulm/Neu-Ulm

"Migration & Innovation in the Danube Region"

Tanja Salzmann-ReiBer is a lecturer and doctoral student at the Ludwig-Uhland-Institute for Empirical Cultural Studies and works as a freelance project manager for the Danube Schools at the European Danube Academy in Ulm. t.salzmann-reisser@danubeschools.eu

The third part of the Danube School Series 2018 proceeded as a cooperation between the European Danube Academy in Ulm (EDA), the University of Tuebingen (Ludwig-Uhland-Institute of Historical and Cultural Anthropology and the Institute of Danube Swabian History and Regional Studies) and the University of Neu-Ulm (HNU) in collaboration with our Danube School partners from Novi Sad, Budapest and Ruse.

Between 14. - 19. October 2018, more than 30 professors, academics, students and experts of the Danube region came together in Illertissen, Neu-Ulm and Ulm and worked on the topic of "Migration and innovation". For the first three days the group stayed at the Seminar Centre of the Universities of Applied Sciences Neu-Ulm and enjoyed a program full of lectures and workshops in the great seminar house of the HNU, the Vöhlín Castle in Illertissen. In addition to the high-quality speeches from professors and lecturers from Universities of Tuebingen, Neu-Ulm, Novi Sad, Budapest and Agder the participants from Germany, Serbia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Ukraine received the task to work together

in small international groups and create their own "Danube Project", following our leading subject "migration and innovation in the Danube Region".

The target of the group work is on one hand to encourage the participants from different countries to cooperate successfully in an international team and improve intercultural communication skills. On the other hand, the goal is to create innovative and realistic Danube projects and work on a certain Danube project proposal. These group projects are presented and critically analysed in Ulm in the Donaubüro/Danube Office on the last day of the school. Some of the project descriptions are also published in the section: *Project Proposals* on page 342.



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During the school, the lecturers 2018 focused on our main topic of the Danube School and spoke about "The experimentalist governance of the EUSDR" (Prof. Dr. Gänzle, University of Agder), "Along the Danube – A History of (Re-) Migration, Flight, and Expulsion in the Danube Region" (Dr. Sparwasser, Federation of Expellees), "A Hungarian trademark: the

moral panic button" (Dr. Melani Barlai, Andrassy University Budapest), "New Social Innovation Paradigma" (Prof. Dr. Kormann, HNU), "Demographics in the Danube Region" (Prof. Dr. Savic, Novi Sad) and "Tradition and Innovation, examples from the University of Novi Sad" (Prof. Dr. Pavle Sekerus, Novi Sad).

In addition to these great lectures there was a workshop about the film "Danube Exodus" (Dr. Spiridon, University of Tuebingen), a presentation about funding opportunities in INTERREG (Ms Specker, Danube Contact Point Stuttgart), an open discussion with the director Dr. Szabó of Hungarian Balassi Institute Stuttgart and of course an intercultural night with food and funny facts about the Danube Region.

After three days in Illertissen, the group moved to the twin cities Ulm and Neu-Ulm and had two more interesting days there. The program in Ulm was for instance rounded off by a meeting with the director of the Danube Swabian Museum Mr. Glass (DZM) in Ulm and a visit of the very interesting current exhibition "Brave New World. Migrants' Dream Houses", a meeting with Mayoress Iris Mann from Ulm, a visit of the exhibition "Weiße Rose"/ "White Rose" in the adult education center of Ulm and the chance to join a movie night organised by DZM: „Transilvania mea - Von Gewinnern und Verlierern“.

Compared to the Danube School Series the last years, the concept is growing and rising very successfully. Not only that in 2018 students from the University of Tuebingen could get ECTS as a key qualification for their participation in this Danube School, but also the network of cooperating universities is growing: Ruse in Bulgaria joined our network- and one great fact about this new cooperation is that it was mainly initiated by one of the participants of the former Danube School Ulm, who has joined the school here in Ulm last year. The Danube School Series is very proud of its

excellent participants that take home inspiration, knowledge and new contacts and create such great projects.

The partners from the Danube School network are already in contact to share new ideas for a fruitful and inspiring cooperation in 2019 and especially the Board of the "Certification and Coordination Council" of the Schools with Prof. Dr. Ellen Bos Prof. Bos (Andrássy Universität Budapest), Prof. Dr. Ivana Živančević Sekeruš (University of Novi Sad), Prof. Dr. Reinhard Johler (University of Tuebingen) and Prof. Gerhard Mayer (European Danube Academy) is supporting the network with their knowledge and contacts.

For 2018 we thank all our sponsors and funders like the Baden-Wuerttemberg Foundation, City of Ulm, Wilhelm Mayer Nutzfahrzeuge, Wieland, Sparkasse Ulm, and Ratskeller Ulm. A huge thanks to all our guests, lecturers and participants for your ideas, exchange of views and perspectives and we hope to see you again 2019!

Tanja Salzmann-ReiBer

BRÜCKEN BILDEN! Jubiläumsveranstaltung im Rahmen des 11. Internationalen Donaufestes Ulm/Neu-Ulm

Tanja Salzmann-ReiBer ist Lehrbeauftragte und Doktorandin am Ludwig-Uhland-Institut für Empirische Kulturwissenschaft und arbeitet freiberuflich als Projektreferentin für die Danube Schools bei der Europäischen Donau-Akademie in Ulm. t.salzmann-reisser@danubeschools.eu

Bereits seit mehr als zehn Jahren setzt sich die Europäische Donau-Akademie in Ulm dafür ein, Völkerverständigung, eine kulturelle, wissenschaftliche und demokratische Zusammenarbeit und Projekte des Umwelt- und Landschaftsschutzes im Donaoraum zu fördern. Die Idee einer erfolgreichen Zusammenarbeit im Donaoraum wird bei der Europäischen Donau-Akademie nicht nur diskutiert, sondern ganz konkret in verschiedenen Projekten umgesetzt. Neben anderen erfolgreichen Projekten hat sich aus der Europäischen Donau-Akademie heraus das Konzept der Danube Schools entwickelt, das 2018 bereits zum fünften Mal umgesetzt wurde. Für 2018 konnte somit ein doppeltes Jubiläum gefeiert werden!

Auch das Internationale Donaufest Ulm/Neu-Ulm steht für ein nachhaltiges erfolgreiches Konzept einer Zusammenarbeit und einer Stärkung des Zusammenhalts im Donaoraum. Weit über die Grenzen der Doppelstadt hinaus ist es bekannt als ein Fest, das nicht nur den Markt der

Donauländer und ein beeindruckendes Begleitprogramm auf die Beine stellt, sondern auch persönliche interkulturelle Begegnungen ermöglicht und Menschen aus den Donauländern zusammenbringt.

Was lag also näher, als das Doppeljubiläum von 10 Jahren Europäische Donau-Akademie und dem 5. Jahr der Danube School-Reihe im Rahmen des Donaufestes zu feiern? Zumal die Europäische Donau-Akademie im Jahr 2008 während des damaligen Donaufestes gegründet worden war und seither als Plattform für die Zusammenarbeit in Wissenschaft, Kultur, Politik, Bildung und Medien agiert. Während des Festakts konnte diese Gründung in einem eingespielten Videobeitrag zur "Gründung der Europäischen Donau-Akademie am 5. Juli 2008" noch einmal miterlebt werden.

Am Donnerstag, den 12. Juli 2018, fand die Jubiläumsveranstaltung in Ulm statt, zu der Akteure aus dem Donaauraum, Politiker, Vertreter der Baden-Württemberg Stiftung, Mitarbeitende der Städte Ulm und Neu-Ulm, Professorinnen und Professoren sowie Studierende der Hochschulen und Universitäten in Ulm, Neu-Ulm und Tübingen, ehemalige Mitwirkende und Teilnehmende der Summer Schools, EDA-Akademieratsmitglieder und korrespondierende EDA-Mitglieder sowie interessierte Bürgerinnen und Bürger eingeladen waren. Bezuschusst wurde der Festakt durch eine Förderung der Baden-Württemberg Stiftung und deren Förderprogramm "Perspektive Donau: Bildung, Kultur und Zivilgesellschaft".

Die offiziellen Grußworte durch den Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Ulm, Gunter Czisch, und durch den Geschäftsführer der Baden-Württemberg Stiftung, Christoph Dahl, wurden ergänzt durch Redebeiträge von Prof. Gerhard Mayer und Prof. Peter Langer als Repräsentanten der Danube School-Reihe und der Europäischen Donau-Akademie.

Mit einem spannenden Impulsvortrag führte Prof. Dr. Harald C. Traue in die Ausstellung „The Making of World Art along the Danube“ ein, von der sich die Teilnehmenden der Veranstaltung in der anschließenden Pause ein Bild machen konnten.

Anschließend wurde das Podium für Akteure geöffnet, die sich in verschiedenen Projekten im Donauraum engagieren. Stefan Barth (Stiftung AGAPEDIA), Teresa Wald (STARKMACHER e.V.), Prof. Dr. Boris Alexander Kühnle (Hochschule der Medien Stuttgart) und Paul F. Langer (Danube School Series) gaben Einblicke in ihre Projekte und diskutierten über das Thema Mobilisierung, Aktivierung und Vernetzung von jungen Menschen im Donauraum.

Den Abschluss des Festakts bildete der Vortrag von Prof. Dr. Reinhard Johler von der Universität Tübingen, der in einer Diskussionsrunde zum Thema "Europa weiterdenken!" mit Prof. Dr. Ellen Bos (Andrássy Universität Budapest), Prof. Dr. Ivana Živančević Sekeruš (Universität Novi Sad), Dr. Dezsö Szabó (Ungarisches Kulturinstitut Stuttgart) und Oberbürgermeister a. D. Ivo Gönner seinen Ausklang fand.

Eine gelungene Jubiläumsveranstaltung, die gerade in diesen herausfordernden Zeiten für Europa zeigt, wie wichtig, inspirierend und unersetzlich grenzüberschreitende, internationale und transnationale Kooperation im Donauraum im Kleinen - und in Europa im Großen - ist und bleibt.

Blagovesta Tsenova

Danube School in Ruse 2018 - HOPE

***Blagovesta Tsenova** holds a master's degree in European Studies and Region Cooperation from BRIE, University of Ruse, Bulgaria.*

btsenova@gmail.com

On November 1, the International Danube School, hosted this year by University of Ruse , brought together 40 academics, post-doctoral and PhD students, BRIE master degree holders and bachelor level students from 7 countries. The network of the project - Bulgarian-Romanian Interuniversity Europe Center (BRIE), Baden Württemberg Foundation, European Danube Academy, European Initiatives without limits NGO and Ruse Free City Foundation supported the organization of a conference under the motto **HOPE** to mark the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union on 1 November 1993.

Mayor of Ruse Plamen Stoilov, the director of Ruse Free Spirit City Foundation, Elena Minkova, the Rector of the University - Prof. Hristo Beloev, DSc and the Dean of the Faculty of Business and Management Assoc. Prof. Alexander Petkov, PhD addressed the conference participants with welcome speeches. The Mayor said, he was delighted that this high-ranking event was taking place in Ruse and extended congratulations and sincere gratitude to all project partners: BRIE, Baden-Württemberg Stiftung, European Danube Academy (Ulm/Neu-Ulm), European Initiatives without limits and Ruse Free Spirit City Foundation. Last but not least, he greeted University of Ruse for having been the first institution in Bulgaria

to introduce European Studies into the national higher education – initially at Bachelor, and later at Master and PhD level. In his speech the Rector of University of Ruse also emphasized the fact, that the city of Ruse has been the first in Bulgaria to provide a shelter for the development of European Studies in the autumn of 1993, the year, when on 8th March Bulgaria signed its Association Agreement with the European Community. The results of this development deserve highest appreciation and respect, he said referring to the fact, that the bachelor and the master level studies are delivered for international students in English, and the PhD programme is an opportunity for the best graduates. He concluded, that this conference is an excellent evidence of a potential, which has been unlocked to become internationally visible as a Danubean and European center of academic and research cooperation.

At the heart of the conference discussion four key roles of the Union were positioned: *Harnessing Regions' strengths; Overcoming weaknesses of states; proactively responding to global threats and opportunities; Elaborating Future Policy Priorities*. It was opened by Assoc. prof. M. Kornazheva, PhD, director of BRIE and conference scientific supervisor. She elaborated on the question *why we hope?* by focusing on the history of EU as an evolving political and economic crisis management capacity, and as a resilient political and economic environment, which has secured rights, freedoms and well-being of European citizens.

In the first panel B. Gruber (Regensburg, Germany), B. Tsenova and T. Reisser (Ulm/Neu Ulm, Germany), I. Markova, Y. Petrov and A. Alipiev, Bulgaria (Ruse, Bulgaria) outlined the growing importance of regionalism/decentralization and European regions (incl. the Danube region) in the multilevel governance of the EU. Dr. S. Karapchanski, Deputy Mayor of Rousse, presented the impact of EU 2014-2020 cohesion policy on the sustainable urban development of Ruse region. Drivers of change

such as the Danube School and other forms of cross-border and transnational cooperation were introduced and analyzed.

The second panel referred to weaknesses of nation states, which challenge European Union multi-level governance. Dr. B. Stancheva determined deficits of liberal democracy, E. Parvanova analyzed manifestations of separatism, M. Nikolov commented on the demographic crisis, Dr. H. Sokolova presented theory of success and practices of illegitimate success in Bulgaria and Hungary, E. Veysalova discussed rights of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria from a post-communist perspective, Dr. O. Sumer (Turkey) pointed to the problem of weak political participation.

The third panel offered views on EU in the context of a complex foreign policy environment. S. Kirova saw a synergy effect in linking the Strategy for the Danube Region to the Eastern Dimension of the EU Neighborhood Policy. M. Kiosia from Moldova sought an answer to the question of whether stability of the turbulent eastern border of the EU is attainable. Dr. N. Venelinova examined theoretical and empirical aspects of the threat of fake news. A. Yemelyanova from Ukraine commented on the situation in the country as oversupply of historical legacy, a limited space for maneuver at present and availability of opportunities for the future. Mahmoud Zahra from Al Quds University, Jerusalem, discussed aspects of Israel's political relations with European countries from 1948 to 1990. D. Imbia of Cameroon made an overview of EU policies in response to the migration crisis, and Edmund Muaka referred to the European Union as a model for the unification of African countries.

The last panel was related to the upcoming political cycle in 2019 and the forthcoming discussion on EU priorities. A. Delchev expressed his belief, that intelligent management will address some of the problems of protecting EU's external borders. Milena Dimitrova commented on the

decisions of the EU Court on migration policy in view of the principle of solidarity, and referred to the urgent need to assure a legally binding definition of the concept of solidarity. Dr. Andrea Radu from Romania offered an innovated perspective to the communication problems and the must to address them through the creation of EU's single digital voice. The last presentation was devoted to the significant place in the European policy that the young generation must fight for, to the experience it needs and to a successful practice in this respect - the European Youth Event as an initiative of the European Parliament since 2014.

The conference proceedings will be published. All speakers and participants express their gratitude to project HOPE partners and supporters.

Fanni Elek

Sommeruniversität 2018 at the Andrassy Universität Budapest

***Fanni Elek**, M.A. is research associate at the Chair of Comparative Political Science with focus on Central and Eastern Europe in the EU Andrassy University Budapest, Hungary.*

As part of the Danube School Series 2018, the German-speaking Andrassy University in Budapest, Hungary hosted from 22.7. - 29.7. 2018 its traditional summer school as a successful continuation of the first Danube Spring School in Novi Sad,



Serbia in March 2018. The very experienced organizing team put on a variety of outstanding lectures and workshops in the elegant rooms of the University. Besides the presentations of professors, academic lecturers, and experts, all 20 participants (from all over Europe as well as from Egypt and Azerbaijan) had to give a short presentation related to the main topics of the Summer School.



The central theme of the Summer School was "*Der Donauraum im Fokus. Zwischen Dekonsolidierung und Erneuerung – Aktuelle Diskurse über die Lage der Demokratie*" (Focusing on the Danube Region - Between deconsolidation and renewal - current discourses on the state of democracy).

The main topics were e.g. the political situation of the states of the Danube Region three decades after the system change, state and perspectives of transformation research, current challenges of democracies, development of the democracies in the region and other transformation countries, alternatives for democracies - new authoritarianism, and also actual discourses on the state of democracy.

In addition to the lectures and presentations, the participants had the opportunity to visit the Hungarian Parliament Building, the Memento Park, and to make an excursion to Szentendre, one of the most beautiful small cities along the Danube.

One of the highlights of the program the participants took part in the simulation game workshop of the Young Citizens Danube Network (YCDN), called "Compass."

Aleksandar M. Gajic

Danube International Weekend 2018

Aleksandar M. Gajić, Junior Researcher, PhD candidate, Department of History, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad, Serbia.
aleksandarmgajic@gmail.com

Danube International Weekend is an event organized by Danube Area Research Center (DAReC) and European Danube Academy (EDA) with support of the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad, between March 23rd and 25th, 2018. This event was a continuation of the Danube YUGO school organized from 18 to 24 March 2018 in Novi Sad, which gathered more than 60 participants from the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The topic of the Danube Yugo School was the *Archaeological Heritage of the Danube Region*. The lecturers were renowned professors and researchers from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. During the five working days, the latest scientific results of archaeological research in the Danube Region were presented, but also workshops were held on which the demonstrators were introduced to the participants of the school with work on materials excavated at locations around the Danube region. The school closed the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, prof. Dr. Ivana Živančević Sekeruš, who also awarded certificates to the participants of the Danube Yugo School. In addition to the certificate, students received 3 ECTS points for regular participation and active work during lectures and workshops.

The topic of the Danube International Weekend was the Cultural and Archaeological Heritage of the Danube Region with a special focus on the issue of identity in the heritage. A total of 27 participants from 12 countries participated in the Danube International Weekend: Austria, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, BiH, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Russia and Bulgaria. Upon the arrival of school participants and registration, intercultural evening was organized together with participants of the Danube Yugo School, along with the tasting of national food and drinks that the participants brought with them. The atmosphere was erected by traditional music from Vojvodina, where all together, with playing and song, celebrated this international evening and at the same time new acquaintances.

The first day of the weekend began with the visits of Novi Sad, the Museum of Vojvodina and the Petrovaradin Fortress. After a five-hour walk, the working part of the day continued with lectures held in the new building of the Historical Archives of the City of Novi Sad. On Saturday, March 24, 2018, the lecturers were:

- Prof. Dr. Aleksandar Bandović, National Museum Belgrade - *Beyond Danube and Prehistory*
- Prof. Dr. Tatjana Cvjetičanin, National Museum Belgrade - *Danube River Frontier - Roman Archeological Heritage: Living Landscape of Conflict; Landscape of cooperation?*
- Prof. Dr. Marko Janković, Archaeological Collection, University of Belgrade - *Archeology of Roman Leisure in the middle of Danube*

After the lectures were finished, there was a long debate and discussion about the abovementioned topics, which took place during the evening. The evening ended with a tour of local pubs and karaoke, where the participants had the opportunity to show their vocal talent.

The second day of the weekend began with the visit of the *BioSense* Institute, which is located at the University of Novi Sad, where prof. dr. Sofija Stefanovic presented her *Horizon2020* project, and then gave another lecture in the building of the Historical Archive of the City of Novi Sad on the topic *From Heritage to EU projects*. In addition to prof. Stefanović, on Sunday, March 25, 2018, lectures continued:

- Aleksandar Tomašević, PhD, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad - Cultural Heritage in the Danube Region, the question of identity
- Milan Marković, PhD, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade - Research of Cultural Heritage in Lisbon, Portugal, The Muslim or Christian Identity?
- Mr Gyula Ribar, City of Novi Sad - Presentation of ECC2021 - Novi Sad - European Culture Capital 2021.

The Danube International Weekend was concluded with the award ceremony for students, where they received certificates by Aleksandar M. Gajić, director of DAREC.

The Danube International Weekend is the fourth continuation of the Danube School Series, implemented with the support of the Baden Württemberg Foundation from Stuttgart, Wilhelm Mayer Co. from New Ulm, the European Danube Academy from Ulm, the City of Novi Sad, the Provincial Government of AP Vojvodina, the Museum of Vojvodina and the Historical Archives of the City Novi Sad. We hope to continue with our program next year.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPEAKERS AND PARTICIPANTS
OF THE DANUBE SCHOOLS 2018

Mirko Savić

Migration and Demographics in the Danube Region

Mirko Savić, PhD is Full Professor at the Faculty of Economics in Subotica, University of Novi Sad, Serbia. savicmirko@ef.uns.ac.rs

Abstract

After political turmoil and wars in the Middle East in the last twenty years we are witnessing large migration waves towards Europe, where Danube region is also significantly affected. On the other hand, Danube region suffers from the low fertility rate, ageing and the decrease of population. Demographic picture of the region is changing rapidly. The aim of this paper is to present and explain the most important demographic indicators, such as fertility rates, life expectancy, crude marriage rates, etc. on the one side and effect of the migration on the other across countries of Danube region. The influence of demographic factors and migration on economic variables will be presented and explained. Also, the purpose of this paper is to analyse and discuss the possible consequences of demographic trends and to give an answer what can we expect in the future on the basis of latest available data from Eurostat database in 2018.

Key Words:

Demographics, Labour Market, Migration, Danube Region

Introduction

When we look at demographic data across Europe, Danube area is one of the demographically most endangered regions. "The Danube Region is the only macro region in the EU where the population is decreasing. The decrease has both natural and migratory reasons." (Gal, Lux, & Illes, 2013).

Danube region is very specific, because the countries along the Danube are sharing not only the river, but many problems too, like high migration and low fertility. On the other side, the region is very heterogeneous. "The division of the Danube region follows not only political–state aspects, but ethnically, linguistically, religiously and culturally it is one of the most diverse and mosaic-patterned territories of Europe." (Gal, Lux, & Illes, 2013).

European Commission has developed the strategy for Danube region as a sustainable framework for policy integration and coherent development of the entire region (European Commission, 2010), followed by Action Plan (European Commission, 2010), as its operationalization. The Danube Strategy addresses several important issues across 4 main pillars (Connecting the Region, Protecting the Environment, Building Prosperity, and Strengthening the Region) and 11 Priority Areas, but only small part of the document is dedicated to demographic problems in the region. In the Action Plan demographic challenges are mentioned under the 9th priority area which is defined as "investment in people and skills". One action under this area is focused "to improve cross-sector policy coordination to address demographic and migration challenges. Enhanced efforts should be pursued to develop knowledge on the status quo, on drivers and impacts of migration flows and demographic change, so to develop a basis for enhanced cooperation of different policies at all levels of governance. Cross-sector policy coordination between relevant

government departments, education authorities, social services, healthcare services, cultural policy authorities, housing and spatial planning authorities as well as asylum and immigration services at local, regional and national level, as well as dialogue with civil society are essential to ensure an adequate level of support." The action is more focused on migration as one of demographic problems in the region, like low fertility rates, brain drain, abortions, ageing etc. although ageing and brain drain are also indirectly mentioned through development of knowledge society as one of the priorities.

The purpose of this paper is to present the effects of demographic decline in the countries of the Danube region on the basis of latest available data from EUROSTAT database in 2018. Also, the purpose of this paper is to analyse and discuss the possible consequences of demographic decline and the issues of migration drain in the region.

Population

The Danube Region covers 14 countries with more than 150 million residents. Nine of them are the members of European Union (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia), two recognized EU candidates (Serbia and Montenegro), one potential candidate (Bosnia and Herzegovina), and two countries (Moldova and Ukraine) included into the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). With exceptions of Germany and Ukraine it can be concluded that all other countries belong to the group of countries with small and medium population numbers. "In terms of population density – except for Montenegro – these figures cluster around the value of 100 people per km²." (Illes, 2002).

Table 1 is showing the population trends in the Danube region from 1970 to 2017. The countries in red are actually the countries with population decline. From 1990 demographic decline has started in many countries in the region, especially in former socialist countries, with significant population fall in Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Croatia and Serbia. On the other hand, we are witnessing population growth in the European Union as a whole, and very strong growth in neighbouring Turkey.

Table 1: Population on 1 January in the countries of Danube region, EU (28) and Turkey (in millions)

GEO/TIME	1970	2000	2010	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union (current composition)	439.9	487.3	503.2	507.0	508.5	510.3	511.5
Bulgaria	8.5	8.2	7.4	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.1
Czech Republic	9.9	10.3	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.6	10.6
Germany including former GDR	78.3	82.2	81.8	80.8	81.2	82.2	82.5
Croatia	4.4	4.5	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2
Hungary	10.3	10.2	10.0	9.9	9.9	9.8	9.8
Austria	7.5	8.0	8.4	8.5	8.6	8.7	8.8
Romania	20.1	22.5	20.3	19.9	19.9	19.8	19.6
Slovenia	1.7	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1
Slovakia	4.5	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.4
Montenegro	:	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Albania	2.1	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9
Serbia	:	7.5	7.3	7.1	7.1	7.1	7.0
Turkey	34.9	66.9	72.6	76.7	77.7	78.7	79.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.7	3.8	3.8:	:	:	:	:
Moldova	:	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6:	:	3.6
Ukraine	:	49.1	45.8	45.2	42.8	42.6	42.4

Source: Eurostat, retrieved October 2018, from:
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/statistics-a-z/def>

Demographic decline is followed by ageing of population. This factor will influence not only the overall economic development, but it also generates unfavourable trends in social policy as well. It will reduce labour market reserves and make pressure on governments to dedicate

significant financial funds toward increasing number of retirees. This will cause the slowing down of the catching-up process in the less developed countries.

The following two tables are showing youngest and oldest population in the Danube region. The countries in red are actually the countries with decline of youngest population. We are actually having the drastic decrease of young population in the entire region. In comparison with 1960, in 2017 there is approximately 12 million less youth, or from 1990 to 2017 approximately 8 million. We can notice also some stabilization of number in last four years.

Table 2: Population less than 15 years old (in millions) in the countries of Danube region and EU (28)

GEO/TIME	1970	2000	2010	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union	:	:	78.97	79.14	79.31	79.46	79.69
Bulgaria		1.94	1.30	0.98	1.00	1.00	1.00
Czech Republic		2.12	1.71	1.49	1.58	1.60	1.62
Germany including former GDR		18.20	12.90	11.02	10.64	10.69	10.88
Croatia	:	:	0.66	0.63	0.62	0.61	0.60
Hungary		2.18	1.73	1.48	1.43	1.43	1.42
Austria		1.82	1.37	1.25	1.22	1.23	1.25
Romania		5.24	4.16	3.21	3.09	3.08	3.06
Slovenia	:	:	0.32	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.31
Slovakia		1.25	1.07	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.84
Montenegro	:	:	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.11
Albania	:	:	0.66	0.57	0.55	0.53	0.52
Serbia	:	:	1.25	1.11	1.02	1.02	1.02
Turkey		14.58	20.13	18.86	18.85	18.86	18.89
Bosnia and Herzegovina	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Moldova				0.60	0.57	0.57	0.57
Ukraine	:	:	6.48	6.71	6.45	6.49	6.54

Source: Eurostat, retrieved October 2018, from:
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/statistics-a-z/def>

At the same time, the number of oldest citizens is growing significantly. Their number is increasing again in all the countries in the region. In 2017 in comparison with 1990 there is approximately 9 million more people older than 65 years of age. In Germany in the same period there is increase of 5.3 million of oldest people. One of the explanations are better living conditions which is followed by longer life expectancy.

Table 3: Population 65 years old or over (in millions) in the countries of Danube region and EU (28)

GEO/TIME	1970	2010	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union	:	87.86	94.02	96.00	97.75	99.44
Bulgaria		0.80	1.35	1.42	1.44	1.46
Czech Republic		1.18	1.60	1.83	1.88	1.93
Germany		10.59	16.90	16.85	17.09	17.51
Croatia	:		0.77	0.78	0.80	0.80
Hungary		1.18	1.66	1.73	1.76	1.80
Austria		1.04	1.47	1.56	1.58	1.60
Romania		1.72	3.27	3.30	3.38	3.44
Slovenia	:		0.34	0.36	0.37	0.38
Slovakia		0.41	0.67	0.73	0.76	0.78
Montenegro	:		0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09
Albania	:		0.31	0.35	0.36	0.37
Serbia	:		1.24	1.29	1.31	1.34
Turkey		1.53	5.08	5.89	6.19	6.50
Bosnia and Herzegovina	:	:	:	:	:	:
Moldova	:		0.36	0.36	0.37	0.40
Ukraine	:		7.17	6.93	6.68	6.77

Source: Eurostat, retrieved October 2018, from:
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/statistics-a-z/def>

Other demographic indicators are also unfavourable. Total fertility rate (number of new born babies per mother in fertile period (15-49 years of age)) in 1960 was between 2 and 3 babies across region, but in 2016 it was from 1.35 in Ukraine to 1.64 in Romania, which is far from enough for population reproduction. In Turkey, for example, total fertility rate is 2.11. In EU (28) it is 1.60.

Table 4: Total fertility rate and mean age of women at birth of first child in the countries of Danube region and EU (28)

INDIC_DE	TFR	TFR	TFR	TFR	Mean age	Mean age	Mean age
GEO/TIME	1970	1990	2000	2016	1990	2000	2016
European Union	:	:	:	1.60	:	:	29.0
Bulgaria	2.17	1.82	1.26	1.54	:	23.5	26.0
Czech Republic	1.92	1.90	1.15	1.63	:	25.0	28.2
Germany including former GDR	:	:	1.38	1.60	:	:	29.4
Croatia	:	:	:	1.42	:	:	28.5
Hungary	1.98	1.87	1.32	1.53	:	25.1	27.8
Austria	2.29	1.46	1.36	1.53	25.0	26.4	29.2
Romania	:	1.83	1.31	1.64	:	23.6	26.4
Slovenia	:	1.46	1.26	1.58	:	26.5	28.8
Slovakia	2.41	2.09	1.30	1.48	:	24.2	27.0
Montenegro	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Albania	:	:	:	1.54	:	:	26.0
Serbia	:	:	1.48	1.46	:	24.1	27.8
Turkey	:	:	:	2.11	:	:	:
Bosnia and Herzegovina	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Moldova	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Ukraine	:	:	:	1.35	:	:	25.0

Source: Eurostat, retrieved October 2018, from:
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/statistics-a-z/def>

Crude marriage rate (number of marriages per 1000 citizens) is also decreasing significantly. In 1960 it was between 7.7 in Czech Republic and 10.1 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 10.7 in Romania. In 2016 (latest available data) crude marriage rate is spanning between 3.2 in Slovenia and 6.8 in Romania. This phenomenon influences and changes our basic attitudes towards marriage, families, children, their upbringing, population and other social categories which at the end has its reflection on the labour market and economy as a whole.

Table 5: Crude marriage rate in the countries of Danube region and EU (28)

GEO/TIME	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2016	
European Union)	:		7.9	6.8	6.3	5.2	4.4:	
Bulgaria		8.8	8.6	7.9	6.9	4.3	3.3	3.8
Czech Republic		7.7	9.2	7.6	8.8	5.4	4.5	4.8
Germany		9.5	7.4	6.3	6.5	5.1	4.7	5.0
Croatia		8.9	8.5	7.2	5.8	4.9	5.0	4.9
Hungary		8.9	9.3	7.5	6.4	4.7	3.6	5.3
Austria		8.3	7.1	6.2	5.9	4.9	4.5	5.1
Romania		10.7	7.2	8.2	8.3	6.1	5.7	6.8
Slovenia		8.8	8.3	6.5	4.3	3.6	3.2	3.2
Slovakia		7.9	7.9	7.9	7.6	4.8	4.7	5.5
Montenegro	:	:	:	:	:	:	5.9	5.1
Albania		7.8	6.8	8.1	8.9	8.4:		7.8
Serbia	:	:	:	:		5.7	4.9	5.1
Turkey	:	:		8.2:	:		8.0	7.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina		10.1	9.3	8.5	6.7	5.6	5.1:	
Moldova	:	:	:	:	:		7.4:	
Ukraine	:	:	:	:	:		6.7	5.4

Source: Eurostat, retrieved October 2018, from:
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/statistics-a-z/def>

Parallel with the reduction of marriages goes the increase of divorces in Danube region. Number of divorces per 100 marriages in EU in 2011 was 46.1 (latest available data). In 1960 in the Danube region the same indicator went from 7.2 in Slovakia and 10.7 in Germany to 18.7 in Hungary and Romania. In 2016 the number of divorces per 100 marriages goes from 22.1 in Montenegro to 56.7 in Ukraine.

Decrease of marriages has brought one more change in our society. The proportion of newly born children outside marriage has been increasing dramatically. In the entire EU that proportion is 40% in 2012 (latest available data), while the same proportion in the Danube region in 1960 was from 4.7% in Slovakia, 4.9% in Czech Republic and 5.5% in Hungary to 13% in Austria. In 2014 the lowest share of live births outside marriage

in Danube Region is in Croatia (17.4%) and Serbia (25.1%), while the highest is in Bulgaria (58.8%), Slovenia (58.3%) and Hungary (47.3%) (Eurostat, 2016).

Mean age of women at childbirth is increasing in all the countries in the region. In 1960 for example mean age was 25.1 years in Bulgaria and 27.6 in Austria, while in 2016 it goes from 26 in Ukraine to 29.4 in Germany. Increase of mean age of women in childbirth is followed by decrease of probability that woman will have more than one child in the future.

Legally induced abortions are showing decrease in the last decade, but statistics of induced abortions are not reliable because of significant number of illegal abortions.

These dramatic changes in the Danube region, especially in the case of former socialist countries are explained by the theory of Second Demographic Transition. "Second Demographic Transition is the transformation from traditional way of population reproduction, which is characteristic of underdeveloped societies with high fertility and mortality rates, to a modern way of reproduction, which is characteristic of developed societies with low fertility and mortality rates." (Savić M. , 2007). Demographic consequences of economic transition in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with the overview of countries in the Danube region is well explained in Philipov and Dorbritz (2003).

Theory of demographic transition is trying to explain changes in the population reproduction of Western European countries at the end of XIX century and at the beginning of XX century, which is called First Demographic Transition.

Today, socio-economic development has brought to us great individualisation in the society and the individualisation of reproduction.

The balance between fertility and mortality rates was not established. The accent is on the post-industrial society with different patterns and expectations in changed socio-cultural environment. We are now talking about Second Demographic Transition.

According to Landry (1934), the fundamental principle of the first transition was the rationalisation of life, and the fundamental principle of the second demographic transition is the right to self-realisation granted to each individual and the demystification of social control according to Van de Kaa (1998).

Migration

We are witnessing strong migration pressure in recent years from Middle East on European countries. Although it is very difficult to predict all consequences of this phenomena, migration represents one of the solutions for population decline in Danube region. On the other hand, it raises many political, social and economic questions. What can we expect in the future when it comes to migration? Without migration population drop in the region will be dramatic. The following table is showing population forecast in the following 45 years for available countries in the Eurostat database (reduced variant). It is obvious that even with the controlled migration influence we can expect the decrease in population across the region with two small exceptions in the case of Czech Republic and Austria.

**Table 6: Population forecast: Reduced migration variant –
Population on 1st January**

PROJECTION	Sensitivity test: lower migration					
	2030	2040	2050	2060	2070	2080
Bulgaria	-6,052	340	2,573	439	842	1,129
Czech Republic	11,660	13,688	9,360	5,874	5,691	5,982
Germany	178,708	137,357	132,686	116,706	95,638	90,378
Hungary	10,821	13,886	10,226	9,233	7,449	6,598
Austria	36,937	26,860	17,563	16,499	13,722	12,340
Romania	-34,063	-5,966	5,163	1,061	1,746	634
Slovenia	2,748	2,850	2,518	1,888	1,682	1,626
Slovakia	3,330	4,501	4,311	2,515	2,143	2,148

*Source: Eurostat, retrieved October 2018, from:
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/statistics-a-z/def>*

Beside migration inflow from outside Europe, there are also significant migration flow inside the continent and Danube region. These flows are always connected with the issue of brain drain in many countries of Eastern Europe. Major part of countries in the Danube region are so-called "sending countries", while only two are "receiving countries" (Austria and Germany).

Highly qualified labour force from the East are looking for job opportunities in the West, starting mostly during their education and studies. According to Eurostudent (2015), mobility flows from Eastern and Southern EHEA (European Higher Education Area) countries to Western end Northern EHEA but also between countries of North-Western EHEA are imbalanced. Consequently, import-export ratio of internationally

mobile students in the countries of the region is unfavourable. Only Austria, Germany, Czech Republic and Hungary have positive balance.

Is there a real threat of brain drain as the consequence of international student mobility for the mostly sending countries? According to Gibson and McKenzie (2010), among the highly skilled workforce there are very intensive emigration and return migration with large positive benefits for high emigration countries. Authors are also underlying the benefits for source countries in terms of knowledge flows and sending remittances but with rare cases of engaging in trade or foreign direct investment.

Chevalier (2014) is summarising the main pros and cons of international student migration. The positive sides are that student mobility can foster economic growth both in sending and receiving countries, student mobility can influence the wage growth for the migrants, and elimination of visa restriction will increase the quantity and quality of international students in host countries. On the other side, there is a risk of brain drain for source countries, economic growth can suffer because of student migration, source countries incur fiscal costs due to absence of a qualified and skilled workforce, and target countries are facing fiscal costs through subsidizing foreign students.

“The brain drain has long been viewed as a serious constraint on poor countries development. However, recent theoretical literature suggests that migration prospects can raise the expected return to human capital and foster investment in education at home.” (Beine, Docquier, & Rapoport, 2008). “Even if certain number of international students decide to stay abroad after their studies, the brain drain will not have exclusively negative effects for sending countries, because it will still contribute to human capital formation, development of domestic educational system, return migration with additional skills acquired abroad, creation of

scientific and business networks, remittances, etc.” (Savić, Kresoja, & Živadinović, 2014).

Discussion

The general conclusion is that demographic decline in the Danube region is lasting for approximately 30 years and drop in the population growth is compensated with migration flows, especially from Middle East, and prolongation of working life on the labour market. Demographic decline could endanger the economic base of our countries, especially in the case of Western Balkans and it is necessary to take synchronized action in the entire region reverse the negative demographic trends. Strategy for Danube region represents a good step forward, but only in the case of migration inflows, educational policies and ageing. In the future demographic decline will continue and it is necessary to undertake joint action in all demographic aspects: fertility, abortion, health care, gender equality, disintegration of families, births outside the marriages, youth unemployment, full-time and part-time employment of parents etc.

Countries in the Danube region must find the way to reconcile their differences. “In political sense the Danube region has always been historically fragmented and we can conclude that it is still the same even today. The majority of the small catchment area is divided among small states, representing so many competing interests.” (Gal Z. , 2009). This problematic and ambiguous situation is also pronounced at the regional level within the countries.

Enlargement of the EU should bring the region, or at least the major part of it, to unified political and integrating economic entity, so that political obstacles to cooperation should be removed. “It is a strange characteristic of the procedure that the later a country applies for membership, the more

and more difficult conditions they are expected to fulfil.” (Gal, Lux, & Illes, 2013). In the meantime, the time for confronting the demographic problems is running out.

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Pavle Sekeruš:

Tradition and Innovation - Changing Roles of Universities in an Interdependent World

Pavle Sekeruš

Tradition and Innovation - Changing Roles of Universities in an Interdependent World

***Pavle Sekeruš**, PhD is Full Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad, Serbia. psekerus@ff.uns.ac.rs*

Over recent decades, the role of universities has evolved from their traditional and almost exclusive concentration on **education** and **research** to active participation in regional development. Universities are also becoming important actors in regional **innovation** (knowledge applied somewhere in the society) systems, with different strategies and activities which vary across institutions and regions.

In this introduction we used the word **traditional universities**, those with the strong focus on research activities, ranging from basic research to applied research, although we bear in mind that there are large differences between universities, including size, range of disciplines, balance between research and education, international commitment and the type of region they are located in.

As we have already mentioned, the role of universities has evolved over the last 50 years, as it was usual in the XX century, first in the United States, then in Western Europe and so on. They are no longer simply involved in producing and providing knowledge through education and research but are also becoming increasingly involved in regional development. We can witness that the level of education and research of these newer universities

is usually lower than in old universities, but on the other side, the expectations from them concerning regional development tend to be much higher.

Over the past few decades, there has been a general increase in demand for universities to become involved in **external collaboration**, often considered their **third role**, mission or task, in addition to education and research. Today, most of the universities are expected to engage in external collaboration to **disseminate knowledge, promote the social impact** of scientific and cultural activities, **stimulate commercialization** of research and increase the **applicability of education and research**.

Internationally, this development was theoreticized in the so-called **triple helix model** of regional and national development, formulated in the nineties as an analytical framework, which puts in a triangular scheme universities, governments and businesses as key actors. This concept tries to offer a perspective for understanding of the sources and development paths of innovation and can be an interesting paradigm for regions. It explores the complex dynamics of the **knowledge society** and offers an insight into new strategies of development and innovation to policy makers on the national, international and regional level. (Knowledge society is a sociological concept which describes society that generates, shares and uses the knowledge for the prosperity of its members, drastically developed with accessibility of internet and the quantity of the data available, that is the society in which the generation Z evolves (born in a period from 1995-2015) which had the possibility to use the internet from a very young age.

Academic research has identified a number of functions of universities in regional development, including **direct economic impact** (students coming to the city, renting apartments, eating, buying clothes, traveling...),

capital investment (universities making decisions on investing in laboratories, classes, equipment...), **creation of human capital and knowledge, transfer of existing knowledge, technological innovation, regional leadership** (regions with strong universities in much better position than the others) and **production of knowledge infrastructure** (schools, colleges, journals and books, media, CIT). Various roles of universities in regional development can go from passive to increasingly strategic roles.

Among the most often theoreticized approaches discussing the role of the university in the regional development we can mention 4 most commonly used models: the **Engaged university model**, which supposes adaptation of the university to the regional needs, the **RIS (Regional innovation system)**, conceptualizing universities as key factors which, in a broader interaction with wider set of transfer mechanisms transfers knowledge to SME. **The mode 2 model** which sees university knowledge fundamentally changed in the direction of applicability, transdisciplinarity, heterogeneity producing relevant knowledge connected to its environment. And finally, the **entrepreneurial university** concept, which sees universities developing their third function through commercialization of their knowledge and development of spinoffs and incubators (demands the business culture among researchers, and technology transfer offices). Different names of the models do not express their purity and exclusivity, but just the prevailing tendency.

Economic impact of universities varies according to the type of university and region. A medium-sized university may have an important role as an employer and economic actor in a small region, (ULM UNI, PECS UNI...), whereas a large university in a metropolitan area (Humboldt UNI, Eötvös Loránd in Budapest) may have a less obvious economic impact. A university may also have indirect economic multiplier effects on other

sectors. In most regions, the presence of a university also has indirect location effects, by contributing to the image and attractiveness of a region to potential students, employers and investors. During the previous visits to the University of Pecs, Maribor and similar universities, on several occasions we were offered very precise examples of its invaluable role for the city and the region, its national and international position, all documented with accurate financial data, numbers of employed citizens, numbers of international students and tourists attracted, and so on.

We have already mentioned that the traditional role of universities is to create knowledge and develop **human capital** through education and research. Even today, this is its main function. Relevant competence is of enormous importance for the regional development. Although there are important regional variations, with the highest retention rates in metropolitan areas, huge percentage of students and researchers remain in their study region after graduation. We have a huge problem in Serbia, where development after the collapse of the socialistic type of society contributed to the huge concentration in the capital city which produces more than 40% of the national GDP, Novi Sad 11% of the GDP, Nis 3,3% and Kragujevac 3,4%... Brain drain on the European level, and not only brain drain, but work force and population drain in the direction of rich parts of Europe, plus concentration in Serbia, mostly in two cities, Belgrade and Novi Sad, creates huge societal problems.

To keep students in the region, it is important to provide them with the necessary skills to find suitable jobs after graduation. As a result, many universities now invite regional stakeholders (companies, regional political representatives, agencies...) to participate in the development of educational programs; for example, on boards of education, through problem-based learning or as lecturers and associate professors. In terms of research, many universities have combined basic with applied research,

Pavle Sekeruš:

Tradition and Innovation - Changing Roles of Universities in an Interdependent World

often in collaboration with large industrial companies in specific disciplines.

Inspired by the US in the 1980s, many universities have undertaken various activities to stimulate commercialization of knowledge and research findings. Examples of these activities are the development of more professional management of intellectual property (e.g. licenses and patents) and provision of internal support structures to stimulate spin-off and start-up companies among students, staff and researchers, such as innovation offices, advisory services, incubators and science parks.

(Bombardment of Serbia from March to June 1999. Sanctions 1992-1996, Fall of Milosevic 5th of October 2000)

I am going to give you an example of this through the story of the University of Novi Sad and the province of Vojvodina. Commercialization of knowledge was initiated as a bottom-up activity of the Faculty of Technical Sciences of our University. In the nineties, *anni horribiles* for Serbia, (Milosevic regime, Kosovo secession, international sanctions, NATO bombardment from March to June 1999, collapse of the economy), group of professors and teaching assistants came up with an idea and pressed the dean to allow them commercialization of their research, and allow them to transform their offices into small companies. (later on, they would be transformed into startups and incubators) **Research and invention** were on their way to become **innovation**, which means "applied somewhere in the society". The dean accepted to play along, which was not an easy thing to do because he was entering the sphere of **almost legal activities**, since that combination of private and public domains was illegal.

The end of the year 2000 saw the fall of Milosevic and the arrival of the new minister of science, an engineer who had recently arrived from Singapore. He invited Serbian faculties of technical sciences and recommended the creation of startups and incubators. Invited to Novi Sad to see that his ideas had already been implemented at one university, he appointed one of our colleagues from the Faculty of Technical Sciences to a working group which would create a new law for higher education. That was the beginning of the evolution of Serbian universities. Novi Sad had already been miles in advance in comparison to others and this advantage has not been challenged so far.

Novi Sad is a center of Serbian communication and information industries with 4.000 engineers gathered in Vojvodinian cluster of IT industries. (DMS Schneider Electric, 1000 engineers employed, RTRK 800 engineers, Execom, Eipix...between 300 and 500 engineers, a lot of other smaller companies). The Faculty of Technical Sciences today has 130 affiliated companies.

The concepts of **clusters**, **innovation systems** and **triple helixes** were developed largely during the 90s all over the world. Many universities became increasingly involved in collaborative activities, including joint research projects and the development of shared facilities such as research centers and test laboratories. These activities were at first more closely related to **knowledge dissemination** and **open innovation** (open source knowledge...) than to commercialization activities, based only on intellectual property rights, only to evolve later into profit-oriented companies and, organized in clusters, important creators of development policies and strategies for the region.

To meet the challenges of globalization, pressure on limited resources and an aging population, the EU has launched the Europe 2020 strategy for

smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. One of the three priorities is to develop an economy based on **knowledge** and **innovation**. This involves improving the quality of education, strengthening research performance, and promoting innovation and technology transfer throughout the EU.

To implement the Europe 2020 strategy, the EU flagship initiative Innovation Union and Regional Policy Contributing to Smart Growth in Europe 2020 launched the concept of **smart specialization**, supporting interaction between policymakers, businesses, and education and research institutions at the EU level, as well as at the national and regional levels. The concept of smart specialization can be seen as a new type of regional specialization, including diversification into related areas, regional collaboration and global outreach. According to the **Innovation Union strategy**, the biggest challenge for the EU and its member states is to adopt a more strategic approach to innovation, whereby innovation becomes an overarching policy objective.

The symbol of success of the smart specialization "strategy" of the University of Novi Sad and the province of Vojvodina is ANTARES teaming project (within the Horizon 2020 scheme), of Novi Sad BioSense Institute and Wageningen Research Institute from the Netherlands, whose implementation started in March 2017. The project won the best marks and acquired a budget of **28 million euros** in the competition of almost 200 projects across Europe, including institutions like UNI Oxford, Max Planck institute and similar.

The aim of the Antares project is the development of the BioSense institute into the **European center of excellence** for advanced technologies in the field of sustainable agriculture and food safety.

BioSens combines two most promising sectors in Vojvodina: ICT and agriculture (for decades agriculture, food processing industry and corresponding industries have been the specificity and main economic orientation of the region). Multidisciplinary research in BioSens is performed in the fields of micro and nano electronics, communications, signal processing, remote sensing, big data, robotics and biosystems, with a common goal to support the development of **sustainable agriculture** and create a positive impact to the lives of people.

The institute today grows rapidly. It employs 50 researchers, 15 of which are foreigners (from Greece, France, Japan, Morocco..) and is a representative example of internationalization of research at the University of Novi Sad.

When I spoke about the theoreticized models for the involvement of universities in regional development (Engaged uni, Regional innovation system, Mode 2 model and so on...) it is clear that it was the model of **entrepreneurial university** that was applied in Novi Sad, a result of a predominantly spontaneous bottom-up action, based on entrepreneurial process of discovery and entrepreneurial selection of market opportunities. Only later did it receive support from regional and national politicians and became an object of interest and development policies. High levels of research and moderate costs for good quality attracted foreign companies. The French multinational Schneider Electric bought DMS Company, Dutch and American companies cooperate closely with Novi Sad companies, and the German Continental opened its offices in summer 2018 and so on. Those foreigners are both the blessing and the curse of the Novi Sad IT. They bring money and market, but they also have the tendency to ignore solutions and products created in Novi Sad and transform them into companies for treatment of solutions and products created somewhere else under the name which is not from Novi Sad.

Pavle Sekeruš:

Tradition and Innovation - Changing Roles of Universities in an Interdependent World

There was a saying that winners import knowledge from producers and export knowledge products which put us in a position of successful losers. But this is another long story which we cannot develop further here.

To conclude, we can say that the universal model for success does not exist. The regional context demands adaptation of all models to specific needs of the region. As for universities, they will remain the place of conflicting expectations. Academic incentives and research policies will tend to give the priority to the funding of scientific research, while regional, business and innovation policy makers will continue to expect participation in applied development. The constant search for balance between the two can be a winning formula.

Suggestion for Further Reading:

The dynamics of innovation: from National Systems and "Mode 2" to a Triple Helix of university–industry–government relations,
<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0048733399000554>, consulted on October 1st 2018.

The future of the university and the university of the future: evolution of ivory tower to entrepreneurial paradigm,
<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0048733399000694>, consulted on October 1st 2018.

Catalogue of research and innovation potential of the University from Novi Sad <https://www.uns.ac.rs/images/doc/WBCInnoEng.pdf>, consulted on October 1st, 2018.

The role of universities in innovation systems and regional economies
<https://www.oecd.org/innovation/research/37592074.pdf>, consulted on September 3rd 2018.

Mimi Kornazheva and Krassimir Kornazhev:
What Could Be the Added Value of the Danube Region Strategy for the
Western Balkans?

Mimi Kornazheva and Krassimir Kornazhev
**What Could Be the Added Value of the Danube
Region Strategy for the Western Balkans?**

Mimi Kornazheva, PhD is an associate professor in Political Science at the Department of European Studies and International Relations and director of BRIE at University of Ruse, Bulgaria, mkornazheva@uni-ruse.bg

Krassimir Kornazhev is a security expert, former director of Border Police (Bulgaria-Romania), PhD student at the Department of European Studies and International Relations, kkornazhev@uni-ruse.bg

Abstract:

The paper introduces the current status of the Western Balkans countries on their path to NATO and EU membership, and the European policies related to the region. It views the legacy of Yugoslavia wars as trauma which impacts all needs for regional change. The analysis of different EU policy responses to those needs identifies practices of cooperation with incomplete positive effects. The 2018 EU Strategy to the Western Balkans is seen as a break-through with promising results. To that end the EU Strategy for the Danube Region could play a specific role to trigger regional reforms with regard to observed compliance with accession criteria and utmost regional demands.

Key words: *Western Balkans, EU, enlargement, EUSDR, security, cooperation*

Introduction

Countries of Western Balkans (former Yugoslavia minus Croatia and Slovenia plus Albania) have been an enlargement goal of EU since the end of Cold war. The trauma of Yugoslavia wars (from 1991 till 1999) reshaped the political, economic and the human landscape of the region. In 1999 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was signed to support post-war recovery. The Thessaloniki European Council in 2003 viewed the future of the region as an integral part of EU. But the fatigue of the Eastern enlargement of 2004-2007 (the so-called Big Bang), the financial crisis of 2008, the Arab spring at the EU's southern borders since 2010, and the 2013 Ukraine crisis at its eastern borders impacted a decision for a five-year term enlargement break, starting 2014, as announced by the Juncker Commission. This decision had a disturbing impact on the region, the vacuum had attracted the interest of global players Russia, China, Turkey, and some of the Arab countries¹ its west-oriented development perspective had been put on hold.

On the grounds of chronological and discourse data, NATO and EU official documents, this paper discusses the 2018 renewed EU engagement with the Western Balkans enlargement perspective and the potential contribution of the EU Strategy for Danube Region, which includes three Western Balkans countries, i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia.

¹Jasna Causevic. Are the countries of the Western Balkans ready for the European Union? https://www.gfbv.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Reporte_Memoranden/2018/2018-05_Memorandum_Western-Balkans_STP.pdf, retrieved 4 Jan 2019

The Western Balkans and their NATO and EU membership status

Montenegro is a **member of NATO** since 5 June 2017, when the instrument for its accession to the Washington Treaty (or the North Atlantic Treaty) was deposited with the US State Department. The milestones to that end mark a bi-lateral relationship of more than 10 years.

Shortly after regaining its independence in June 2006, Montenegro joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP)² in December 2006. The country was invited to join the Membership Action Plan³ in December 2009. It supported the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan from 2010 to end of 2014 and is now supporting the follow-on mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces. The government started accession talks to join the Alliance in December 2015. The Accession Protocol was signed by Allied foreign ministers on 19 May 2016. By the middle of 2017 the process was finalized.

Montenegro is ahead to other Western Balkan countries in terms of its **EU membership**. On 15 October 2007 Montenegro signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement⁴ (SAA) with EU and an Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related issues. They entered into force on 1 January 2008 and on 1 May 2010. By the act of signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, Montenegro formally agreed an association with the

² Partnership for Peace was established in 1994 to diminish threats to peace and build relationships between NATO and non-member countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.

³ The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance.

⁴ SAA is the framework of The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), EU's policy towards the Western Balkans, which is aimed at accession to EU.

European Community and its Member States, thereby accepting responsibility for its European future.

The country's government submitted **an application for EU membership on 15th December 2008**. On 22 July 2009 European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn handed over to Montenegro's authorities a Questionnaire to help prepare an assessment of the country's readiness to fulfil EU membership obligations. On 9 December, Montenegro's Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic delivered the answers to the EC's questionnaire. The European Commission acknowledged that Montenegro has made significant progress toward opening talks on EU membership and on 17 December 2010 the country was granted the **official status of candidate country**.

On 22 February 2012 the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, ECRI, has issued its first report on Montenegro, expressing **concerns over the status of refugees** in the country⁵. Although they are commonly referred as refugees, around 17,000 people from Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia in Montenegro were given the administrative status of either "displaced" or "internally displaced persons". This hampers their access to social, political and economic rights, ECRI's experts' state.

The **accession negotiations with Montenegro were opened** on 29 June 2012. As of 11 December 2017, 30 negotiating Chapters, including the rule of law Chapters, 23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights and 24 – Justice, freedom and security, have been opened, out of which three Chapters (25

⁵ Milena Milosevic. Report: Worrying Status of Refugees in Montenegro. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/experts-report-worrying-status-of-refugees-in-montenegro>, retrieved on 28 Dec 2018

– Science and research, 26 – Education and culture and 30 - External relations) have been provisionally closed.⁶

Albania is a **NATO member**, as well. NATO-Albania relations date back to 1992, when the country joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council⁷, the Partnership for Peace in 1994 and played an important role in supporting Allied efforts to end the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and secure peace after the air campaign. Bilateral talks developed progressively on the grounds of the country's membership aspirations and its participation in the Membership Action Plan since April 1999. NATO HQ Tirana⁸ was established in 2002 to contribute to the command and control of Kosovo force (KFOR), NATO-led international peacekeeping force which was responsible for establishing a secure environment in Kosovo. It also provided advice, assistance and support to the Albanian government in its defence reforms.

Political and public support of Albanians for accession to NATO has always been very high (over 95 per cent⁹). In April 2008, Albania was invited to start accession talks with the Alliance. NATO Allies signed protocols on Albania's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty on 9 July 2008. After the

⁶ Montenegro's path towards the EU.

</https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/montenegro/27529/montenegro-and-eu_en>, retrieved on 29 Dec 2018

⁷ The 50-nation Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is a multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues and for the bilateral relationships developed between NATO and individual partner countries under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.

⁸ NATO Headquarters Tirana role was to facilitate co-ordination between the Government of Albania, Organisations of the International Community and NATO. With Albania now a full NATO member the mission was deactivated in June 2010.

⁹ NATO HQ Tirana (NHQT).//< <https://shape.nato.int/page13612628>> retrieved on 28 Dec 2018

ratification Albania became a **full member of the Alliance on 1 April 2009**.

Albania is an **EU candidate country** following the Brussels European Council of June 2014. The granting of candidate status was the result of Albania's reform efforts in recent years and acknowledgement of efforts made and progress achieved to meet accession criteria. The decision also provides encouragement to continue with existing reforms and embark on new reforms necessary to prepare Albania for the start of the accession negotiations later on. The candidate status raises the relationship between Albania and EU to a higher level: Albania is invited to Council meetings, its access to and cooperation with EU agencies is easier — for example its participation in the Fundamental Rights Agency as an observer¹⁰.

Serbia has not declared interest in joining NATO but has aspired to EU membership. On 7 November 2007, the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU and Serbia was initiated and signed in Luxembourg on 29 April 2008. On 22 December 2009, Serbia **applied for European Union membership**. On 12 October 2011, the European Commission recommended that Serbia be granted the status of a candidate country for EU membership. On this occasion, the Commission recommended that EU accession negotiations with Serbia should begin as soon as Serbia achieved visible progress in the further normalization of relations with Pristina. On 1 March 2012, the European Council granted the country **candidate status**.

On 14 December 2012, the conclusions of the European Council stated that, based on the report of the European Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton,

¹⁰Albania./</https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/albania_en>, retrieved on 28 Dec 2018

the Council of the European Union (FAC) would consider progress made by Serbia in the reform implementation process and in **the improvement of its relations with Kosovo**, in March 2013. On 19 April 2013, Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dacic and the Pristina representative Hashim Thaci signed in Brussels the "First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations" and agreed the Implementation Plan thereof on 22 May 2013. On these grounds the Council of the European Union decided on 28 June 2013 to **open accession negotiations**. The Stabilization and Association Agreement between the Republic of Serbia and the EU entered into force on 1 September 2013.

Serbia lost sovereignty over Kosovo in 1999, when NATO bombing campaign put an end to Serb military attacks on the province during a two-year counter insurgency war. Kosovo declared independence in 2008, it is recognized by more than 110 states, but not by Serbia. Although Serbia and its former province committed to an EU-mediated dialogue to improve relations, little progress has been made since then.

At the August 2018 meeting of the European Forum Alpbach, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Kosovo President Hashim Thaçi for a first time publicly talked about border "correction"¹¹. The eventual land-swap deal is to give Serbia control over the northern part of Kosovo populated mainly by Serbs and to Pristina, control of southern Serbian municipalities populated mainly by Albanians. *"If we ever reach an agreement (with Pristina), Serbia would need to get clear guarantees that it would become an EU member state in 2025,"* president Vucic told Reuters in an

¹¹Vessela Cherneva. The price of normalisation: Serbia, Kosovo, and a risky border deal. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_price_of_normalisation_serbia_kosovo_and_a_risky_border_deal, retrieved 27 Dec 2018

interview¹². *"Right now, we don't know where our borders are,"; "No one in the region should be afraid of any agreement between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo...,"* he said. The United States and some EU officials claimed they would not oppose a deal if an agreement could be reached, but Germany has rejected the idea assuming it could revive old hostilities from the ethnic wars in the 1990s. A final deal would be a gain for Kosovo, it will enable its membership in the United Nations.

NATO – Kosovo relations are based on Kosovo Force (KFOR), a peace-support operation in Kosovo since June 1999¹³. It was established when NATO's 78-day air campaign against Milosevic's regime aimed at putting an end to violence in Kosovo, was over, and under mandate from United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and the Military-Technical Agreement between NATO, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. KFOR's objectives were to deter hostilities, establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order, demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army, support international humanitarian effort. Today, KFOR continues to contribute towards maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo and freedom of movement for all. NATO supports the Belgrade-Pristina EU-brokered Normalisation Agreement (2013).

Relations of Kosovo with EU date back to March 2011, when the EU-facilitated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade was opened. In January 2012 visa liberalization dialogue with EU was launched. In April 2013 agreement of principles governing normalization of relations with Serbia

¹² Ivana Sekularac, Kirsten Donovan. Serbian President says he wants EU membership guarantee as part of Kosovo deal. September 13, 2018
[//https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-balkans-serbia/serbian-president-says-he-wants-eu-membership-guarantee-as-part-of-kosovo-deal-idUSKCN1LT2EY](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-balkans-serbia/serbian-president-says-he-wants-eu-membership-guarantee-as-part-of-kosovo-deal-idUSKCN1LT2EY),
retrieved on 26 Dec 2018

¹³ NATO's role in Kosovo.//< https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm>,
retrieved 29 Dec 2018

was reached. **The Stabilization and Association Agreement entered into force April 2016**, and in May 2016 the European Commission issued a proposal to the European Parliament and Council recommending visa liberalization for Kosovo. The European Union Office in Kosovo and the EU Special Representative (EUSR) ensure permanent political and technical dialogue with EU institutions, offers advice and support to the Government and promotes human rights and fundamental freedoms. The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the European Security and Defense Policy. The aim is to assist the local authorities in the area of rule of law, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs. The EU is the largest donor providing assistance initially on emergency relief actions and reconstruction, and later on promoting Kosovo's institutions, sustainable economic development and Kosovo's European future¹⁴.

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995, and the Membership Action Plan in 1999. For many years, the country has provided valuable support to NATO-led operations and missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo. NATO provided assistance when violence between ethnic Albanian insurgents and security forces broke out in the west of the country in February 2001. A NATO military headquarters created in Skopje during the operational period of the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo has since been downsized and transformed into a NATO Liaison Office, which assists with security sector reform and host nation support to the Kosovo Force. A NATO Advisory Team is located within the country's defence ministry.

¹⁴ Kosovo* and the EU. // https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/1387/kosovo-and-eu_en, retrieved 28 Dec 2018.

The country was the **first Western Balkan nation to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU**, which entered into force in April 2004. The SAA aims to liberalize trade for 95% of exports to the EU. Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EU and FYROM was established in 2004. The Committee looks at all aspects of relations between the two parties, particularly the implementation of the SAA. FYROM was granted **candidate country status for EU membership** in December 2005. In February 2008, the EU adopted the Accession Partnership for the country, which updated the previous European Partnership agreement of January 2006. Citizens of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were granted visa-free travel to the Schengen area in December 2009.¹⁵ The country has overcome its main constraint on the path to NATO and EU membership.

On 19 October 2018 the Assembly in Skopje voted to start drafting constitutional amendments to **rename the country North Macedonia**. This is a major step to settling the 27-year-long name dispute with neighboring Greece. The procedure to complete constitutional changes is lengthy and needs a number of voting rounds. It should be completed by January 2019 the latest. The Greek Parliament will also have to ratify the deal once the Assembly in Skopje formally amends the constitution. At the Brussels Summit in July 2018, Allies welcomed the historic agreement between Athens and Skopje and invited the government in Skopje to begin **accession talks to join NATO**.

¹⁵Political relations. // https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia_en/1457/The%20Former%20Yugoslav%20Republic%20of%20Macedonia%20and%20the%20EU
retrieved 27 Dec 2018

Bosnia and Herzegovina aspires to NATO and EU membership. **NATO** has been committed to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina since early 1990s. The Alliance played a key role in implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement¹⁶ through peacekeeping deployments over a nine-year period from December 1995 to December 2004. In December 2004, primary responsibility for military aspects of the Peace Agreement was handed over to the European Union (EU). In December 2018, Allied Foreign Ministers decided that NATO accepts the submission of Bosnia and Herzegovina's first Annual National Programme on political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal reforms as the basis for practical cooperation and political dialogue between NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The registration of immovable defence property to the state is an essential for the continuation of the dialogue.¹⁷


The Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 identified Bosnia and Herzegovina as a **potential candidate for the EU membership**. In 2005 Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiations were officially launched in Sarajevo. But the country is lagging behind on its way to EU. One of the reasons is the post-war mode of governance of the country. It is composed of the autonomous entities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, and of a third region, the Brčko District, governed under local authorities. It has a bi-cameral legislature and a three-member Presidency including members of each major ethnic group. Therefore, the political practices of the country are rather conflict provoking than constructive and based on self-referential ethno-politics.

¹⁶The Dayton Agreement is the peace agreement reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, United States, on 1 November 1995, and formally signed in Paris, France, on 14 December 1995. These accords put an end to the 3 1/2-year-long Bosnian War, one of the Yugoslav Wars.

¹⁷Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina.
//<https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49127.htm> retrieved 29 Dec 2018

What Could Be the Added Value of the Danube Region Strategy for the Western Balkans?

To summarize, the six – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia – are pursuing the goal of **a common future as EU member states**. What they also have in **common**, is the visible scar of **a recent past**. They are all challenged by internal tensions and bilateral disputes. These countries have been facing the **common burden of triple transition**: from war to peace, from communism to democracy, from state owned to market economy, but the shadow of incomplete reconciliation had been overwhelming and predefining the volatility of the other two processes.



Map, visualizing the NATO and EU membership status of Western Balkans countries.

Obviously, the military dimension of security is not relevant any more, insecurity is rather due to political risks and ethnic tensions, economic and societal concerns, unsettled neighbor relations. Therefore, on the grounds of its experience of post-second-world-war reconciliation, EU has the capacity to identify relevant policy responses to the on-going threats to regional stability. It is beyond any doubt, that these responses should be focused on support for practices, which are directly addressing the

construction of a **common peaceful and prosperous European future of the region**, and thus indirectly contributing to **mitigation of traumatic memory and other destructive legacies of the common past**.

To what extent EU's Western Balkans' policies so far have been relevant to such a paramount regional demand? The next part of the paper will attempt at answering such a question.

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE) was launched on 10 June 1999 in Cologne 20 years ago, in the context of escalation of Kosovo War. The initiative of the European Union addressed the need for security and economic and political (democratic) stability. The Pact's activities targeted strengthened local democracy and cross-border co-operation, parliamentary co-operation, development of regional infrastructure, trade, investment, recruitment, combating organized crime, policies on refugees and persons granted asylum, managing and stabilising population movements. All countries of the region, except for Serbia and Montenegro (then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) were present at the above-mentioned founding conference. Representatives of Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Turkey, United States, all members of the EU at the time, OSCE, Council of Europe and European Commission were active participants. Representatives of Canada, Japan, United Nations, UNHCR, NATO, OECD, Western European Union, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development were present as facilitators. One of the sustainable projects of SPSEE is BRIE (Bulgarian-Romanian Interuniversity Europe Center), a structure of cross-border cooperation in higher education and research, established on the initiative of the German

Rectors' Conference to meet needs for knowledge and research on European integration and regional cooperation.¹⁸

According to the analysis of Srdjan Vucetic the Pact was adopted with the idea to deliver the message that the region belongs to Europe:

*Perhaps following the Latin adage nomen est omen, the drafters decided to shun the term - 'the Balkans' in favour of 'South Eastern Europe'. The change of the name is symbolic: the ideas and practices in the SP thus represent not only the latest and most systematic attempt on the part of extra-regional players to establish a regional framework for security, but also a desired commitment to the idea(l) of one Europe. Therefore, the Balkans are slowly being transformed from 'backyard', 'periphery', 'border' or 'transition zone' into 'Europe.'*¹⁹

The last meeting of the SPSEE took place on 28 February 2008, in Sofia, Bulgaria when it was succeeded by the Regional Cooperation Council, formed by the countries of the region themselves, but with continued support and advice from the international community. The new cooperation format serves regional cooperation and European and Euro-Atlantic integration of South East Europe with the aim "to spark development in the region to the benefit of its people"²⁰. Currently, the Regional Cooperation Council implements a Strategy, which seeks to stimulate the key long-term drivers of growth such as innovation, skills

¹⁸ See Kornazheva, M. Bulgarian-Romanian Interuniversity Europe Center. //Higher Education Reform Projects in South-Eastern Europe. HRK Commitment 1999-2006. Bonn, 2007. pp 78 – 86

¹⁹ Srdjan Vucetic. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution. //Southeast European Politics, Vol. II, No. 2, October 2001, pp. 109-134

²⁰ South East Europe 2020 Strategy. //<<https://www.rcc.int/pages/86/south-east-europe-2020-strategy>>, retrieved 4 Jan 2019

and the integration of trade. The SEE 2020 is focused on a set of interlinked development pillars all of which are central to the socio-economic policies of each SEE country and are also critical elements of the EU accession process.²¹

The Thessaloniki European Council in 2003

In the Presidency Conclusions, the future of the region is viewed as an integral part of EU. The European Council, recalling its conclusions in Copenhagen (December 2002) and Brussels (March 2003), reiterated its determination to fully and effectively support the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries, which will become an integral part of the EU, once they meet the established criteria. The relevant conclusions' annex is entitled "The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: moving towards European integration". It emphasizes the privileged relations between the EU and the Western Balkans, drawing from the enlargement experience. The Union's thus enriched Stabilisation and Association Process remains the framework for the European course of the Western Balkan countries all the way to their future accession²².

In 2013, 10 years later Corina Stratulat of the European Policy Centre²³ said that despite the colossal efforts made in the past decade regarding democracy-building and democratic legitimacy, much more democratic transformation is still required in the Western Balkan region. Status issues, border disputes, ethnic tensions and the legacy of war all take time to

²¹ Op.cit.

²² Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003 Presidency conclusions. Pressrelease. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-03-3_en.htm, retrieved 5 Jan 2019

²³ The European future of the Western Balkans: Thessaloniki@10 (2003-2013) 9 July 2013, http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=6&pub_id=3662, retrieved 4 Jan 2019

overcome and therefore slow down the process of democracy-building. A lack of supply and demand for substantive democracy lies at the heart of the problem. Corruption among the elites in these countries has a disempowering effect on citizens and the rule of law is still not functioning properly.

The Berlin Process

Following the enlargement break of 2014, the same year Western Balkan countries were offered a German initiative, known as the 'Berlin process'. Consisting of yearly high-level meetings between the six Western Balkan governments and several EU Member this process seeks for connectivity, it is a pre-accession strategy, providing the "carrot" with investment in infrastructure being seen as a means for creating jobs, business opportunities and other benefits. But financial provision and implementation were slow.

To close this gap, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Sigmar Gabriel announced in 2017 a "Berlin plus" agenda. The context was troublesome. A number of political conflicts inside and outside local political institutions seemed to threaten the stability in the region. Therefore, Minister Gabriel called for a Berlin process "reloaded" to generate visible improvements for the local populations. He proposed to set up a fund for infrastructure and technology to which EU member states, EFTA and the European Economic Area members could contribute as donors to creation of special funds for start-up businesses, vocational training, IT infrastructure development, and the formation of a fund for infrastructure and technology. Given the scope of the challenges the region and EU face, it is unlikely that this Berlin Plus process will play a compensation role to the "no war, no integration" EU approach. Further constraint is the ever slow delivery of funds.

In contrast to this, China undertook a regional promotion tour for its “Belt and Road” initiative. Some 10 billion EUR have already been committed for Chinese investments which are expected to become game-changers in linking up the region²⁴.

The Western Balkans is the perfect springboard for China’s expansion strategy, he pointed out. The region directly borders the EU and its countries enjoy zero customs regimes with the bloc. China is investing heavily in infrastructure there, including a high-speed railway line between Budapest and Belgrade and a \$260 million bridge across the Danube. It loaned Macedonia 580 million euros for two highway projects and earmarked another 500 million euros for projects related to its Belt and Road Initiative there. It has also been investing in a railway project in Albania, while a Chinese company will build part of the Ionian-Adriatic highway running through Montenegro and Albania²⁵.

The Bulgarian presidency of the Council of EU

The Bulgarian presidency of the Council (January-June 2018) has opted for a priority aimed at a change of the 2014 EU enlargement policy break. The Programme promises “Delivering a tangible European perspective for the Western Balkans including a dialogue, based on fulfilment of the conditions and the principle of own merit, political will and decisive

²⁴Tobias Flessenkemper ‘Berlin Plus’ will not change the game.//<
<https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/06/06/berlin-plus-will-not-change-the-game/>> retrieved on 26 Dec 2018

²⁵GIS expert Dr. Blerim Reka, quoted in GIS Dossier: The Western Balkans.//<<https://www.gisreportsonline.com/gis-dossier-the-western-balkans,politics,2527.html>>, retrieved 5 Jan 2019

reforms by these countries, is key not only for the region but for the European Union as a whole”.²⁶

EU Enlargement Policy is seen as the “most effective instrument for guaranteeing peace, stability, and prosperity in the Western Balkans”. Bulgarian officials have confirmed the will of the government to moderate and facilitate the reform efforts of the countries in the region. Lilyana Pavlova²⁷, the minister responsible for Bulgaria’s EU presidency, told Reuters that the “integration is a natural process”, which “needs to continue and now is the time if we don’t want to miss the moment”.

The ambition of the Bulgarian Presidency was to achieve an action plan without creating unrealistic expectations. The goal was to enhance connectivity of EU with the Western Balkan countries in terms of transport, energy, education and digitalization. Bulgaria invested consequent efforts in this direction, for example by promoting the digital policies of the EU among the countries of the Western Balkans through gradual reduction of roaming charges and by increasing the possibilities for broadband internet.

Sofia hosted a summit on 17 May 2018 in an attempt to reconfirm the European perspective of the region. The efforts resulted in a declaration of agreement on investment in connectivity and concrete objectives for the benefit of the citizens of EU and Western Balkans, such as:

- Strengthening support to the rule of law and good governance;
- Reinforcing engagement on security and migration;

²⁶ Program.<https://eu2018bg.bg/en/programme>, retrieved on 5 Jan 2019

²⁷ Katarina Anđelković, Bulgarian presidency – Priorities and expectations.<https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2018/01/18/bulgarian-presidency-priorities-expectations/>, retrieved on 5 Jan 2019

Mimi Kornazheva and Krassimir Kornazhev:
What Could Be the Added Value of the Danube Region Strategy for the
Western Balkans?

- Supporting socio-economic development and putting a special focus on youth;
- Increasing connectivity: transport, energy, digital;
- A digital agenda for the Western Balkans;
- Supporting reconciliation and good neighbourly relations in the Western Balkans.

Further on, a statement of support for a Western Balkans digital program was signed, and Western Balkans leaders agreed to improve the investment climate and to develop digital projects. Additional funds were foreseen for 11 priority transport projects (road, rail, water) and construction of new sections of the Peace highway (Nis-Pristina-Durres) and the Blue Highway (Adriatic coast). Within the Erasmus + program a pilot project for mobility in professional education and training “Youth Lab for the Western Balkans” has been launched. A dialogue between EU and Western Balkans leaders has been started on common challenges in the area of security. Commitment to the energy connectivity has been confirmed, Bulgaria and Serbia signed a joint declaration for the construction of a gas interconnector.²⁸

Sofia declaration labelled the six Western Balkan countries ‘partners’, but not states due to Kosovo’s disputed status among EU Member States²⁹. The Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the EU will be known as the ‘Balkan Presidency’ or the Connectivity Presidency. It was a revival of EU commitment to the region, and an evidence of Balkan leaders’ loyalty to EU in a context of emerging geopolitical alternatives.

²⁸Home Priorities and programme Priorities Western Balkans
//<https://eu2018bg.bg/en/28>, retrieved 5 Jan 2019

²⁹ Sofia Declaration, 17 May 2018
//<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/34776/sofia-declaration_en.pdf>

The New EU Strategy for the Western Balkans

On 6th February 2018 the Commission adopted a Strategy for the credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans countries³⁰ confirming the European future of the region as a geostrategic investment in a stable, strong and united Europe based on common values, as the official news publications claims.

The Strategy clearly states, that the EU door is open to further accessions when – and only when – the individual countries have met the criteria. It depicts the priorities and areas of reinforced cooperation and focuses on the need for fundamental reforms and good neighbourly relations. Progress along the European path is an objective and merit-based process which depends on the concrete results achieved by each individual country.

The Strategy explains the steps that need to be taken by Montenegro and Serbia to complete the accession process in a 2025 perspective; while others could catch up, Montenegro and Serbia are the only two countries with which accession talks are already under way. This perspective will depend on strong political will, the delivery of real and sustained reforms, and definitive solutions to disputes with neighbours.

All Western Balkans countries have the chance to move forward on their respective European paths. Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are making significant progress on their European path and the Commission is ready to prepare recommendations to open accession negotiations, on the basis of fulfilled conditions. The Commission will start preparing an Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina's membership

³⁰ Strategy for the Western Balkans. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/strategy-western-balkans-2018-feb-06_en, retrieved on 26 Dec 2018

application following receipt of comprehensive and complete answers to its Questionnaire. With sustained effort and engagement, Bosnia and Herzegovina could become a candidate for accession. Kosovo has an opportunity for sustainable progress through implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement and to advance on its European path once objective circumstances allow.

The Strategy pinpoints, that the EU has been engaged in the region since the Thessaloniki European Council in 2003. Since then, the European perspective had been an incentive for the countries to achieve overall political and economic reforms with improved democratic processes. Visa liberalisation and regional cooperation are fostering more open societies. In 2016, the region's total trade with the EU was over EUR 43 billion, up 80% since 2008 and with significant further growth potential. EU companies are also the biggest investors in the Western Balkans, with over EUR 10 billion of Foreign Direct Investment in the region in the past five years alone. The interlinkage and interdependence of the region with the European Union was evident in the migration crisis. The countries of the region are increasingly acting as partners on the global stage. It is recognized, that the merit-based prospect of EU membership for the Western Balkans is in the Union's very own political, security and economic interest. It is a geostrategic investment in united Europe based on common values, it is a tool to promote democracy, the rule of law and the respect for fundamental rights. A credible accession perspective is the driver of transformation in the region and thus enhances security, prosperity and social well-being.

The document sets out an Action Plan with **six concrete flagship initiatives** targeting specific areas of common interest: rule of law, security and migration, socio-economic development, transport and energy connectivity, digital agenda, reconciliation and good neighbourly

relations. Concrete actions in these areas are foreseen between 2018 and 2020. To deliver on the Western Balkans Strategy and support a seamless transition to membership, adequate funding is indispensable. The European Commission proposes to gradually increase funding under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance until 2020 in so far as reallocations within the existing envelope allow. In 2018 alone, €1.07 billion of pre-accession assistance for the Western Balkans is already foreseen, on top of almost €9 billion from the 2007-2017 period.

Thus, the 2018 EU Strategy for the Western Balkans is a shift into the policy on enlargement, which used to be less accepted by citizens and less enthusiastically promoted by politicians. It seems time has come for EU to realize that there is no vacuum in the realm of geopolitics and invested effort and resource may be lost. Bell is ringing for the Western Balkans leaders, too, any choice for an alternative destination may result in turmoil and destabilization.

What Could Be the Added Value of the Danube Region Strategy for the Western Balkans?

According to its 4 pillars and 12 priorities the EU Strategy for the Danube Region³¹ should target tackle most pressing problems³² of three Danube region Western Balkans states: Bosna and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. Examples are presented below.



³¹ Map source : <https://www.danube-region.eu/>

³² The sample of pressing problems is extracted from Memorandum 05/2018 of Society for threatened peoples, entitled *Are the countries of the Western Balkans ready for the European Union*, <https://www.gfbv.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Reporte_Memoranden/2018/2018-05_Memorandum_Western-Balkans_STP.pdf>, retrieved 5 Jan 2019

Mimi Kornazheva and Krassimir Kornazhev:
What Could Be the Added Value of the Danube Region Strategy for the
Western Balkans?



Source: www.danube-region.eu/about/priorities

Examples

Pillar CONNECT THE REGION	
Priority CULTURE AND TOURISM, PEOPLE TO PEOPLE	
<u>Problem:</u> Neighbour relations	<u>Contribution to solution:</u> Support development of Western Balkans Cultural Route and involve people in cross-border common governance. Support the implementation of a harmonised monitoring system, dedicated to tourism, able to provide complete and comparable statistical data in the 3 countries.

Pillar PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT	
Priority ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS	
<u>Problem:</u> There are still about 120,000 war-time landmines in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which can lead to fatal accidents.	<u>Contribution to solution:</u> Support disclosure of information and creation of database of accident risk spots. Support removal of landmines.

Pillar BUILDING PROSPERITY Priority KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY	
<p><u>Problem:</u></p> <p>Lack of economic and social development perspective.</p> <p>Last year, Bosnia and Herzegovina alone registered 33,377 people who left the country, about 40,000 people between the ages of 20 and 30 decide to leave Serbia every year.</p>	<p><u>Contribution to solution:</u></p> <p>Support development of Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialization in the three countries as a precondition for social and economic development.</p> <p>Support promotion of the strategies to attract investors.</p> <p>Support educational institutions with strong profile and provide access to digital skills and new qualifications relevant to the human resources needs of the Strategy.</p>

Mimi Kornazheva and Krassimir Kornazhev:

What Could Be the Added Value of the Danube Region Strategy for the Western Balkans?

Pillar STRENGTHENING THE REGION	
Priority INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND COOPERATION	
<u>Problem:</u> Authoritarian politicians are in power in all the countries of the Western Balkans, and they are trying to keep themselves in power through corruption and nepotism.	<u>Contribution to solution:</u> Support development of civic skills. Support active citizenship projects. Support development of social capital.

Pillar STRENGTHENING THE REGION	
Priority INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND COOPERATION	
<u>Problem:</u> In many schools in BiH Bosniak and Croatian children attend classes in the same building, but are physically separated and learn different curricula. On the other hand, schools in Republika Srpska teach curricula from Serbia in which war criminals are glorified. Apartheid system.	<u>Contribution to solution:</u> Support projects to promote best educational policies. Support projects to modernize the educational system.

Mimi Kornazheva and Krassimir Kornazhev:
 What Could Be the Added Value of the Danube Region Strategy for the
 Western Balkans?

Pillar STRENGTHENING THE REGION	
Priority INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND COOPERATION	
<u>Problem:</u> Yugoslavia wars refugees, internally displaced persons, missing persons	<u>Contribution to solution:</u> Support NGOs to search for people and data to and provide assistance.

Pillar STRENGTHENING THE REGION	
Priority INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND COOPERATION	
<u>Problem:</u> "Balkan route" refugees and migrants. There are currently about 3,900 refugees in Serbia, and about 3,500 to 3,600 of them are in refugee camps with catastrophic living conditions.	<u>Contribution to solution:</u> Support a donors' conference to raise funds. Support improvement of conditions in camps.

Conclusion

With the revival of the enlargement policy, the Danube Strategy is becoming a much bigger window of opportunity for the European Union and for the Western Balkan countries. For the next policy cycle EU should revisit the specific objectives of the Strategy and should adapt them to the pressing needs of a western region, which strives to go west, "there where the air is free"³³. Implemented projects should involve always partners from the 3 countries to assure the indirect effect of reconciliation.

One of the main goals for the region should be education. BRIE³⁴, a PSSEE cross-border interuniversity structure, disposes of know-how, which has been tailored for the regional needs and is a relevant partner in educational and research projects.

³³ From "Go West", a popular Pet Shop Boys song of the 80s.

³⁴ See www.brie.uni-ruse.bg

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<https://www.gfbv.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Reporte_Memoranden/2018/2018-05_Memorandum_Western-Balkans_STP.pdf>, retrieved 5 Jan 2019
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Jan C. Weyerer and Paul F. Langer
Smart Cities in the Danube Region

Jan C. Weyerer is an expert and consultant in the field of digitisation of the public sector. He is currently a researcher at the German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer and a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of the German Institute for eGovernment. His main areas of expertise include e-business, artificial intelligence, big data and e-government.

Paul F. Langer is research associate at the German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer and member of the Scientific Advisory Board of the German Institute for eGovernment. His main research interests are innovation diffusion, platform economics, cloud computing and digitisation of the public sector.

The Smart City Concept for Challenges of our Time.

Cities and urban areas have gained increasing importance worldwide in recent years. Meanwhile more than every other citizen lives in an urban area and this urbanisation trend is set to continue, enclosing about two-thirds of the world population by the year 2050. In addition, all world population growth will be in urban areas and cities of all sizes will grow significantly within the next decades (United Nations 2015). This urbanisation trend also pertains to the Danube Region in which cities, such as Vienna, Munich, Sofia or Prague have been subject to significant growth in the last ten years.

Against this background, cities all over the world and so also in the Danube Region are facing the major challenge of coping with growing populations and resulting effects such as overuse of public infrastructures, resources and services, as well as increasing traffic congestion and pollution. For instance, cities are not only main consumers of energy with 75 percent of the global primary energy but also greatly contribute to climate change, accounting for 50 to 60 percent of the world's greenhouse gas emissions (UN-Habitat 2012).

This issue is not only relevant in terms of environment and sustainability but also on a political level, as countries and cities increasingly commit themselves to certain energy and climate goals (e.g. the EU's 2030 climate and energy framework). To put it in the words of the former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, "cities are where the battle for sustainable development will be won or lost" (UN-Habitat 2014). Accordingly, cities need smart advanced solutions to plan and develop the urban environment in an efficient and effective manner and thus to cope adequately with these challenges. An essential key to coping with environmental challenges of cities is technological innovation.

In this connection, the concept of smart city has received great attention in research and practice in recent years (Meijer/Bolivar 2016, Trindade et al. 2017, Ruhlandt 2018). In particular, in Europe and the Danube Region, the development of smart cities has also entered the political agenda and is fostered by various promotion programs such as the European Union's initiative "European Innovation Partnership on Smart Cities and Communities" (European Commission, 2019).

What is a Smart City?

Although there is so far no unified definition of the smart city concept, a common denominator of the multitude of different definitions available in the literature refers to the application of smart technology to urban infrastructures and services. Based on an analysis of 120 definitions and focus groups, the International Telecommunication Union (2014) developed an integrated definition, coining the term “smart sustainable city” that refers to “an innovative city that uses information and communication technologies and other means to improve quality of life, efficiency of urban operation and services, and competitiveness, while ensuring that it meets the needs of present and future generations with respect to economic, social and environmental aspects” (ibid, p. 1). This definition also reveals the major objectives of smart cities, i.e. economic growth, quality of life and sustainability (Deloitte 2015).

Against this background, a smart city comprises six dimensions, including (1) smart people, (2) smart economy, (3) smart governance, (4) smart mobility, (5) smart environment and (6) smart living (Giffinger et al. 2007, Cohen 2014). Figure 1 illustrates these dimensions, showing typical characteristics and exemplary applications for a better understanding of each smart city dimension.

	Characteristics	Exemplary Applications
Smart People (Social & Human Capital)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information/knowledge society as foundation • Smart education and digital skills • Inclusive society (internet, smartphone penetration), plurality • ... 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Digital learning formats (learning apps, videoconferences for tutorials & homework) • Open access online libraries • IT lessons for the public at large • ...
Smart Economy (Efficiency & Competitiveness)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Entrepreneurship & innovation (new startups, R&D) for creating promising innovative ideas • E-business and e-commerce • Local and global interconnectedness • ... 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industry 4.0 systems and applications • Mobile job centers and job market apps • Sharing economy applications (car sharing) • ...
Smart Governance (Participation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Digital public administration, public & social e-services • Open government (open data/apps, citywide privacy policy) • Data-driven policy making • ... 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Digital civil office with virtual service assistant • ICT-based co-creation and e-participation apps for citizens • Government information and data via apps • ...
Smart Mobility (Transportation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainable, innovative and safe • Reduced congestion & pollution through energy-efficient & low-emission use of transportation infrastructure • Mixed-modal access and integrated ICT • ... 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smart traffic routing and parking (digital traffic and navigation app, digital parking meter and online tickets) • Charging stations for e-cars • Bike rental terminals (via app) • ...
Smart Environment (Natural Resources)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainable resource management (water, waste, air, energy) • Energy monitoring • Smart green buildings (sustainability-certified, smart homes) • ... 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sensor systems for public waste containers • Smart grids (interconnected generation, storage and consumption of electricity) • Sensor system for rainfall and water quality • ...
Smart Living (Quality of Life)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culture, social cohesion & happiness (life quality & Gini index) • Public safety (smart crime prevention) • Public health (smart healthcare) • ... 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Digital travel guide and city tour app • Surveillance camera sending real-time data • AI-based database for blood & organ donation, digital patient records • ...

Figure 1: Dimensions of Smart Cities with Characteristics and Exemplary Applications

The main technological foundation and innovation in the context of smart cities is the Internet of Things (IoT), which refers to the Internet-based connection of physical and digital “things”, including machines, services and humans (Wirtz 2019). An important requirement and enabler of smart cities is therefore a wide diffusion and availability of the Internet. In Europe, more than 85 percent of the population use the Internet, which is well above the global average of about 55 percent. Only North America shows a higher Internet penetration rate with 95 percent of the population using the Internet (Internet World Stats 2018).

The great availability of the Internet has paved the way for increasing investments in the smart city infrastructure and the increasing deployment of IoT technology to cities and urban areas (Gartner 2015, Business Insider, 2016), which in turn have led to the introduction of smart city applications and respectively the emergence of smart cities all over the world and in particular in the Danube Region. Against this background, smart cities are also expected to have a great economic impact. According to the McKinsey Global Institute (2015), the potential global economic impact of IoT applications in the context of cities amounts to 930 billion to 1.6 trillion USD per year in 2025.

Apart from all the advantages, it is important to also mention the potential downsides of smart city solutions. Cities that offer such services and implement respective policies might be confronted with several significant challenges, including the automation-induced change of the labour market, which might also lead to unemployment and frustration of unqualified workers, a strong competition on talent and potential increase in inequality, a digital divide of the society, resilience against disruptions due to accidents, attacks or natural disaster, lack of interoperability and overarching system solutions, as well as cybersecurity and privacy issues (Deloitte 2015).

Cases of Smart Cities in the Danube Region

The heterogeneous socio-economic composition of the Danube Region is characterised by the differences of its cities and regions. On the one hand, you find some of the strongest economic areas of the European Union in the upper Danube Region in Baden Württemberg, Bavaria and Austria. On the other hand, the lower Danube Region consists of the poorest countries in the EU: Romania and Bulgaria and the two poorest countries in Europe: Ukraine and Moldova (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019).

Considering the economic output of the different regions along the Danube and the cost of IT infrastructure, it is surprising that the different economic status of the regions does not strongly correlate with the progress of digitisation. Comparing the provided Internet speed for instance, Romania has the fifth fastest average Internet speed in the world (Cable.co.uk 2018). Also, Hungary (Rank 9th) and Slovakia (Rank 21st) have a faster average Internet speed than Germany (Ranked 25th) and Austria (Rank 35th). Moreover, in Bulgaria, Romania as well as Serbia, people have developed solid digital competences, which attract large corporations such as Microsoft, Google and IBM to invest and build own development centres there (Hope, 2016; MacDowall, 2017; Vasovic, 2018).

Besides Internet speed, digitisation competences and investments of the private sector, which are in many ways a requirement for cities to offer own smart city solutions, there are also promising developments in the strategic development of some city authorities in the Danube Region.

Vienna has been ranked for being the most advanced smart city in the world by the consultancy Roland Berger in 2017 (Roland Berger, 2017). Ahead of cities such as New York and Singapore, Vienna convinced mostly with its intermodal public mobility system, its environmental policies and

the quality of life. Due to its history of being the capital of the Habsburg Empire, Vienna undoubtedly represents to a certain extent also the Danube Region as such. Besides the performance of Vienna which has admittedly also the financial capacity to invest in costly infrastructure and public transportation services, there are other cities in the Danube Region with stricter budgetary constraints that offer attractive and innovative smart city services and thus also perform well in respective smart city rankings.

Although exact economic figures regarding the impact of smart cities in the Danube Region are not available so far, statements concerning smart city development in the Danube Region can be derived. A study of the EU Directorate General for Internal Policies (Manville et al. 2014) concerning smart cities in Europe enables a compilation of a sample of Danubian cities and thus a case analysis of smart city development in the Danube Region based on this sample. Table 1 shows the results of this analysis, illustrating the smart city areas in which cities in the Danube Region are active.

Danube Region City Sample	Smart Governance	Smart Economy	Smart Mobility	Smart Environment	Smart People	Smart Living
Budapest			X	X	X	
Ljubljana			X	X		X
Mannheim		X		X	X	
Miskolc		X		X		
Munich	X			X	X	
Tirgu Mures	X			X	X	X
Vienna			X	X	X	X
Total	2	2	3	7	5	3

Table 1: Smart City Case Analysis for the Danube Region

The results show that smart city projects in the Danube Region particularly focus on the areas of smart environment and smart people, thereby rather neglecting other smart city areas and project types such as intelligent traffic systems and participation platforms. However, such applications hold great potential for the future as they represent generic smart city solutions, which can be applied in most urban environments or cities in a cost-effective way and may greatly contribute to Europe 2020 targets and those of the Digital Agenda (Manville et al., 2014). Overall, Manville et al. (2014) propose eight smart city solutions, including (1) smart cycling plans, (2) integrated multi-modal transport, (3) smart traffic flow system, (4) smart building technology and management, (5) smart city lighting, (6) smart open services platforms, (7) single access point for government services and (8) local integrated sustainability initiatives. Cities in the Danube Region can learn from smart city pioneers such as Copenhagen,

Barcelona or Amsterdam and be guided by best-practice role models of such generic smart city solutions.

Concluding Remarks

The various concepts for a smart city provide blue prints for the future development of cities to cope with the many challenges of our time. The Danube Region is home to many cities that few people would expect to be involved in advanced smart city development.

Against the background of the afore-mentioned findings, it is difficult to depict a simple description of the current status of smart city development in the Danube Region. On the one hand, the lower Danube Region outperforms the richer parts in the upper Danube Region to some extent when it comes to Internet speed. On the other hand, the more sophisticated smart city solutions are costly and thus cities such as Vienna stand out with their smart city solutions. However, the cities in the lower Danube Region have achieved surprising successes with their strategies. Recent investments of IT companies as well as their good Internet connection show that there is the commitment in those cities for making use of modern technologies for the benefit of their regions.

Moreover, there seems to be an enthusiastic and young community of people that have developed competences that hold enormous opportunities for the entire region (Hope, 2016; MacDowall, 2017; Vasovic, 2018). It remains the challenge to hold those young and capable people in the region even though average salaries are uncompetitive, which made many of them already emigrate.

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Paul F. Langer

Ein brutales architektonisches Erbe

Paul F. Langer, M.Sc. ist Doktorand an der Deutschen Universität für Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer. Zudem arbeitet er an verschiedenen Projekten der Europäischen Donau-Akademie und ist Mitbegründer der Danube School-Reihe. paul.langer@donauakademie.eu

Brutalismus im Donaauraum

Bei der Suche nach einer Art Markenidentität „Donaauraum“ gibt es sicherlich viele Ansatzpunkte. Literatur, Musik, Sprachen, gemeinsame Geschichte etc. können Grundlagen liefern. Gleichzeitig ist der Donaauraum in seiner Vielfalt meist eben nicht durch klar erkennbare Ähnlichkeiten zu identifizieren. Man könnte jedoch mit einer visuellen Gemeinsamkeit der Region beginnen: Das allgemeine Erscheinungsbild der Städte für Einwohner und Reisende bzw. die Einstellung der Bevölkerung gegenüber dem Baubestand.

Natürlich sind Städte wie Ulm, Regensburg, Wien, Budapest, Novi Sad, Belgrad, Vidin, Ruse, Tulcea usw. sehr unterschiedlich und haben jeweils verschiedene historisch-architektonische Einflüsse erlebt. So hat beispielsweise die Habsburger-Monarchie in vielen Donaustädten ihre Spuren hinterlassen. Aber es gibt auch Einflüsse der osmanischen Zeit und vieler anderer Stile, die in den verschiedenen Ländern und Regionen entwickelt oder übernommen wurden. Auf der Reise durch den Donaauraum gibt es allerdings einen Stil, der den Raum anders prägt: Ein

Baustil, der mit vielen Konventionen brach und oft mit der populären ästhetischen Wahrnehmung kollidierte: der Brutalismus (siehe Bild 1: Richters "Rakete", Mehrfamilienhäuser in Zagreb).



*Bild 1: Richter's "Rakete". Brutalist apartment blocks in Zagreb
Credit: By Suradnik13 (Own work) [CC BY-SA 4.0-3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0
(<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0-3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0>)], via Wikimedia Commons*

Stadtführer in Südosteuropa sind meist zögerlich, wenn es darum geht, Bereiche mit brutalistischen Gebäuden zu präsentieren. Plattenbauten oder die zahlreichen Bauwerke, die die sozialistische Vergangenheit repräsentieren, werden so gut es geht gemieden. Es wird deutlich, dass eine Gemeinsamkeit, die die Menschen im Donauraum teilen, ihre Abneigung gegen diese Betonmonster ist („Concrete Monstrosity“: Ijeh 2015, S. 10). Tatsächlich sind es nicht nur Menschen im Donauraum, die diese Strukturen ablehnen. Ein Großteil der Architektur der 1960er Jahre wird von Menschen aus aller Welt immer noch mit drastischer Negativität betrachtet (ebd.). So bezeichnete der konservative britische Kolumnist

Anthony Daniels 2009 in einem Artikel im City Journal die Gebäude als Artefakte europäischer spiritueller, intellektueller und moralischer Deformität, die kaltherzig, unmenschlich und abscheulich sind (Dalrymple 2009). "You have to give this much to the Luftwaffe" sagte Prinz Charles unter Bezugnahme auf die vielen britischen brutalistischen Gebäude.

Offensichtlich wird in vielen Donauländern hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang, die früher starre autoritäre Regime hatten, nicht nur das ästhetische Erscheinungsbild, sondern auch die politische Symbolik dieser Betonblöcke abgelehnt. Infolgedessen wurden auch viele Gebäude abgerissen oder gingen zumindest in den Ruin, wie beispielsweise das beeindruckende Denkmal der Bulgarischen Kommunistischen Partei, das bis heute existiert, sich allerdings in einem jämmerlichen Zustand befindet (Bild 2).



*Bild 2: Buzludzha Monument in Bulgaria,
Credit: By Mark Ahsmann (Own work) [CC BY-SA 4.0
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In den letzten Jahren scheint sich jedoch in manchen Teilen der Gesellschaft ein Wandel der Wahrnehmung von Architektur zu vollziehen: Ein erstes Zeichen ist beispielsweise das Phänomen, dass immer mehr Cafés und Einzelhändler bewusst ihre Betonwände sichtbar machen, ihre Versorgungsleitungen frei legen und verborgene Baustoffe wie Stahl, Ziegel und Kabelkanäle zeigen. Dies geht einher mit einem zunehmenden öffentlichen Interesse und einer steigenden Bewunderung von Industriearchitektur. Ermutigt durch den Erfolg der heute 48.000 mitgliederstarken Facebook-Gruppe "Brutalism Appreciation Society" werden in Münster und Düsseldorf Ausstellungen zum Thema Brutalismus veranstaltet (moderneREGIONAL 2017). Auch die Initiative #SOSBrutalismus zielt darauf ab, "unsere geliebten Betonmonster" vor dem Abriss zu retten. #SOSBrutalismus als Initiative des Deutschen Architekturmuseums (DAM) und der Wüstenrot Stiftung initiiert zudem Ausstellungen zum Thema Brutalismus. Diese Wertschätzung wäre vor zehn Jahren "undenkbar" gewesen (Ijeh 2015, S. 10). Um eine solche Erweckung zu verstehen, sollte man sich die Gedanken hinter diesem harten Baustil ansehen.

Im Jahr 1953 prägte die britische Architektin Alison Smithson den Begriff Brutalismus und leitet ihn aus Le Corbusiers Idee von "béton brut" (deutsch: rauer beton) ab, der sich auf einen Stil bezieht und der mutig das Material (meist Beton) des Gebäudes offenlegt. Reyner Banham folgte dieser Idee 1955 mit seinem Essay "The New Brutalism" in der Zeitschrift *Architectural Review* und definierte ihn mit Hinweis auf drei wesentliche Kriterien (Banham 1955):

1. Formale Lesbarkeit des Grundrisses
2. Klare Darstellung der Konstruktion
3. Wertschätzung, Offenlegung und Präsentation der verwendeten Materialien



*Bild 3: Genex Tower, Belgrade, Serbia by Mihajlo Mitrovic, 1980
Credit: photograph by Blažej Pindor (Own work) [CC BY-SA 3.0
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Neben der Liste der grundlegenden Merkmale der brutalistischen Stile war Banham deutlich in dem was er beabsichtigte. Er vertrat eine Haltung der Kompromisslosigkeit und des Radikalismus: "[...] was den Neuen Brutalismus auszeichnet [...] ist gerade seine Brutalität, seine je-m'en-foutisme [seine 'I don't care'-Haltung], seine blutige Einstellung" (Banham 1955).

Ohne zu sehr ins Detail zu gehen, gibt es einige architektonische Ansätze, die als Vorläufer des Brutalismus angesehen werden können. Im Jahr 1920 entstand eine neue Architektur, die heute "klassische Moderne" genannt wird. Merkmale waren:

- Der Verzicht auf den Historismus und seine spielerischen Formen
- Kubische oder zylindrische Formen und Flachdächer
- Reduktion auf das Wesentliche und Verzicht auf Ornamente
- Eine Tendenz zum weißen oder cremefarbenen Putz
- Die Verwendung neuer Materialien wie Spannbeton, Stahl und Glas.

Der Brutalismus unterschied sich im Vergleich zu früheren modernen Architekturen, allerdings in manchen Bereichen grundlegend von früheren Ansätzen und insbesondere von den klaren Entwürfen der Bauhausschule: Beim Brutalismus ging es nicht so sehr um perfekte und einfache Formen, sondern um die kompromisslose "Präsentation der Konstruktion" und ihres Materials. Mit anderen Worten, auch wenn es nicht notwendigerweise schön aussieht - Brutalismus soll radikal und ehrlich sein.

Viele der sozialistischen Blöcke sind in der Tat nicht als brutalistische Entwürfe angelegt. Sie könnten teilweise der konstruktivistisch-sozialistischen Architektur zugeordnet werden, ein Stil, der in den 20er Jahren in der Sowjetunion florierte. Ziel war es, mit Hilfe modernster Technologien und Techniken die Einheit, Stärke und das Wohlergehen der

kommunistischen Gesellschaft zu fördern. Die sehr klassischen bahnbrechenden Projekte kamen in den 30er Jahren jedoch aus der Mode. Anschließend wurde in vielen Bauprojekten der Länder im Ostblock meist ohne klaren Rückgriff auf einen spezifischen Architekturstil insbesondere auf Symbolik von Stärke und Überlegenheit geachtet. Die brutalistische Architekturphilosophie wird dabei oft mit der utopischen Ideologie kommunistischer Regime in Verbindung gebracht. Darüber hinaus ist der Brutalismus selbst mit seiner kompromisslosen Betonung von Funktionalität und Institutionalismus untrennbar mit einer sozialistischen politischen Ideologie verbunden, weshalb er bei den Regierungen hinter dem ehemaligen Eisernen Vorhang so beliebt war (Ijeh 2015, S. 11). Tatsächlich waren auch die europäischen Architekten und Vordenker des Brutalismus, insbesondere die Briten Alison und Peter Smithson, in den 60er Jahren große Anhänger von kommunistischen Idealen. Mit der politischen Entwicklung in den europäischen sozialistischen Ländern sank jedoch die Unterstützung der westlichen Intellektuellen für die autokratischen Regime im Osten und somit auch für deren Bauten. Unabhängig davon, war die große Zeit der sozialistisch-brutalistischen Bauprojekte in den 60 Jahren gerade erst am Anfang. Von Mitte der 1960er bis Ende der 1980er Jahre (insbesondere in Bulgarien, der ehemaligen Tschechoslowakei, der DDR, der UdSSR und in Jugoslawien) stetig an (Kulić et al. 2012). Nach dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs wurde der Brutalismus auch von den neuen Regierungen als unmenschlich, kalt und einfach nur hässlich abgetan und mit dem damaligen Bauideal klar gebrochen. Die schlechten Erinnerungen an brutalistische Gemeinschaftsstrukturen sowie die politische Symbolik führten dazu, dass sie oft still und ohne viel Protest abgerissen wurden, um so Platz für eher traditionell orientierte Gebäude zu schaffen. Trotzdem sind viele der Beton-Bauten wie die massive Donaubrücke in Bratislava nach wie vor vorhanden und prägen die Donaustädte in ihrer Erscheinung.



*Bild 4: Evening shot of Nový Most (New Bridge) at the Danube in Bratislava,
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Ausblick und persönliche Einschätzung

Während die meisten Menschen den Brutalismus immer noch aus ästhetischen Gründen ablehnen, erlebt er, wie eingangs erwähnt, in manchen Kreisen - insbesondere, wenn Abrisspläne bekannt werden - eine neue Welle der Unterstützung (Ijeh 2015). Meist geht es dabei nicht unbedingt um das Bewahren einer zugeschriebenen Schönheit. Es geht oftmals darum Gebäude zu schützen, die einst als fortschrittlich, innovativ und optimistisch galten und grundsätzlich für eine Epoche stehen (Steven 2016, S. 90). Stilrichtungen ändern sich, folgen ästhetischen Trends und neuen Technologien. Oft halten sie nur wenige Jahre und werden anschließend völlig überholt (Ijeh 2015). So ist die Argumentation einiger Befürworter der brutalistischen Bauwerke unabhängig vom Objekt selbst: Baudenkmäler, die Teil der Menschheitsgeschichte repräsentieren, sollen erhalten werden, um die damit verbundene Geschichte nicht zu vergessen. In diesem Kontext sind auch die Anstrengungen des Deutschen Architekturmuseums zu sehen, die mit ihren aktuellen Veranstaltungen vor der potenziellen Zerstörung von Symbolen der Architekturgeschichte warnen (Deutsches Architekturmuseum 2016).

Neben der Begründung zur Bewahrung von kulturellem Erbe, könnte es aber auch weitere und interessantere Gründe geben, die die Wiederbelebung dieses radikalen Baustils erklären. Es stellt sich heute manch einer die Frage, ob es nicht zu einfach ist, den Brutalismus als „unmenschlich“ abzutun (Ijeh 2015, S. 11). Man könnte vermuten, dass die Kernidee von Banham und anderen Vertretern des Brutalismus - der Versuch der radikalen Offenheit - etwas ist, wonach Menschen sich heute sehnen.

Einer der besten Indikatoren, um die populäre Wahrnehmung von Ästhetik zu verstehen, ist ein Blick in die globalen Medien - Fakenews in

der Politik, aufgehübschte Bilder in sozialen Medien und operierte Körper bei Prominenten. Die brutalistische Idee der radikalen Offenlegung dessen, woraus Gebäude bestehen, kann als Gegenkonzept zu diesen Manipulationen und Verdeckung betrachtet werden: Man sieht, was es ist, offen und ehrlich – ohne das geltende Schönheitsideal zu entsprechen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund wäre es begrüßenswert, wenn wir unser architektonisches Erbe anerkennen würden – viele der beschriebenen Gebäude sind brutal hart. Viele sind sicherlich nicht mit konventionellen Ästhetikideen in Einklang zu bringen. Man könnte sie aber auf zwei Weisen zu schätzen beginnen:

1. Sie sind Symbole einer Zeit, die die Region mit allen Schwierigkeiten geprägt hat. Sie zu erhalten sind Teil einer ehrlichen Erinnerungskultur.
2. Sie sind Symbole der Ehrlichkeit. Die Tatsache, dass sie den Stein, aus dem sie gebaut sind; die Kabel, die Strom und Internet bringen; die Rohre, die Wasser und Wärme bringen, nicht verstecken, ist ein Zeichen von radikaler Transparenz.

Tatsächlich können diese zwei Ansätze auch in weiteren Dimensionen der gesellschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung relevant sein. In Zeiten eines wiederaufkommenden Nationalismus ist es wichtig, einen ehrlichen Blick auf die Vergangenheit zu haben. Diesem Gedanken folgend, könnte das Abreißen weniger schöner Gebäude auch dem Versuch einer Geschichtsverkittung gleichkommen. Genau dies lässt sich bei so manchen Ansätzen nationalistischer Politiker und Kommentatoren erkennen: Eine Vereinfachung und Glorifizierung der eigenen Nation unter Ausblendung der vielen dunklen Teile der eigenen Vergangenheit.

Darüber hinaus ist unser Alltag geprägt von Kitsch: Eine Welle aus plumpen, trivialen, teilweise sentimental anmutenden Inhalten überschwemmt unsere Gesellschaft insbesondere in den Sozialen Medien.

Bilder- und Videokommunikation ist meist unkonkret und zielt auf die emotional affektiven unterbewussten Reaktionen. Auch die politische Debatte wird oft von Bewegungen angestachelt, die vermeintlich einfache Antworten auf komplexe Herausforderungen verbreiten und damit genauso unwahr sind, wie Selfies, die mit Fotofiltern eine irreale Welt darstellen. In diesem Kontext kann der Brutalismus mit seiner radikalen Ehrlichkeit als Gegenkonzept gefeiert werden. Ideale wie Lesbarkeit einer komplexen Baustruktur und Wertschätzung und Offenlegung von Baustoffen stehen im Widerspruch zu Kitsch und Verschleierung. Es wäre begrüßenswert, wenn diese Ehrlichkeit und Anerkennung einer komplexen und nicht immer schönen Wirklichkeit sich auch in anderen Bereichen unserer Gesellschaft durchsetzen würde.

Neben dem grundsätzlichen Aufruf einer Neubewertung des architektonischen Erbes in der Donauregion lassen sich auch sehr praktisch einige Handlungsaufforderungen ableiten: Tourismusverbände und Regionalmarketing-Akteure sollten ehrlich mit dem wahren Erscheinungsbild der Städte umgehen. Die gehypte Stadt Berlin wird ja auch nicht für seine romantische Bausubstanz wie Florenz oder Paris gefeiert. Berlin gilt als ein ehrlicher Ort mit vielen interessanten, aber meist nicht wirklich schönen Plätzen. Davon lässt sich lernen: Es muss nicht nur um die Präsentation der schönen Seiten einer Stadt gehen. Es geht darum ein authentisches Bild einer interessanten Stadt zu zeigen. Somit ist die Zerstörung oder Ausblendung der sozialistischen Vergangenheit weder eine ehrliche noch sinnvolle Strategie für den Tourismus. Ein solches Ausblenden oder gar Ausschneiden eines Teils der Stadt repräsentiert auch eine Art Minderwertigkeitsgefühl, welches weder angebracht noch gut ist für eine Gesellschaft. Stadtverwaltungen im gesamten Donaauraum, auch an der oberen Donau, neigen allerdings dazu, Städte mit Kitsch zu verblenden und damit ihren wahren Charakter zu verschleiern. Dagegen

steht die brutale Offenheit der vermeidlich hässlichen Gebäude. Sie sind etwas Bewahrenswertes, was vor dem Hintergrund einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit der historischen Bedeutung, durchaus mit Selbstvertrauen gezeigt werden kann.

Die Donaustädte sollten diesen Gebäuden den Respekt zollen, den sie verdienen. Denn auch wenn sie nicht ausschließlich in dieser Region zuhause sind, so definieren sie tatsächlich viele Donaustädte in ihrem Erscheinungsbild. Meiner Meinung nach wäre es großartig, wenn man sie in Kontroversität bewahrt und damit zu Denkmälern der Wirklichkeit und Ehrlichkeit erklärt. Die Hoffnung liegt dabei auch darin, dass sich diese Symbolik auf unseren Alltag und politischen Diskurs auswirkt.

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Bernadette Gruber

European Regionalism and European Identity

Bernadette Gruber is a lecturer for the Robert Bosch Foundation at Nanjing University's Jingling College in China. E-mail: nanjing@boschlektoren.de

Abstract

The paper discusses European regionalism in relation to European identity as a catalyst of political loyalty to European Union. The motto of EU is seen as an expression of common identity. **“United in diversity”** means, that our European “we” is our togetherness in terms of debating, negotiating and decision making regarding the past. In this context, we the Europeans, have made war materially impossible, an achievement with implications for a safe future. Further on, our European “we” is our togetherness in terms of our prospects, i.e. our constant debate, negotiation and decision-making regarding values and goals in the common interest of all, while preserving our diverse local, regional/multiregional, national belongings. The paper argues, that the regional dimension brings about two-fold strengthening of our loyalty to EU and is therefore, an important construct of our European “we”.

Key words: European regionalism, European identity, EU

Introduction

The 2009 Lisbon treaty had introduced reforms in the political processes and the structures of EU. It had enhanced citizens' participation, creating a new institutional set-up and modifying the decision-making processes to increase efficiency and transparency. A higher level of parliamentary control and democratic accountability has been achieved. The Treaty adhered to the fundamental principles of democratic equality, representative democracy and participatory democracy in the form of a citizens' initiative. The European parliament was defined as 'composed of representatives of the Union's citizens', not of representatives of 'the peoples of the States'. The Treaty had strengthened the principle of subsidiarity by involving the national parliaments in the decision-making process¹.

In spite of these positive changes, European Union (EU) is still facing a deficit of political loyalty, as evidenced nowadays by the rise of nationalistic, anti-EU parties. The paper addresses this problem and focusses on an eventual solution through exploration of the potential of regionalism as a factor of self-identification of citizens with united Europe.

European Regionalism and European Identity

Europe has always been a matter of **identity**. Identity is constructed, changes and differs from one situation to another resulting in multiple identities. In the Middle Ages Christianity was the shared identity of the Europeans. With the renaissance and the humanist area the identification criteria became rational thinking. Latin was the common scientific

¹ See Roberta Panizza. The Treaty of Lisbon.
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/5/the-treaty-of-lisbon>,
accessed on 28 October 2018

language and the Dutch renaissance humanist Erasmus of Rotterdam proposed *Res publica litteraria*, Europe united as the civilized world (Kornazheva, 2009).

Wolfgang Schumann gives an example about his assumption of European identity (2005, p.1):

As my family was living as farmers in the foothills of the Alps for several generations, being part of the Catholic Church, speaking a strong Bavarian dialect and holding on to cultural traditions, I identify as a Bavarian. Due to my German school education in language, history and politics, I consider myself as German. Participating in a European youth organization and having a lot of similar minded friends all over Europe, the political actor I feel attached to in our globalized world is the European Union. And when thinking about the goals the EU should aim for, I recognize I have a cosmopolitan world view and want political actors to act in favor of the population in the whole world.

Until 1945 the identity of Europe was associated with wars, exclusion of others and domination of force. To make wars materially impossible, the community method of integration has been implemented since 1950 and new values have been adopted as explicit of European identity: democracy, human rights, rule of law and inclusion. (Kornazheva, 2009).

Regional identity has been a part of the multiple European identities for centuries. The term 'region' is defined in different ways (Popescu & Nica, 2011; Scully & Jones, 2010). Webster (2017) offers six definitions. The word *regio* originates in the Latin word *regere* (Eng.: to direct) and has several meanings: line, direction and area (ibid.). Current synonyms are nowadays *demesne* and *zone* (ibid.). What all definitions have in common is a shared answer to the question What makes the region a region and limits it. Either the geographic location is the shared feature and the region in itself is

divided by others or there is one uniting aspect making a certain area one unity like “an administrative area” (Webster, 2017, p.1) or “a sphere of activity or interest” (ibid.). Popescu and Nica (2011) see essentially a region as a living space referring to Denis de Rougemont (1977) embracing a shared way of living as preserved in traditions and customs:

Culturally seen, a region can cross national borders through shared culture. I, for example, was born in the Austrian city of Salzburg, even though I have a German passport. Referring to my nationality of course I am German. Talking about my region, I refer to the rural area in the most northern part of the Alps where people speak a dialect of Higher German and for traditional festivities wear Dirndl and Lederhose. This includes the southeast of Germany and northwestern parts of Austria.

Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister in 1950 had originally German citizenship (EU, 2017). He was born in a border region, nowadays Luxembourgian territory, the Lorraine region between Germany and France, which was several times subjected by both nation states in war times, in 1871 and 1918. Schuman is considered one of the founders of the European Union, as he set the base for it with the proposal for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It is well known, that he saw himself as a real European. It is estimated, that due to the negative effects of the conflicts between France and Germany on his family and himself, the reconciliation of the neighboring countries was a political matter close to his heart.

Even if no official agreement at EU level has been achieved to define the term ‘region’ (Popescu & Nica, 2011), in academic discourse European regionalism has become a very popular concept (Applegate, 2003). Within the evolving European Communities resulting in European Union as a sui-generis organization, regional actors have been playing influential roles.

New types of regions have appeared on the EU map, i.e. regions for cross-border cooperation at the opened internal frontiers, and macro-regions for transnational cooperation, such as the Baltic and the Danube regions. Regional actors have been effective in transforming the institutional structure of the Union, and Committee of the Regions had been established to represent their interests.

Regions have impacted EU policy making, and nowadays regional development is one of the most persistent policy areas. After the first enlargement of the EU, the Northern Enlargement in 1973 with Denmark, Ireland and the UK, the European Fund for Regional Development was set up in 1977. Monetary resources to support areas to adapt to the demands of the larger market has been provided. The Southern Enlargement with Greece, Spain and Portugal joining the Union made more structural and social funds necessary. One third of the Union's budget was then spent on regions. Caring about the regions which were dependent mainly on agriculture, was a successful strategy, as it made farmers accept the Union's politics and the supranational political level over the national governments.

Probably this initial euphoria has been forgotten over the years and is taken for granted these days. Voters in favor of Brexit are surprisingly well-represented in the rural areas considered development zones in Great Britain like Wales and until now depending on high EU subsidies in the agricultural sector (Hübsch, 2018). The current struggle on a Brexit deal or no deal and hard Brexit has to worry at least some of them (ibid.).

Until nowadays the European Regional Development Fund exists and supports for example with 500€ million the interregional cooperation

program INTERREG V C 2014-2020². The motto of the organization INTERREG IVC is "Innovation & Environment - Regions of Europe sharing solutions"³.

Examples for the cross-border cooperation are often between two states in a field of mutual interest. Cost-intensive cooperation in the medical field are a wide-spread type of cross-border projects and interregional assistance (European Union, 2016). Academic partnership is a popular way of collaboration between two neighboring cities for example between Salzburg and Munich in the Austrian-German border region having established shared study degrees between two of their universities or the BRIE initiative between the University of Ruse in Bulgaria, the Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Romania and German institutions (Kornazheva & Apostol, 2006).

Cooperation beyond borders is not only profitable in an economic sense but also in a mind shaping way. Horga (2007) sees an essential contribution in order to create a European public space to be made by local, regional and national media in the way of referring to borders. The usage of *European* as an attribute instead of listing the participating nations is a useful beginning to change the meaning of national borders, considered insuperable by the European citizens due to national history education (Horga, 2007).

Cooperation at regional level is actually a process of developing European identity. To assert this thesis, I will refer to the case of the EU Strategy for the Danube region and its implementation.

² http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index.cfm/en/policy/cooperation/european-territorial/interregional/

³ <http://www.interreg4c.eu/programme/index.html>

The Strategy brings together supranational, as well as national and subnational decision makers from 14 states. They all comply with the EU multi-level governance, which is an evidence of political loyalty and identification. Their motivation for togetherness is catalyzed not only by their geographical belonging to the Danube river basin, but by their political will to transform it into a corridor for freedoms of movement Europe-wide, a space of rich cultural heritage, environmental diversity, security, innovation and prosperity. The involvement of actors from non-EU member states such as Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Moldova is also a process of European identity building. Participation of their governments and citizens enables them to learn about EU values and policies, the "language" of European integration. Learning of a language is a process of identity building, as well (Norton, B. and Toohey, K.).

The Strategy creates epistemic communities, networks of experts, managers and beneficiaries, who exchange know how and implement projects. At the same time, they are adhering to social values, norms of behavior and collective symbols (Jacobs, D and R. Maier, 1998), indicative of EU. These communities are transnational, their "we" is actually a part of the practice of European identity.

Conclusion

It has been argued, that European regionalism is related to European identity. The motto of EU is an expression of the European identity, i.e. "united in diversity" means, that we are Europeans in the processes of constant negotiation of our common values and goals, and at the same time we are Europeans when we perceive these values and goals through the lenses of our aspirations to preserve our diverse heritage - our national, local and regional, belongings.

Therefore, the regional dimension is an important construct of the two aspects of European identity: (1) we are *Europeans* when we are involved into the constant negotiation and renegotiation of the regional development as an ever-persistent EU goal, (2) we are *Europeans*, when our regional belonging calls for our involvement into constant negotiation and action on the achievement of that goal. The practice of European regionalism positions regional development higher in the political agenda of EU, it brings European diversity together and supports the building of European political identity.

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Marko Radić

Croats into *Gastarbeiter*: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

*Marko Radić holds an MA in History from the University of Zagreb.
marko.radic1@yahoo.com*

The arrival of so-called *Gastarbeiter*, foreign workers who carried out the weight of German economic expansion of the post-World War II era, stands out as one of most important topics of contemporary German economic history. Among these guest workers there was a significant number of Croats, who arrived in West Germany leaving behind socialist Yugoslavia of which Croatia was a part. There is a variety of reasons that made Croats search for a better life in the Federal Republic of Germany, with Croatia's century-long history of outward migration not being the least among them. Alongside with the from growing unemployment caused by an attempted reform of a dysfunctional socialist economy as the most important one, there were also other causes: the specific position socialist Yugoslavia had in the bipolarized Cold War world, the unfavorable position of Croats and Croatia in Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia's demographic conditions, the production and financing gap between developed and underdeveloped Yugoslav republics, political peculiarities of Yugoslav socialism and Yugoslavia's internal political disputes. In addition to local

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

causes, European and global processes must equally be taken into consideration:

West Germany's postwar position, both its political pursuit of an elusive *Wiedervereinigung* and its economic miracle, European south to north labor migration, as well as a position of overall inferiority of socialism versus capitalist economies. These different causes colluded during late

1960's and early 1970's to produce favorable conditions for one of the densest migratory waves in Croatian history, having huge impact on Croatian society and its demographics.

The time frame of this paper is marked by two decisive moments: its opening year marks the decision of Yugoslav government to start change its rigid rules of migration and slowly liberalize its migration regime. The closing year marks the decision of West German government to ban further immigration of guest workers.

Since neither West Germany nor Yugoslavia had statistical data on the ethnicity of Yugoslav migrants, they are mostly present in statistics only as Yugoslavs. We know, however, from contemporary literature that, according to the results of 1971 census, there were over 400,000 Yugoslav workers in West Germany, with over 38 percent coming from Croatia. A total of around 250,000 came from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, another Yugoslav republic with high numbers of Croats. The areas with highest emigration rate both in relative and absolute terms were in

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

Croatia.¹ Number of Yugoslav emigrants peaked in 1973, with 1,1 million Yugoslav citizens on temporary labor abroad, mostly in Western European countries.² Over two thirds were young men, overwhelmingly industrial and agricultural workers, and almost half of them stayed abroad for more than 5 years, slowly turning from temporary labor migration into permanent diaspora.³ After mid 1970's, mostly due to the first energy crisis of 1973-1974, Western European economies fulfilled their needs for unskilled labor and started introducing measures to limit immigration, with German decision of November 1973 to restrict employment of workers from non-EEC countries (Anwerbestopp) being the most important one for Yugoslav migrants.⁴

Certain aspects of Croatian labor migration can be explained by numerous migration theories. The attractiveness of Western Europe to workers from a socialist country partly fits into both micro and macro levels of migration theory of neoclassical economics, one of the oldest theoretical approaches to international migration which emphasizes wage differentials between emigration country and receiving country. The need of developed

¹ Christopher A. Molnar, "Imagining Yugoslavs: migration and the Cold War in postwar West Germany", *Central European History*, 47 (2014), pp. 138–169, at p. 146; Ivo Baučić, "Stanje vanjskih migracija iz Jugoslavije krajem sedamdesetih godina", *Rasprave o migracijama*, 57 (1979), pp. 1-46, at p. 16; Vladimir Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno. Jugoslovenski gastarbajteri u SR Nemačkoj i Austriji 1965–1973* (Beograd, 2012), pp. 70-72.

² Ivana Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem. Odlazak jugoslovenskih državljana na rad u zemlje zapadne Evrope 1960–1977", *Istorija 20. veka*, 2 (2007), pp. 89-100, at p. 96; Sara Bernard, "Il ritorno dei gastarbajteri nella politica migratoria della Jugoslavia socialista (1969-1991)", *Percorsi storici*, 1(2013), pp. 1-13.

³ Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem", p. 96-97; Molnar, "Imagining Yugoslavs", p. 146.

⁴ Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem", pp. 97-98; Bernard, "Il ritorno dei gastarbajteri", pp. 1-3; Pol O'Dochartaigh, *Germany since 1945* (Basingstoke, New York, 2004), p. 125.

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

economies for unskilled workers is explained by dual labor market theory, which stresses differentiated labor demands of industrial societies as key element at structuring immigration. Since industrial societies need workers at the bottom who will accept least desirable, unstable, precarious jobs without causing structural inflation. Continuous flow of Croats to West Germany is well interpreted by the network theory, which underlines the importance of interpersonal ties between migrants and non-migrants in supporting further migration, but also by migration systems theory which by identifying international migration systems as stable channels of exchange between certain states serves to explain the connection between West Germany and Yugoslavia.⁵

However, these theories do not explain a number of migration causes, especially the push factors of Yugoslavia's internal political and economic disputes or its foreign relations policies. In this article I will make an overview of causes that are not adequately explained by existing theories of international migration. First, I will elaborate different aspects of Yugoslavia's political positions, both internally and abroad. Then I will turn to economic conditions that set the migratory pattern in motion. Finally, I will outline the development of socialist Yugoslavia's migratory policies, as well as demographic trends stimulating migration.

⁵ Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, J. Edward Taylor, "Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal", *Population and Development Review*, 3 (1993), pp. 431-466; Milan Mesić, "Međunarodne migracije – teorijski pristupi", in: Vlado Puljiz, Josip Tica, Davorko Vidović, eds., *Migracije i razvoj Hrvatske. Podloga za hrvatsku migracijsku strategiju* (Zagreb, 2014), pp. 157-175.

1. Relations with Cold War Blocs

One of the important levers in the initial launch of economic migration from socialist Yugoslavia to the Federal Republic of Germany has to be sought in the early stages of socialist Yugoslavia's foreign relations with the two blocs.

Yugoslav communists built their autonomy from the Soviet Union on the successes of their victory in the partisan war against Nazi Germany and its allies, reached mostly without assistance from the Red Army. The position of Tito and his Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) differed from any other Eastern European Communist regime, since other Communist movements relied on the Soviet Union in every respect and had neither an independent source of power matching Tito's partisan army, nor personal allegiance of Party members to the leader comparable to the loyalty of Yugoslav communists to Tito. Being no soft-liners, Yugoslav communists were, in some respects, even more radical than the Soviets. Although Tito was widely considered as Stalin's most loyal affiliate, first conflicts between Yugoslav and Soviet communist movements occurred already during the war. However, further deterioration of relations came about in the immediate post-war years. During the period of establishing the Communist regime, Tito and other leading Yugoslav Communists pursued the most far-reaching revolutionary policy in Eastern Europe, being the first in every element of sovietization: Soviet-style constitution, brutal sanctions against opponents, central planning and collectivization. The overly energetic Yugoslav approach to the pursuit of a socialist revolution was matched by their radical foreign policy, which clashed with more cautious plans and needs of Stalin's USSR, especially considering Soviet foreign policy in the Balkans. Apart from Yugoslav tendencies towards independence from Moscow, it was this radicalism of Tito and his Party

that initiated the conflict with Stalin. Their radical approach fell in line with the radical faction in Soviet leadership, urging Stalin to react. Communist Party of Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform in 1948, established in 1947 in place of the pre-war Comintern, the incident that effectively set it in conflict with the rest of the communist bloc. Although Tito managed to retain control over his Party, the break up between Yugoslavia and other Communist movements, reflecting immediately in an economic boycott of Yugoslavia by the entire Soviet bloc from 1949 on, pushed Yugoslavia towards a moderation of foreign policy and a new start in relations with Western countries. Being an underdeveloped, war-destroyed, mostly agricultural country under blockade, with skyrocketing defense expenditures, Yugoslavia had to change. Although change meant accepting economic and military aid from the United States and other western countries, Yugoslavia remained an orthodox Communist country below the surface.⁶ This shift was mirrored in a gradual development of new doctrines over the next decades, making the regime more acceptable to the West. It was also echoed in an almost overnight receptiveness to western cultural models, as well as a certain degree of liberalization in

⁶ Ivo Banac, "Yugoslav communism and the Yugoslav state", in: Norman Naimark, Silvio Pons, and Sophie Quinn-Judge, eds., *The Cambridge history of communism, 2* (Cambridge, 2017), pp. 573-579; Archie Brown, *The rise and fall of communism* (London, 2009) pp. 203-209; Beatrice Heuser, *Western 'containment' policies in the Cold War. The Yugoslav case, 1948-53* (London and New York, 1989) pp. 20-35, 68-70, 81-102, 208; William R. Keylor, *A world of nations. The international order since 1945* (Oxford, New York, 2003) pp. 8-9, 17; Vladimir Velebit, *Moj život* (Zaprešić, 2016) pp. 498-502.

comparison to the bloc countries – a hurried attempt to reinvent Yugoslavia as a western communist ally.⁷

Very soon after Yugoslav communists broke off from the rest of the communist world, Western aid started flowing into Yugoslavia. Although relations of the West with Yugoslavia were, up to the moment of Tito – Stalin split, equally strained as its relations with the Soviet Union, the West decided to help Yugoslavia immediately because its defiance to Stalin was seen as an alluring heresy: it was an outstanding opportunity of encouraging other Eastern European countries to sever their ties with USSR as well. Attempts at undermining Soviet influence have been part of Western containment policy, formulated in the Truman Doctrine, ever since the beginning of the Cold War, but after clashes over Iran, Turkey and Greece, the split between Tito and Stalin offered a unique option of driving a wedge into the heart of Stalin's empire. It therefore pushed Yugoslavia into the foreground of Western containment plans and made it a recipient of Western financial aid. The strategy of containment was complemented by active economic aid policies aimed at boosting European economies, most notable among those being European Recovery Program, widely known as Marshall Plan. Economic aid was a crucial part of a broader, active strategy to project power into regions of strategic importance – and it was exactly the Tito-Stalin split that offered an opportunity to project American power through aid to Tito's Yugoslavia

⁷ Heuser, *Western 'containment' policies*, pp. 57-59; Celia Hawkesworth, "Images of the West in Serbian and Croatian prose fiction, 1945-1995", in: Andrew Hammond, ed., *The Balkans and the West. Constructing the European other, 1945-2003* (Aldershot, Burlington, 2004) p. 85; Tatjana Šarić, "Bijeg iz socijalističke Jugoslavije – ilegalna emigracija iz Hrvatske od 1945. do početka šezdesetih godina 20. stoljeća", *Migracijske i etničke teme*, 2 (2015), pp. 195-220, at p. 197.

into Eastern Europe.⁸ United States has been the leading foreign aid donor after World War II, with primarily security and strategic goals. Content to see aid as *realpolitik* means, the US government has largely acted contrary to its public statements, ignoring political or ideological issues concerning the recipient regimes. It was this realism that overnight made Tito's regime eligible for American aid.⁹ Aid to Tito's Yugoslavia started flowing at first in the form of small gestures, like first sales of crude oil, enabled by exemption of Yugoslavia from trade restrictions. First Western credits to Yugoslavia were negotiated in September 1949, with other credits following forthwith, totaling hundreds of millions of dollars by 1953. Credits were provided by the American government itself, International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other Western governments. This economic incentive did not necessarily make Tito follow Western goals in many foreign policy issues, nor did it make Yugoslavia non-communist, but it "kept Tito afloat", as the policy of sustaining Yugoslavia's defiance to Soviet Union was called.¹⁰

⁸ Heuser, *Western 'containment' policies*, pp. 10-20, 48-49, 64-67, 81-85; Keylor, *A world of nations*, pp. 11-27; Lloyd C. Gardner, *Three kings. The rise of an American empire in the Middle East after World War II* (New York, London, 2009), *passim*; Jacob Magid, "The Marshall Plan", *Advances in Historical Studies*, 1 (2012), pp. 1-7; J. Bradford De Long, Barry Eichengreen, *The Marshall Plan: history's most successful structural adjustment program. Working Paper No. 3899* (Cambridge, MA, 1991), pp. 1-66.

⁹ Foreign aid is often harming a society's transfer to democracy by strengthening the government, thereby in fact sustaining dictatorships and reducing government accountability to its tax payers. Aid has also been charged of causing corruption, wasteful public consumption, dependency and a rent-seeking mentality. When specific failures of Yugoslav economy are taken into consideration, excessive foreign aid should probably be held accountable a number of problems plaguing Yugoslav economy throughout its existence. Marijke Breuning and Christopher Linebarger, "Foreign Aid", in: Steven W. Hook and Christopher M. Jones, eds., *Routledge handbook of American foreign policy* (London and New York, 2012) p. 347-355.

¹⁰ Heuser, *Western 'containment' policies*, pp. 82-102, 184-192, 219.

Apart from economic aid, his preservation of Yugoslavia's independence gained significant importance in the development of Western defense strategies against a presumed Soviet attack on continental Europe. Its crucial strategic importance was even more increased after the start of the Korean conflict and was mirrored in Western decisions to provide not only economic support, but also military aid to Yugoslavia. There were even considerations whether to use nuclear weapons in case of a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia.¹¹ Yugoslavia's strategic position made it one of the focal points of early stages of Cold War.

New Western relations to Yugoslavia were based on the assumed possibility of a peaceful coexistence with non-aggressive Communist governments. The new approach laid foundation for the differentiation between Moscow-led Communism, seen as inherently expansionist and inimical, and states with Communist regimes that are not actively working against the West, the latter therefore being considered as possible partners. It was this *realpolitisch* precedent that effectively set up the Yugoslav Cold War position and made its openness to the West possible.¹²

Although Yugoslavia had used its position after Tito-Stalin split well, playing a decisive role in Western containment policies, ideological differences between Western democracies and Tito's regime remained an important obstacle.¹³ Process of close cooperation with the West, culminating during 1951 and 1952, ended with the death of Stalin in 1953, when Yugoslavia gradually started building its equidistant position

¹¹ Heuser, *Western 'containment' policies*, pp. 112-125, 149-187.

¹² *Ibid.* pp. 59-68.

¹³ Dragan Bogetić, "Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu", *Istorija 20. veka*, 2 (2008), pp. 315-370, at pp. 316-318. ^{14 15}

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

towards both Cold War blocs.¹⁴ Throughout the Cold War Yugoslavia found herself repeatedly in danger of isolation from both East and West, which, after a period of "non-bloc socialism" between 1955 and 1961, led her to look for new allies. The result became known as the Non-Aligned Movement.¹⁵ Claiming itself "non-aligned", Yugoslavia was thereafter able to adjust its ideological position to its economic needs and to float between the two superpowers. She could therefore keep open towards the West with its imports, its loans and its markets, more than any other communist country, providing her with an opportunity for a radically different migratory policy compared with the Soviet bloc.

2. Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany

The most important issue in the immediate aftermath of World War II was the political future of defeated Germany, a "bombed-out, shell-shocked country of displaced persons".¹⁶ The discussions on postwar policy toward Germany between the Allied powers were blocked by disputes between Anglo-Americans and the Soviet Union, mostly over the issues of reparations and the eventual establishment of institutions that would administer the country as a single political unit. The gradual intensification of their confrontations eventually led to a halt in negotiations within the Four-Power network, and to establishment of two separate German states in 1949 – Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic. Federal Republic of Germany, established on the territories of former American, British and French occupation zones, almost immediately

¹⁴ Banac, "Yugoslav communism and the Yugoslav state", p. 579; Bogetić, "Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu", pp. 320-343.

¹⁵ Banac, "Yugoslav communism and the Yugoslav state", pp. 580-584; Bogetić, "Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu", pp. 342-347, 352-366.

¹⁶ Keylor, *A world of nations*, pp. 36.

ceased to be treated as a former enemy by the Western powers, with restrictions on its industrial production alleviated. The new Republic became a firm supporter of the West in the Cold War and a valuable partner in the international economic order. The course of American economic aid and the pursuit of the free market policies quickly brought the Federal Republic, immediately nicknamed West Germany, a long era of economic growth, re-establishing its former position of one of the world industrial powers.¹⁷

Yugoslavia's turn to the West after the break with the Soviet Union also led to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1951/1952, and to signing of first economic agreements. In a few years, FRG became one of Yugoslavia's most important economic partners, accounting for between 10 and 15 percent of its imports and exports.¹⁸ Throughout the Cold War era, West Germany remained one of Yugoslavia's chief economics partners as well as one of its main creditors.¹⁹ However, when Yugoslavia in 1957 recognized the German Democratic Republic as well, it led to an instant break of diplomatic relations with FRG, thereby making Yugoslavia the only country to ever suffer consequences of the so-called Hallstein doctrine.²⁰

¹⁷ Keylor, *A world of nations*, pp. 24-36.

¹⁸ Molnar, "Imagining Yugoslavs", p. 142; Sabrina Petra Ramet, "Yugoslavia and the two Germanys", in: Dirk Verheyen and Christian S e, eds., *The Germans and their neighbors* (Boulder, CO, 1993), p. 318; Kaja Shonick, "Politics, culture, and economics: reassessing the West German guest worker agreement with Yugoslavia", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 4 (2009), pp. 719-736, at p. 724.

¹⁹ Ramet, "Yugoslavia and the two Germanys", pp. 323-324.

²⁰ Molnar, "Imagining Yugoslavs", p. 142; Ramet, "Yugoslavia and the two Germanys", pp. 318-319; for a detailed analysis of the problem, see: Dušan Ne ak, *Hallsteinova doktrina i Jugoslavija* (Zagreb, 2004), passim.

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

During the next decades, the issues of World War II lay a heavy burden on West German – Yugoslav relations: Yugoslavia demanded the payout of war reparations and questioned West German support of Croatian political emigration. On the other hand, fears of communist infiltration became increasingly important in the FRG's discussions about guest workers, especially those coming from socialist Yugoslavia.²¹ Nevertheless, since the period of Erhard's government, there were increasing contacts between the two countries, with a new economic agreement of 1964 marking an overture in Bonn's renewed interest in relations with Eastern Europe.²² West German – Yugoslav relations reached a new stage when the Grand Coalition came to power in 1966. The new foreign minister of the Federal Republic, Willy Brandt, devised a new approach towards the communist Eastern Europe, and improving relations with Yugoslavia was an important entry point of this new *Ostpolitik*. The conclusion of a labor recruitment treaty with SFRY in 1968 became an opening step toward an improvement of relations with the East in general, with Brandt imagining Yugoslav labor migrants and German tourists as bearers of the new idea of Cold War détente. This labor agreement was strongly opposed by West German Ministry of Labor on economic grounds, but foreign policy interests gained the upper hand, giving a huge impulse to Yugoslav immigration to the Federal Republic.²³

²¹ Molnar, "Imagining Yugoslavs", pp. 144-154; Ramet, "Yugoslavia and the two Germanys", pp. 319-320; for further explanations of the negotiations on reparations, see Zoran Janjetović, *Od Auschwitza do Brijuna: pitanje odštete žrtvama nacizma u jugoslavensko zapadnonjemačkim odnosima* (Zagreb, 2007), passim.

²² Ramet, "Yugoslavia and the two Germanys", p. 320.

²³ Molnar, "Imagining Yugoslavs", pp. 158-169; Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno*, pp. 105-130; Shonick, "Politics, culture, and economics", pp. 719-736; a thorough examination of mutual relations between FRG and SFRY in the years leading up to the restoration of diplomatic ties in 1968 can be found in: Dušan Nečak, *„Ostpolitik“ Willyja Brandta i Jugoslavija (1963.-1969.)* (Zagreb, 2015), passim.

3. Yugoslavia's Internal Disputes

An important cause of migration was Yugoslavia's internal political landscape and its conflicts. The harsh centralism of the early years and the campaign against nationalism made the so called "national question" appear dissolved. But, during the 1960s, those issues came back to the forefront of political discussion during the clashes between two blocs that have formed in the Yugoslav ruling communist party, LCY (League of Communists of Yugoslavia).²⁴ Although not official factions in the LCY, which remained firmly centralized in the hands of the ageing Josip Broz Tito, two blocs were formed around most important social issues: the ones concerning relations among Yugoslav nations and those concerning the form of Yugoslav economy.

One faction promoted centralization, and a common Yugoslav identity, considering nationalisms of respective Yugoslav nations to be dangerous to the unity of the country. Members of this group used these ideas with the main aim of preserving their positions in the federal state administration and were therefore opposed to all decentralizing tendencies in Yugoslav economy, such as selfmanagement, emancipation of the economy from the state, emergence of the market. Considering themselves to be true to real ideals of Marxism-Leninism, they were mostly in favor of closer relations with Moscow, were associated with the older

²⁴ Banac, "Yugoslav communism and the Yugoslav state", pp. 584-585.

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

generation of Yugoslav communists and supportive of all centralist ideas – be it in culture, politics or economy.²⁵

The other faction considered the federal state bureaucracy to be the main obstacle to economic development and saw government's unsustainable investment policies as means of keeping the existing bureaucratic apparatus in power. Federalists were also the biggest adherents of bringing the proclaimed ideals of workers' self-management into practice, which meant a more independent role of republics and companies as well as rising the levels of productivity through market practices. All of these ideas summed up to so-called market socialism, and their pronounced support for republics' independent economic role made them also support various expressions of national identities. This position was also underpinned by the majority of federalists coming from Yugoslavia's most productive republics of Croatia and Slovenia. Federalists were also in favor of opening up to the global market and further distancing from the Soviet bloc. It was the federalists who opened the way for the economic reform of 1965 through their political fight for decentralized republic-based economies.²⁶

²⁵ Banac, "Yugoslav communism and the Yugoslav state", pp. 585-592; Jakov Sirotković, *Hrvatsko gospodarstvo. Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika* (Zagreb, 1996), pp. 21, 28, 40; Duško Sekulić, *Tržište, planiranje i samoupravljanje* (Zagreb, 1987), p. 134; Hrvoje Matković, *Povijest Jugoslavije. Hrvatski pogled* (Zagreb, 1998), pp. 333-340; Zdenko Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945. – 1991. Od zajedništva do razlaza* (Zagreb, 2006), pp. 335, 346-353, 403-412; Hrvoje Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet 1968* (Zagreb, 2012), p. 26; Branko Horvat, *ABC jugoslavenskog socijalizma* (Zagreb, 1989), pp. 23-24; Dennison Rusinow, „Facilis decensus averno”, in Dragutin Lalović, ed., *Hrvatsko i jugoslavensko „proljeće” 1962-1972* (Zagreb, 2014), pp. 57, 62; Goran Sunajko, „Hrvatsko proljeće i načela ustavnih reformi”, in Tvrtko Jakovina, ed., *Hrvatsko proljeće 40 godina poslije* (Zagreb, 2012), pp. 205-223.

²⁶ Banac, "Yugoslav communism and the Yugoslav state", pp. 585-592; Sekulić, *Tržište, planiranje i samoupravljanje*, 147-155; Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 333-335, 346; Matković, *Povijest Jugoslavije*, 333-340; Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet*, 20-22.

The federalists lost the battle when Tito decided to side with the centralists and eliminate Croatian and Serbian pre-reform federalist leaderships between late 1971 and late 1972. The winning centralist faction was the one conducting Yugoslavia's political and economic life since 1945, creating an uncompetitive economy and a totalitarian political regime, and thereby setting the stage for mass emigration as soon as borders were open. The failure of the reformist faction to design a functional reform blueprint and its failure to win the political battles needed to set the plan fully in motion meant missing what became the last opportunity for Yugoslavia to liberalize and democratize.

4. Yugoslavia's Economic System

The first economic model, implemented by Yugoslav communists after World War II, has in all of its forms and goals mirrored the Soviet ideal, creating thereby a highly centralized economy to match its highly centralized political system. Conditioned by autarchic Stalinist concepts (and additionally strengthened by the paranoid mentality developed after the break with the Soviet bloc), the basic goal of this economic model was rapid industrialization at the expense of existing light industry and agriculture. However, high levels of growth, achieved through high investment, were not matched by high productivity – expensive investment, as well as Communist ideology, left no room for productivity incentives to Yugoslavia's cheap labor force. Although this model was abandoned soon after the emancipation from the Soviet bloc, its main

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

focus on huge but ineffective investments, as well as the long-term imbalances it created, troubled the Yugoslav economy until its very end.²⁷

This economic model also created a vast state bureaucracy that was to keep its position and its power throughout and in spite of all the attempts at reform made in the next forty years. The basic segments of the economic system stayed within its jurisdiction: apart from the investment policy, the state exercised control over pricing, monetary and credit systems and foreign exchange operations, and the centralized tax policy practically annulled the independence of the republics, making federal state bureaucracy the most important economic factor of Tito's Yugoslavia. It was this federal bureaucracy that tried to equalize Yugoslavia's unevenly developed republics by political, rather than economic measures, implementing vast, economically unsound investment projects in industries of underdeveloped republics, thus repeatedly creating inflation and stimulating further credits from abroad.²⁸

After the break with the Soviet bloc, Yugoslav communists tried to develop their own „road to socialism“ at the beginning of 1950's, a cosmetic change of the system mostly motivated by Yugoslavia's dealings with liberal democracies. The basic aims of this reform – aims to be revisited in every reform attempt until Yugoslavia's breakup – which came to be known as workers' self-management, were said to be the reduction of

²⁷ Sekulić, *Tržište, planiranje i samoupravljanje*, pp. 120–121, 126–139; John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as history. Twice there was a country* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 229, 238–250, 253–256, 260–271; Matković, *Povijest Jugoslavije*, pp. 286–295, 306–307, 317–319; Zoran Jašić, *Budžet i privredni razvoj* (Zagreb, 1980), pp. 167–169; Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 177–198, 201–204, 216–233, 242–248, 284–285; Sirotković, *Hrvatsko gospodarstvo*, 13–16, 18, 27, 30, 208; Tvrtko Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici* (Zagreb, 2002), *passim*.

²⁸ Sirotković, *Hrvatsko gospodarstvo*, 13 – 47; Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, pp. 219–221.

state administration's power and its "bureaucratism" through some market economy principles as well as the gradual strengthening of the position of republics in relation to the federal state. These changes have brought minor decision making back to the economy, but real control of the economic system ended placed even more firmly in the hands of the LCY and state bureaucracy, especially through investment mechanisms and tax policy. The state continued with huge investments, so badly planned that they even had to be funded through further emissions of money, creating inevitable inflation.²⁹

It soon became obvious that serious reforms were unavoidable, and that meant more market economy principles and an economy free from state tutelage. Western aid, already totaling billions of dollars, was an important incentive in opening the economy to the market.³⁰ It was the need for reforms that polarized two unofficial factions of the LCY – the federalists and the centralists – and brought their disputes to a head in the beginning of 1970's. The first reforms started in 1961, aiming at handing more decisions over to the economy, but failed because of lack of preparations and knowledge, continuing low productivity levels and further unwarranted investments. It led to a retreat back to a fully centralized economic system. Still, some of the reform processes resulted in a more reasonable approach to production which led to first lay-offs of socialist

²⁹ Sirotković, *Hrvatsko gospodarstvo*, pp. 20-21; Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet*, 17-19; Sekulić, *Tržište, planiranje i samoupravljanje*, pp. 120-124, 139-147, 272; Matković, *Povijest Jugoslavije*, 307-310, 314-333; Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, pp. 238-241, 284-290, 293, 349; Jašić, *Budžet i privredni razvoj*, pp. 173-198; Lampe, *Yugoslavia as history*, pp. 229-230, 249-253, 256-258, 273-277.

³⁰ Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet*, 19-20, 23; Lampe, *Yugoslavia as history*, 253-256, 266-278; Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 279-284.

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

Yugoslavia.³¹ Despite this failure, federalist faction kept on pushing and by 1965, Yugoslavia was ready to try again. New reform cycle started in 1965, and set the same aims more radically, trying even to introduce a communist version of the idea of profit and to open Yugoslavia to the global economy.

But the federal state bureaucracy turned out to be too powerful, and the reform ended up one more time providing it with further means to strengthen its position and continue its unsound policies, which meant additional foreign loans. The failure of these reform policies meant additional deterioration of the economy. It was unprepared even for limited exposure to market principles and foreign competition, and heavily burdened by the state. On the other hand, since the workers councils of labor-managed firms gained rights to distribute their part of their income between wages and investment, it distorted new employment by maximizing income, thereby obstructing efficient allocation of labor. Employment rates fell drastically, accompanied by lay-offs, and the number of permanently unemployed reached 200,000. These processes led to massive emigration, mostly from the most industrialized areas, when Yugoslavia's borders were opened in 1966.³² Further economic reform became unattainable without a political outcome of the conflict

³¹ Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 331, 260, 415; Sekulić, *Tržište, planiranje i samoupravljanje*, 141–143; Matković, *Povijest Jugoslavije*, 333–337; Jašić, *Budžet i privredni razvoj*, 191–192; Sirotković, *Hrvatsko gospodarstvo*, 21–22, 41; Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet*, 19–22; Lampe, *Yugoslavia as history*, 278.

³² Sirotković, *Hrvatsko gospodarstvo*, pp. 22, 208–209; Jašić, *Budžet i privredni razvoj*, 194–217; Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 332–337, 345–346, 360–361, 412–428; Sekulić, *Tržište, planiranje i samoupravljanje*, 124, 149–150, 156–164, 272; Matković, *Povijest Jugoslavije*, 337–343, 347–350; Lampe, *Yugoslavia as history*, 280–284; Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet*, pp. 21–27; Sunajko, „Hrvatsko proljeće i načela ustavnih reformi“, pp. 210–211; Leonard Kukić, “Socialist growth revisited: insights from Yugoslavia”, *European Review of Economic History*, 4 (2018), pp. 403–429; Shonick, “Politics, culture, and economics”, pp. 725–726.

between the two factions. Although federalists managed to achieve further gains with the amendments of the constitution in 1971, their fate was sealed in late 1971, when Tito decided to side with the centralists. Despite the new constitution, declared in 1974, and its attempts at decentralizing the system, it ended up making it too complex – overlapping authorities provided ideal conditions for flourishing of bureaucracy. The rest of the 1970's and 1980's were marked by Yugoslavia's deteriorating economic position due to its continuously flawed economic policies and its increased vulnerability to international economic disturbances. Its huge budgetary expenditures kept growing, as well as the inflation rate and foreign credits, while investments efficiency kept falling. Last reform attempts were silenced by the country's breakup.³³

5. Development Gap among Yugoslav Republics and the Position of Croatian Economy

A very important feature of socialist Yugoslavia's economic system was its multiethnicity. Owing to immensely different historic socioeconomic conditions between different parts of the country, as well as its

³³ Matković, *Povijest Jugoslavije*, 350–371; Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet*, 27; Lampe, *Yugoslavia as history*, 283–306; Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 360–475; Josip Mihaljević, *Komunizam i čovjek. Odnos vlasti i pojedinca u Hrvatskoj (1958. – 1972.)* (Zagreb, 2016), pp. 337–459, 544; Kukić, "Socialist growth revisited", pp. 403–429; Rusinow, „Facilis decensus averno”, 64, 76–81; Hrvoje Klasić, „Svibanjsko savjetovanje 1968.: Ekonomsko-politička platforma Hrvatskog proljeća”, in Tvrtko Jakovina, ed., *Hrvatsko proljeće 40 godina poslije* (Zagreb, 2012), pp. 57–74; Miko Tripalo, „Drugo rađanje nove Jugoslavije”, *Dometi*, 4 (1971), pp. 2–15; Sunajko, „Hrvatsko proljeće i načela ustavnih reformi”, 205–223; Stipe Šušvar, *Vrijeme iskušenja. Jugoslavenski socijalizam između vizija i posrtaja* (Sarajevo, 1988), pp. 9–36; Sirotković, *Hrvatsko gospodarstvo*, pp. 13, 23–31; Sekulić, *Tržište, planiranje i samoupravljanje*, pp. 125, 294.

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

geographical diversity, Yugoslavia faced huge differences in the level of development and, consequently, in economic performance. Those differences provided breeding ground for further conflicts among Yugoslavia's six federal states, called republics and constituted as nation states. It also led to clashes among different socioeconomic regions of the country, with underdeveloped areas being mostly agricultural, with high rates of population growth. Given the fact that evening out of the development level between its republics was the overarching project socialist Yugoslavia was based on, political conflicts became unavoidable.

The development of the so-called underdeveloped republics meant investments in heavy industry in those areas, without accompanying growth of level of productivity. It additionally burdened more productive economies of Yugoslavia's heavily taxed western republics, depriving them of their own capital accumulation. The questions of investment allocation and profit distribution therefore became crucial issues of the growing conflicts between republics' political elites. Definition of underdevelopment became one of the most controversial political issues, and a means of income distribution from high to low productivity areas.³⁴

Generally speaking, most of the political elites of underdeveloped republics belonged to the centralist faction of the LCY. The reformist faction was, on the other hand, strongly represented in political leaderships of Yugoslavia's more developed western republics. Being one of Yugoslavia's western republics, Croatia's growing economic problems loomed large in the debates on sharing the burden of underdevelopment.

³⁴ Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 335; Klasić, „Svibanjsko savjetovanje 1968.“, 62–63; Lampe, *Yugoslavia as history*, 275–286; Dejan Jović, „Razlozi za raspad socijalističke Jugoslavije: kritička analiza postojećih interpretacija“, *Reč*, 8 (2001), pp. 96–103; Sirotković, *Hrvatsko gospodarstvo*, pp. 27–47; Jašić, *Budžet i privredni razvoj*, pp. 216–223.

Croatian economy, being a part of the Yugoslav economic system, was plagued by the same overall deficiencies, with a few important exceptions. Compared to other Yugoslav republics, Croatia had higher productivity and a 29 percent higher national product, while at the same time it had the same consumption share and a considerably lower investment share.³⁵ Relative to other Yugoslav republics, Croatia was at the same time overrepresented among the emigrants' republic of origin, losing around 10 percent of its labor force in the mass migration of the late 1960's, and it was this population drain that became an important political issue in the conflict between the federalists and the centralists. The reformist faction in Croatia considered mass emigration to be a direct consequence of Yugoslavia's overall economic policy, especially the policies on funding the underdeveloped republics. Another point of friction were emigrants' remittances, since all foreign currency was controlled by the federal state instead of workers' republic of origin. Workers' remittances were not invested proportionately in the migrants' republics of origin but were instead used to cover federal state budget deficit, thereby financing investments in underdeveloped Yugoslav republics. The federalist faction claimed that state administration used migrants' remittances to its own advantage, deliberately preventing emigrants from returning.³⁶ Driven by flaws and conflicts of Yugoslavia's political and economic system, Croatian emigration became yet another point of dispute in Yugoslavia's internal conflicts.

³⁵ Sirotković, *Hrvatsko gospodarstvo*, pp. 12-20; Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, pp. 335, 350.

³⁶ Matković, *Povijest Jugoslavije*, 365; Rusinow, „Facilis decensus averno“, 64; Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 380-381, 393, 412-428; Lampe, *Yugoslavia as history*, 283-284, 301; Alica Wertheimer Baletić, *Demografska teorija, razvoj stanovništva Hrvatske i populacijska politika* (Meridijani: Samobor, 2017) pp. 158-160, 183; Bernard, „Il ritorno dei gastarbejteri“, pp. 4-7.

6. Temporary Labor Migration and the German Economy

After World War II demographic conditions of Western Europe were dramatically changed. Younger generations were decimated by war casualties, reducing the numbers of younger workers. With birth rates already changed through the process of demographic transition, and postwar emigration further depleting European population, the industrial countries of Western Europe could not fulfill their needs for labor force among their own citizens.³⁷ Through rapid postwar recovery and development their economic demand for labor force has increased, especially in industries that could not be entirely modernized through labor-saving means and machinery (food industry, agriculture, construction, textile industry), industries with difficult and hazardous working conditions (asbestos industry, nerve-wracking assembly lines) and industries with high growth (mining, heavy industry).³⁸ This demand for workers has allowed Western European economies to utilize the labor reserves of European periphery, starting a mass migratory movement through recruitment of foreign workers and shaping consequential migrations to be – at least in the beginning – short-term migrations of solitary workers. Having no political rights, these noncitizens were expected to leave after a few years of labor, and were therefore – first in Germany, and then elsewhere – called guestworkers. Since these labor migrations divided Europe into a northern in-migration region and a

³⁷ Ray C. Rist, „Migration and marginality: guestworkers in Germany and France”, *Daedalus*, 2 (1979), pp. 95-108, at p. 95; Massimo Livi-Bacci, *A concise history of world population* (Chichester, 2017), pp. 119-146.

³⁸ Dobrovojević, „U potrazi za blagostanjem”, pp. 89-101, at p. 89; Klaus Bade, *Migration in European history* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 229-230; Rist, „Migration and marginality”, p. 95; Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The age of migration. International population movements in the modern world* (Basingstoke, London, 1998), p. 194.

southern out-migration region, most immigrants came from poor rural regions with insufficient employment opportunities of Southern European countries (Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain and Portugal).³⁹ Seeking ways out of structural unemployment, or looking for a chance to earn a considerably higher wage, these people responded to Western European economies' need for unskilled labor as well as their own countries' interests to reduce unemployment and to gain access to foreign exchange offset through workers' wage remittances. They mostly arrived in receiving countries through bilateral recruitment agreements. Some of those agreements started migration processes, while others only supported existing migration, but all had the intention of limiting migrations to temporary work stays instead of permanent settlement. Replacing the native laborers who found neither the wage nor the conditions attractive enough, foreign labor migrants were attracted by higher wages compared to their country of origin. During the early 1970's these migrations included almost 15 million people, and their main destinations were France, Federal Republic of Germany or West Germany and Britain.⁴⁰ These migratory processes were mostly stopped or limited during the early 1970s by restrictions on further immigration of laborers from non-EEC countries, mostly due to the worldwide 'oil price shock' of 1973 which slowed down economic growth. On the other hand, the 'oil price shock' was an excuse, since migratory trends already changed to chain migrations and permanent settlement which the receiving countries have not initially planned. However, immigrants were still allowed to be joined by their families, making family reunifications soon a huge migratory process in its

³⁹ Bade, *Migration in European history*, pp. 219-220, 227; Castles and Miller, *The age of migration*, pp. 68-77.

⁴⁰ Bade, *Migration in European history*, pp. 219, 227-231; O'Dochartaigh, *Germany since 1945*, p. 125; Ivanović, *Geburststag pišeš normalno*, p. 55.

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

own right. That way, temporary guests gradually turned to immigrant ethnic minorities.⁴¹

West Germany's 'economic miracle' was supported by three immigration waves. The first and the second wave consisted of ethnic Germans: first one came immediately after the Second World War and consisted of German refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe. Between the foundation of two German states in 1949 and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 came the second wave, bringing a steady supply of labor in German emigrants from East Germany.⁴² After mid-1950's, the third wave brought labor migrants from abroad, mostly through bilateral agreements. These temporary labor migrants, themselves part of a wider migration flow to Western Europe, were unofficially named 'guestworkers' (*Gastarbeiter*) and their arrival was closely linked to the stop put to the inflow of Eastern German workers by the building of Berlin Wall in 1961. It resolved the bottleneck and enabled West German economy to continue growing, providing it with needed workforce – both replacement labor for Germans moving to better jobs and additional labor for further expansion. It was also linked to certain gender ideals that prevented women from entering the workforce. Guestworkers were at first recruited for agriculture and construction and later for all branches of industry, especially for coal

⁴¹ Bade, *Migration in European history*, pp. 219-220, 228, 231-232; Rist, „Migration and marginality”, p. 96; Stephen Castles, “The guests who stayed - the debate on 'foreigners policy' in the German Federal Republic”, *International Migration Review*, 3 (1985), pp. 517-534, at p. 524.

⁴² Bade, *Migration in European history*, p. 242; O'Dochartaigh, *Germany since 1945*, p. 89; Castles, “The guests who stayed”, p. 218.

and steel industries, mostly working at low-skilled manual jobs.⁴³ In the following decade, Germany concluded recruitment agreements with a number of Mediterranean countries, thoroughly regulating the position of arriving immigrants in the German economy through state monopoly of the recruitment and strict state control of migrant population, not least because of the unions' initial opposition to foreign workers. Most important among those were the ones with Italy in 1955, Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Portugal in 1964, and Yugoslavia in 1968.⁴⁴ These treaties meant millions of workers for the growing West German economy, recruited through recruitment offices of German Federal Labor Office set up in the countries concerned, and in 1970 West Germany had the largest foreign national population in Europe.⁴⁵ At first regulated by decrees for utilization of foreign labor made in the late 1930's, migrant population was soon administered through the new Foreigners Law of 1965. It slightly improved their situation but still denied immigrants any political rights or a right to residence, retaining for the authorities the right to issue temporary residence permits. Foreigners Law, as well as a number of other restricting regulations over the following years, had an obvious goal to prevent temporary labor immigrants from long-lasting settlement.⁴⁶ However, despite this legal framework, it became clear at the beginning

⁴³ Bade, *Migration in European history*, pp. 242-244; O'Dochartaigh, *Germany since 1945*, pp. 89-90, 125; Castles, Castles, "The guests who stayed", p. 519; Castles and Miller, *The age of migration*, p. 194; Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno*, pp. 85-86; Shonick, "Politics, culture, and economics", pp. 719-736; Jelena Pašić, "Gastarbajterice kao anticipacija suvremenog tržišta rada: uključivanje glasova iz noćne smjene. Razgovor s Margaretom Kern", *Život umjetnosti: časopis o modernoj i suvremenoj umjetnosti i arhitekturi*, 2 (2017), pp. 152-167.

⁴⁴ Bade, *Migration in European history*, p. 242; Rist, "Migration and marginality", p. 96; Castles, "The guests who stayed", pp. 517, 522; Castles and Miller, *The age of migration*, p. 203; Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno*, pp. 8384.

⁴⁵ Bade, *Migration in European history*, pp. 218, 230; Castles, "The guests who stayed", p. 518.

⁴⁶ Castles, "The guests who stayed", pp. 522-524.

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

of 1970's that what started as officially organized temporary labor migration, attractive to employers in its flexibility according to the needs of the market, slowly transitioned to permanent immigration. It also coincided with the stagnation of the West German economy and finally provoked the government to try restricting further entries with an official recruitment ban of non-European Community workers (Anwerbestopp), announced in November 1973 and initially opposed by employers. Nonetheless, this regulation left the opportunity of family reunification open, thus preventing the government to put an effective stop to further immigration.⁴⁷

The number of foreign workers in Germany in 1956 was only 95000, but in 1970 it was already around 3 million foreigners working in West Germany. The *Gastarbeiter* made up to 7.6 percent of Federal Republic's population and 11.9 percent of its workforce when their numbers peaked in 1973.⁴⁸ Apart from Turks and Italians, Yugoslavs were among the largest foreign workers' nationality groups. Their share in the total foreign population of West Germany grew from 8.8 percent in 1968 to 17.7 percent in 1973.⁴⁹

7. Yugoslav Migration Policies

During the first years of socialism, Yugoslav communist regime denied almost any individual right to migrate, which was a logical consequence

⁴⁷ Bade, *Migration in European history*, pp. 243-244; Rist, „Migration and marginality”, p. 97; Castles, “The guests who stayed”, pp. 517-524.

⁴⁸ Bade, *Migration in European history*, pp. 218, 230; Castles, “The guests who stayed”, pp. 518-520; Castles and Miller, *The age of migration*, pp. 68-73.

⁴⁹ Bade, *Migration in European history*, p. 242; O'Dochartaigh, *Germany since 1945*, p. 125; Molnar, “Imagining Yugoslavs”, p. 146.

of its political mentality, of its all-pervasive control as well as of its Soviet-like economic system that imposed extreme economic hardship on its citizens, motivating them to leave the country.⁵⁰ Tight control over citizens' migration was also necessary as a means of exerting control over other aspects of life – for instance, the markets – thereby strengthening the regime.⁵¹ Prevented to emigrate freely and legally and highly motivated by both political and economic reasons in Yugoslavia, with only a small number of emigration permits issued annually, Yugoslav citizens escaped the country: some of them on tourist visas, and some of them illegally.⁵²

In Croatia, as in the rest of Mediterranean Europe, routes and destination of illegal migrations mostly followed the paths tramped during previous periods of emigration. Long history of Croatian emigration created a large Croatian diaspora, consisting of various groups. Apart from pre-World War II economic migrants, there were different categories of post-World War II political émigrés. In addition to those groups, many Croats escaped the new Communist regime immediately after World War II, as part of national minorities that were being accused of collective collaboration with Axis powers (Italians, Germans, Hungarians) and then forcefully

⁵⁰ Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno*, pp. 49-50; For a comparative perspective on the Soviet system, see: Matthew

A. Light, "What does it mean to control migration? Soviet mobility policies in comparative perspective", *Law & Social Inquiry*, 2 (2012), pp. 395-429, at p. 400, 418, 423. Light argues that it was precisely the Soviet attempt to restrict international mobility across its borders that finally doomed its economy to technological stagnation, because the high-tech revolution of 1970's and 1980's required close collaboration across borders. It could therefore be claimed that Yugoslavia's relative liberalization of migration policies during the 1960's has to be credited for its economic advantages in relation to the Soviet bloc.

⁵¹ Light, "What does it mean to control migration?" p. 422.

⁵² Šarić, "Bijeg iz socijalističke Jugoslavije", pp. 199-205; Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem", p. 90; Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno*, pp. 50-51, 98-99.

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

expelled from Yugoslavia.⁵³ All these groups formed the extremely diverse Croatian diaspora, and new escapees could rely on a vast network of already established migration routes.

However, after a few of years of consolidation at home as well as abroad, the regime slowly liberalized its appearance, according to its foreign policy needs of adjusting to the West. It also meant an easing of the travel regime in 1953, following the political changes after the Tito-Stalin split, which opened another route for emigration. Although Yugoslav government discussed different options of legalizing emigration, making it thereby more controllable, emigration was legally almost impossible until further liberalization of the right to move at the beginning of 1960's.⁵⁴

The first big wave of emigration started in 1961 and meant a 127 percent increase in the number of Yugoslav emigrants to the Federal Republic of Germany. Almost a half of them were Croats.⁵⁵ The fact that West Germany's consulate was located in Zagreb certainly had an effect on the number of Croats applying for West German visa. Yugoslav emigrants mostly settled in Baden Württemberg (especially the industrial area of

⁵³ Franko Mirošević, ed., *Povijest Hrvata* (Zagreb, 2007), p. 392; Bade, *Migration in European history*, p. 220; Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 47-54. For example, within a large contingent of 188000 Italians expelled from Croatia's coastal regions, there were around 25000 Croats, emigrating Yugoslavia because of the new Communist regime. Vladimir Žerjavić, "Doseljavanja i iseljavanja s područja Istre, Rijeke i Zadra u razdoblju 1910-1971", *Društvena istraživanja: časopis za opća društvena pitanja*, 2/4-5 (1993), pp. 631-656; Šarić, "Bijeg iz socijalističke Jugoslavije", pp. 195-220; Practices of forced migration were an imitation of the mass expulsions perpetrated by the Soviet regime. Light, "What does it mean to control migration?" p. 401.

⁵⁴ Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 291, 315; Šarić, "Bijeg iz socijalističke Jugoslavije", pp. 197, 198, 206, 215.

⁵⁵ Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem", p. 90.

Stuttgart) and North Rhine-Westphalia.⁵⁶ The state gradually perceived the benefits it could gain from emigrants, changing its policies and stimulating further emigration. Emigration would decrease the pressure on the economy, especially in underdeveloped areas marked by surplus labor and lack of jobs, while emigrants' remittances could be used for development projects in their communities of origin.⁵⁷ In 1963, after internal disputes, Yugoslavia finally liberalized some of its migration regulations, trying at the same time to stimulate the departure of unskilled workers and discourage skilled workers from emigrating by granting temporary migration permits almost exclusively to the former. From that moment on, Yugoslav regulations have enabled some level of protection to Yugoslav workers in their countries of employment. Nonetheless, a big number of Yugoslav emigrants – mostly those denied migration permits – still preferred leaving the country using tourist visas or illegally crossing the border. Only few more years passed until Yugoslavia completely changed its migratory policies through enactment of new laws in 1965-1967, opening its borders and allowing almost 200,000 unemployed workers to emigrate. These laws also enabled state institutions to deal with all aspects of taking up employment abroad.⁵⁸

After the application of new migratory regulations, it soon became obvious that Yugoslavia's foreign relations with the receiving countries were inadequately governed, resulting in huge bureaucratic obstacles both to further emigration as to social protection of the workers already

⁵⁶ Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem", p. 91; Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno*, p. 53.

⁵⁷ Bernard, "Il ritorno dei gastarbejteri", pp. 2-3.

⁵⁸ Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem", pp. 93-96; Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno*, pp. 55-70.

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

abroad. While Yugoslav government discussed the idea of agreements with countries of immigration already in 1956, no international treaties regulating Yugoslav emigration were signed at that time.⁵⁹ Yugoslavia only started concluding bilateral agreements with different European countries during the 1960's (1965 with France, 1966 with Austria and Sweden, 1968 with the Federal Republic of Germany), seeking to regulate all the issues concerning Yugoslav workers' position in receiving countries. Negotiations with West Germany were particularly difficult and longlasting, with an agreement reached only after Willy Brandt's new *Ostpolitik*. Labor agreement between the two countries was also fostered by good experiences West German employers had with Yugoslav workers throughout 1960's.⁶⁰

The departure of unskilled workers decreased the pressure from high birth rate regions on Yugoslav economy but also opened an enormously important source of capital in workers' remittances – capital needed precisely to fund the reforms of the economy. It was a further motive for Yugoslav administration to promote emigration over finding employment in other parts of Yugoslavia.⁶¹ Yugoslav workers have sent 2/3 of their savings back to Yugoslavia, which over time reached over a billion dollars annually, providing Yugoslavia with most of its foreign currency income.⁶² It was the *Gastarbeiter* who became main customers for Yugoslavia's globally uncompetitive goods, investing their earnings in infrastructure projects as well. The state designed incentives to encourage them to

⁵⁹ Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem", p. 90; Šarić, "Bijeg iz socijalističke Jugoslavije", p. 215.

⁶⁰ Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno*, pp. 61, 69, 97-130; Molnar, "Imagining Yugoslavs", pp. 140-141; Shonick, "Politics, culture, and economics", pp. 719-736.

⁶¹ Bernard, "Il ritorno dei gastarbejteri", p. 4; Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno*, p. 60.

⁶² Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem", p. 92.

spend their foreign currency in Yugoslavia and developed projects to be financed by migrants' remittances, with the first of those "remittance factories" opened in Croatia. However, hindered by local administration, the number of those projects remained small and had no effect on future emigration.⁶³ Nevertheless, Yugoslav communist regime retained its fears from political influence that residing in the capitalist West might have on migrants themselves, their families in Yugoslavia, as well as the image of Yugoslavia abroad.⁶⁴

However, new Yugoslav policies couldn't change the global framework and the needs of receiving countries for temporary workforce. Faced with diminishing opportunities of exporting its labor force surplus, Yugoslavia has tried, during the second half of 1970's and throughout 1980's, to develop a legal framework and employment schemes to integrate returning migrants, participating in various projects promoted by the OECD (Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development) to optimize the use of remittances in creating jobs in areas with high rates of emigration.⁶⁵ Although the number of returning migrants grew over the years, the total number of Yugoslav migrants in Germany did not fall. On the one hand, family reunification and reemergence of illegal and irregular recruitment channels kept the (official) number of Yugoslavs abroad

⁶³ Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem", pp. 92-93; Bernard, "Il ritorno dei gastarbejteri", pp. 5-6; Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno*, p. 81; Mladen Vedriš, "Od deviznih ušteta do radnih mjesta u domovini", *Rasprave o migracijama*, 46 (1978), pp. 1-107; Ivo Nejašmić, "Povratak jugoslavenskih vanjskih migranata i njihovo uključivanje u gospodarski i društveni život zemlje", *Rasprave o migracijama*, 73 (1981), pp. 1-138.

⁶⁴ Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem", p. 93; Šarić, "Bijeg iz socijalističke Jugoslavije", p. 214; Bernard, "Il ritorno dei gastarbejteri", p. 7.

⁶⁵ Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem", pp. 98-99; Bernard, "Il ritorno dei gastarbejteri", p. 3; Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno*, pp. 73-81.

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

around 900,000.⁶⁶ On the other hand, the second generation of Yugoslavs in Germany entered the working force, keeping the number high. It showed that Yugoslavs came to Germany as temporary laborers, but in the end settled permanently.⁶⁷

8. Demographic Trends in Socialist Croatia

During the 1960's, almost half a million Croatian workers have emigrated to find work abroad. Where did this large number come from, given the fact that Croatia has by the beginning of 1960's already finished the process of so-called demographic transition, had the lowest population growth between 1948 and 1991 compared with other Yugoslav republics, and had constantly falling birth rates?⁶⁸

The processes of economic reform, started in the first half of 1960's, have coincided with a great influx of working force. It was the generation born after the end of World War II, in the last short period of high birth rates, and it entered the labor market precisely at the time of employment contractions introduced after 1965 as part of reform measures.⁶⁹ Apart from the pressure from high birth rate generations, it was also the high birth rate areas whose pressure on Yugoslav economy became too intense.⁷⁰ But, since Croatia's birth rate has continuously fallen after mid-1950's, this pressure has been relatively brief, and concentrated on the years after 1965, with highest levels between 1971 and 1976. It was the untimely coincidence of these two factors – growing demand for employment and contracting employment policies – that made

⁶⁶ Bernard, "Il ritorno dei gastarbejteri", p. 2.

⁶⁷ Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem", p. 99.

⁶⁸ Wertheimer Baletić, *Demografska teorija*, pp. 155-188, 210, 254, 276-285.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 191-206.

⁷⁰ Dobrivojević, "U potrazi za blagostanjem", p. 92.

emigration on such a massive scale an attractive option. Combined with socialist Yugoslavia's growing national tensions manifested as employment discrimination, it turned Croats into Yugoslavia's biggest economic emigration contingent, reaching between 42 and 49 percent of the total number of Yugoslav emigrants in the late 1960's.⁷¹ It was a tremendous loss of active working force: 9,6 percent of the entire active population resided abroad in 1971, with almost 90 percent of them being between 15 and 44 years of age.⁷²

9. Conclusion

In this article I have tried to sketch different causes that set the stage during late 1960's for a mass migration from socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany. Considering the population ratio between these two countries, the sheer size of the migratory wave shows certain deficiencies in applicable migration theories. Although capable of explaining some, or even the most important elements of this migration, these theories cannot account for political peculiarities of socialist Yugoslavia, country unique both by its international position and its internal constitution. After centuries of constant emigration, it was precisely the coincidence of distinct demographical, political and economic reasons that produced one of the biggest migratory movements in modern Croatian history, making Croatia's workers into hopeful migrants once again.

⁷¹ Wertheimer Baletić, *Demografska teorija*, pp. 192-199, 207-225, 252-253, 286.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 233.

Marko Radić:

Croats into Gastarbeiter: The Causes of Temporary Labor Migration from Socialist Croatia to the Federal Republic of Germany 1961-1973

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Marina Kyosya and Eva Parvanova

Unlocking the Potential of the Danube Region Strategy for Europeanization of Moldova

Eva Parvanova is a PhD student at the Department of European Studies and International Relations, University of Ruse, Bulgaria eparvanova@uni-ruse.bg

Marina Kyosya holds a master's degree in European Studies and Public Administration from BRIE, University of Ruse, Bulgaria kesya.marina@abv.bg

Abstract

The paper discusses the complicated political situation in Moldova on the eve of parliamentary elections in 2019 in the context of europeanization as a theoretical concept and a phenomenon of practice. It highlights the risk of Moldova's shifting political loyalty in spite of the multifaceted EU assistance. It then addresses the Potential of Danube Region Strategy as an opportunity to mitigate the risk through intensive involvement of Moldova's civil society.

Key words: Europeanization, EUSDR, Moldova

Introduction

The paper discusses the current political situation in Moldova as a challenge to its relations with EU. It identifies the problem of the unlocked potential of the Danube Region Strategy in terms of supporting the complex process of europeanization of the former Soviet Union republic.

Europeanization is an analytical tool, which is used for the exploration of change in the context of EU accession and EU membership. The definitions below add value to the clarification of the concept:

Ladrech (1994: 17): *"Europeanization is an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making"*.

Börzel (1999: 574): *"a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making"*.

Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001: 3): *"the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules"*.

Héritier (2001): *"the process of influence deriving from European decisions and impacting member states' policies and political and administrative structures. It comprises the following elements: the European decisions, the processes triggered by these decisions as well as the impacts of these processes on national policies, decision processes and institutional structures"*.

Radaelli (2003: 30): *"Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies"*.

Ladrech (2010: 2): *"... the change within a member state whose motivating logic is tied to a EU policy or decision-making process. The prime concern of any Europeanization research agenda is therefore establishing the causal link, thereby validating the impact of the EU on domestic change"*.

What all definitions have in common is the process of change, which occurs as a result of interdependence between EU and the prospective or actual member states. Different states have different capacities to impact EU in terms of changing its policies/institutions, and to be impacted by EU in terms of fostering domestic change and adaptation to EU norms and policies. The paper will discuss the case of Moldova to highlight risks and opportunities with regard to these complex processes.

What is the current political situation of Moldova in terms of its potential europeanization?

Moldova is a country in Eastern Europe, bordered by Romania to the west and Ukraine to the north, east, and south. It was one of the republics of

USSR and declared independence in the context of the end of Cold war on 27 August 1991¹.

The state is a parliamentary republic. Due to a decrease in industrial and agricultural output following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the service sector dominates Moldova's economy and currently composes over 60% of the nation's GDP. Its economy is the poorest in Europe in per capita terms.

Moldova is a member state of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).

The country borders EU to the east and profits from privileged relations with the Union on the grounds of the neighbourhood policy of the EU, which has been launched in 2004 in the context of the Eastern enlargement². Moldova joined the policy framework (and more particularly the Eastern Partnership) in 2009.

In 2011 a Eurasian Economic Union was founded by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. On September 12, 2012 Russia addressed an invitation to

¹ A strip of its territory on the eastern bank of the river Dnester is under the control of the breakaway government of Transnistria. Transnistria is a region of Moldova in which ethnic Russians and Ukrainians together outnumber ethnic Moldovans. Since the civil conflict of 1992 Transnistria has declared independence, though it is internationally recognized as part of Moldova. Its government and economy are heavily dependent on military presence and subsidies from Russia. In 2006 referendum the territory's voters affirmed the independence of Transnistria and their desire to join the Russian Federation.

² See Kornazheva, M. and S. Kirova (2013).

Moldova to join the new Union. The then prime minister Vladimir Filat stated firmly Moldova had made a choice to join EU.

On 1 July 2016 the EU-Moldova Association Agreement entered into force. This includes the introduction of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). By signing the agreement, Moldova committed to strengthened political and economic ties with EU and to reforming its domestic policies on the basis of EU laws and practice, therefore, to step on the path of europeanization.

In May 2018, Moldova received observer status with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). *"I would like to mention that the Republic of Moldova participates at the UEEA summit as a state-observer for the first time. After May's session in Sochi, Moldova became the first observer country within this economic structure,"* said Igor Dodon, president-elect of Moldova. President of Parliament Andrian Candu declared that neither the Government nor the legislative forum had submitted requests to the Eurasian Economic Union and did not request any explicit statute by law. *"Under these circumstances, Igor Dodon and the Socialist Party are those who have received observer status, and definitely not the Republic of Moldova. Our country is fully committed to the European Union and the European path is the only strategic option for the country's development."*³

The most recent comment of the President Dodon affirms, that "joining the European Union is possible only without Transnistria and without Gagauzia", even if the center of the country wants to join, because of the "political" mix of preferences. *"For me, the Association Agreement means the necessity to implement reforms within the country: in the court system,*

³ Arina Livadari. *President Igor Dodon is in Russia, again.*
<https://www.moldova.org/en/president-igor-dodon-russia/>

in the prosecution, in the social sphere. This is what the Agreement of Association with the EU means. But not joining the European Union, because joining the EU can kill our country, our statehood", thinks Dodon.⁴

On the eve of the parliamentary elections in 2019 Moldova's policy makers are obviously divided on the question where the country should belong – west or east.

The public opinion is also torn apart⁵. Moldovans are still nostalgic about the USSR. When asked if they regret the dissolution of the USSR, 49.1% of people said they regret it, 25.7% couldn't evaluate it and 21.1% said they don't feel any nostalgia. Moreover, if a referendum took place next Sunday for the Republic of Moldova to become a part of the (non-existent) Soviet Union again, 40.1% of the survey participants said they would vote for, 27.1% would vote against, and the rest said they didn't decide or wouldn't participate. This probably comes from the preponderant positive attitude of the Moldovan people. 47.1% of the 1115 respondents have a positive attitude towards the communist regime that existed in the Republic of Moldova between 1940 and 1990, 23.8% a negative one, and 29.1% are indifferent.

Respondents disapprove the uncertainty about the future of Moldova. The big majority of them believes Moldova goes in the wrong direction (72.7%). There is a dividing line on the question where Moldova should

⁴ Cristi Vlas. *Igor Dodon: Joining the European Union is possible only without Transnistria and Gagăuzia*. <https://www.moldova.org/en/igor-dodon-joining-european-union-possible-without-transnistria-gagauzia/>

⁵ See Maria Dulgher's analysis of 2018 survey, managed by the Institute for Public Policy and performed by the Centre of Sociological Investigations and Marketing CBS AXA, entitled *Separation, uncertainty and melancholy about the past – the main characteristics of the Moldovan population* [//https://www.moldova.org/en/separation-uncertainty-melancholy-past-main-characteristics-moldovan-population/](https://www.moldova.org/en/separation-uncertainty-melancholy-past-main-characteristics-moldovan-population/)

go, west or east. At an eventual referendum, 36.5% of respondents would vote for joining the EU, while for joining the Eurasian Economic Union would vote 29.5%, and the rest wouldn't participate or don't know yet. The biggest concerns of the people are the rising prices, the future of their children, poverty, unemployment rate and corruption. The Moldovan citizens consider the change of the government and fighting corruption the main measures that could be taken in order to improve the current economic and social situation.

In June 2018, early elections called in Chisinau were unexpectedly won by the opposition's candidate, supported by an alliance of recently founded pro-European parties, centred around Action and Solidarity and the Dignity and Truth Platform. Andrei Nastase, a pro-western activist, won the elections with 52.5% of the vote in the second round, surpassing the pro-Russian candidate. The elections and their results were recognised as fair and transparent by international observers. But they were invalidated in the courts. The reasoning was a live Facebook session made by Andrei Nastase during Election Day asking citizens to express their right to vote. Such a decision was taken for a first time, even though during all previous elections live Facebook sessions had been used by the candidates. The opposition and civil society groups stated that the punishment was not even envisaged by the relevant legislation and accused the government of interfering in the justice system. Wide protests followed, while Moldova's international partners, including the European Union, the United States and Canada, adopted an unprecedented harsh position, calling the decision a "threat to democracy".⁶ On 27 November 2018 European Union confirmed reduction of financial support due to

⁶ Moldova's political crisis is calling the country's commitment to European integration into question. <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/07/24/moldovas-political-crisis-is-calling-the-countrys-commitment-to-european-integration-into-question/>

deterioration of rule of law and democracy in Moldova. In light of this deterioration, and in line with the principle of strict conditionality, the European Commission will recalibrate its financial assistance and redirect support to projects that have a direct, positive impact on Moldovan citizens. Payments under the Macro-Financial Assistance and EU budget support programmes have also been put on hold.⁷

Thus, by the end of 2018 Moldova's preference for europeanization seems to be at risk.

Recent dynamics of EU-Moldova relations

Relations between the EU and the Republic of Moldova have become more dynamic since 29 November 2013, when the EU Association Agreement (AA) was initiated in Brussels. It was signed on 27 June 2014 and was being provisionally applied starting 1 September 2014.

On 1 July 2016, the Association Agreement (AA) between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova came fully into force, following ratification by all signatories. It includes the introduction of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The High Representative/Vice-President, Federica Mogherini said: *"I look forward to closer ties between the EU and the Republic of Moldova as a result of this Agreement entering fully into force. Together with the implementation of reforms in the country,*

⁷ European Union confirms reduction of financial support due to deterioration of rule of law and democracy in Moldova//https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/moldova/54511/european-union-confirms-reduction-financial-support-due-deterioration-rule-law-and-democracy_en.

the agreement has the potential to help changing the lives of Moldovans for the better, to bring jobs, growth and stability.”⁸

The official document *Fact and figures about EU-Moldova Relations*⁹ includes four chapters of EU assistance goals in the context of AA: stronger economy, stronger connectivity, stronger governance, stronger society.

In terms of **stronger economy**, it is estimated, that EU is Moldova’s first trading partner and biggest investor in the country. In 2017, it accounted for 64% of total exports and 56% of its total trade. The EU also facilitates access to financial resources for Moldovan SMEs. The EU’s projects have provided support for 5,000 enterprises, and for setting up of 10 business incubators.

As far as **stronger connectivity** is concerned, EU assistance has led to several results. A road bypass around Ungheni was opened on 3 August 2018. Around 700 kilometers of roads are rehabilitated or in process of rehabilitation. Public transport has been improved in Chişinău and Bălţi with modern trolley buses. Biomass heating systems have been installed in more than 225 schools, kindergartens, community centers and village halls, making heating cheaper and diversifying the country’s energy sources. 47 of these sites were also equipped with solar hot water systems. 35 new biomass businesses were set up and over 400 new jobs have been created. New drinking water supply infrastructures were built. As a result, approximately 15,700 people are provided with sufficient and safe

⁸ European Commission - Press release. Full entry into force of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova, Brussels, 1 July 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2368_en.htm

⁹ https://ec.europa.eu/neighborhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eap_factsheet_moldova.pdf

drinking water. EU has also supported the gas interconnector between Moldova (Ungheni) and the EU (Iași in Romania).

Assistance for **stronger governance** is related to promotion of democratic standards, rule of law and justice and tackling high-level corruption in Moldova. Comprehensive EU Council Conclusions on Moldova were adopted on 26 February 2018. The EU reacted to the non-transparent invalidation of the Chisinau mayoral elections in June 2018. The EU expects Moldova to take actions ahead of the Parliamentary elections of February 2019 with a view to ensuring the respect for democratic standards and the rule of law, so that elections are held in line with international standards. Key areas to be tackled remain: the independence of the judicial system, the fight against corruption – including a thorough and effective prosecution of the banking fraud. The EU actively supports civil society in Moldova, including by creating links between civil society organisations on both banks of the river.

By **stronger society** EU means supporting Moldovan citizens to experience and learn about the civil societies of old democracies. Since 28 April 2014, citizens with a biometric passport can travel to the Schengen area without a visa. More than 1.5 million Moldovan citizens have benefitted from the visa-free regime so far. In the years 2015-17, more than 900 Moldovan students and academic staff have benefitted from Erasmus+ mobility to study and teach in the EU. Over 3,000 young people from Moldova took part in EU funded non-formal education projects which organise short exchanges, trainings, common events.

The four assistance goals of EU are transformed into results through projects. The Delegation of the European Union to Moldova publishes on

its official site lists of completed and running EU financed projects¹⁰. Examples of policy areas and relevant projects are presented in the table below.

Policy areas	Project titles
Governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consolidation of migration management capacities in the Republic of Moldova ▪ Democracy support and Confidence-building measures in Moldova ▪ Electoral Support to Moldova Project ▪ Enlarged Sustainable Partnership for Decentralization Reform ▪ Improving the social economic situation of young people in Moldova by empowering Moldovan youth and Moldovan civil society ▪ Monitoring justice sector reform for increased Government's accountability ▪ Monitoring of Human Rights of persons with disabilities ▪ Promoting PPI as an efficient mechanism for community empowerment and sustainable local development ▪ Promoting PPI as an efficient mechanism for community empowerment and sustainable local development (dummy to the main contract 2012/298078) ▪ Promotion of freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom of peaceful assembly ▪ Rehabilitation of torture victims from Moldova

¹⁰ See lists of projects and their short presentations, published on the following web addresses:
<http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/moldova/projects/list_of_projects/projects_en.htm>, <<https://www.eu4moldova.md/en>>

Marina Kyosya and Eva Parvanova:
 Unlocking the Potential of the Danube Region Strategy for
 Europeanization of Moldova

Policy areas	Project titles
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “Remittances Developing Moldovan Communities” Sustainable Use of Remittances by Generating Local Income ▪ Strengthening legal protection from and raising awareness of Discriminatory ill-treatment in the Republic of Moldova, including Transnistria. ▪ Strengthening Public Financial Management in the Republic of Moldova ▪ Strengthening the Forensic Examination of Torture and other forms of ill-treatment, as key strategic element in comprehensive, integrated, holistic efforts to end Torture and related forms of ill-treatment in Moldova ▪ Strengthening the Link Between Migration and Development: Testing an Integrated Service Provider to Moldovan Migrants and their Communities ▪ Strengthening the Moldovan Media Capacity to Cover Issues of Public Interest ▪ Supporting the implementation of the migration and development component of the EU-Moldova MObility Partnership ▪ Supporting the Republic of Moldova to implement the EU-Moldova Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation ▪ Support to coordination of the Justice Sector reform in Moldova ▪ Technical assistance to support the Government of the Republic of Moldova in building the capacity for application of Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA instruments, and to provide support in preparation and implementation of the CIB Programme

Marina Kyosya and Eva Parvanova:
Unlocking the Potential of the Danube Region Strategy for
Europeanization of Moldova

Policy areas	Project titles
Trade and regional integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sector Policy Support Programme on Economic Stimulation in Rural Areas ▪ Strengthening the Capacity of the Centre of Accreditation in the Field of Products Conformity Assessment of the Republic of Moldova ▪ Support the use of remittances for new businesses and jobs creation ▪ Support to Moldova in the field of norms and standards in food safety for plant origin products ▪ Support to the Consumer Protection Agency ▪ Technical Assistance to Sector Budget Support Programme "Economic Stimulation in Rural Areas"
Water and energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MD-04 Water Utilities Development Programme in the Republic of Moldova ▪ Rehabilitation of teh water supply system in the Rayon Nisporeni: Municipalities of Nisporeni, Varzaresti and Grozesti ▪ Rehabilitation of the water supply system in the Municipality of Nisporeni, Republic of Moldova ▪ Sector Policy Support Programme in the water sector ENPI AAP 2009 ▪ SPSP "Suport to Reform of the Energy Sector"
Human development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Better managing the mobility of health professionals in the Republic of Moldova ▪ Better managing the mobility of health professionals in the Republic of Moldova ▪ Health Sector Budget Support Related Technical Assitance

Marina Kyosya and Eva Parvanova:
 Unlocking the Potential of the Danube Region Strategy for
 Europeanization of Moldova

Policy areas	Project titles
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strengthening Moldovan civil society organizations in HIV/AIDS prevention and care for women and juvenile prisoners ▪ Support preparation of the Project "Strengthening the governance of the VET"
Rural development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Remittances Developing Moldovan Communities
Conflict prevention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Building bridges between NGOs, business associations and media from Moldova, Ukraine and Russia for conflict prevention in Transnistria ▪ Support to Confidence Building Measures ▪ Support to the Government of Moldova in the field of anti-corruption, reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including police and personal data protection ▪ Technical assistance to the Bureau for Reintegration of the Republic of Moldova
Multi-sector projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Capacity Building in Regional Development in the Republic of Moldova ▪ EU High Level Policy Adviser Mission II (EUHLPAM II) ▪ Making Migration in Moldova Work for Development. ▪ Support to the Academy of Science of Moldova in better integration into the European Research Area ▪ Support to the implementation of the Pilot Regional Development Programmes (PRDPs) in the Republic of Moldova ▪ Support to the use of biomass for energy (Moldova AAP 2010)

Apart from the intensive targeted EU support, as seen from the data of the table, Moldova benefits from regional programmes as well. For example, instruments of the Eastern Partnership support small and medium-sized enterprises, energy, transport, environment, access to finance, growth as well as the overall business environment. The country also participates in Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) programmes such as the Black Sea Programme, the Romania-Ukraine-Moldova ENPI Land-Border Programme.

EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) and Moldova's peripheral positioning in it

The EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) and its INTERREG Danube Transnational Programme is also an opportunity for the modernization and europeanization of Moldova.

After a press conference in Chisinau EU expert Oliver Baudelet, who introduced the launch of EUSDR to Moldovan audience, was quoted by journalists. The quotations referred to promises. The Strategy would play a key role in improving sustainable transport, linking energy systems, protecting the environment, preserving water resources and stimulating the business climate. The EU would help Moldova elaborating concrete projects on the flood reduction in zones of risk, so the population will be protected, and the Government will not have to spend vast sums of money for building houses. According to him, the living conditions improvement in Moldova is one of the main goals of the Strategy; there will be projects for reduction of the poverty level and social integration of the Roma; for providing cheaper and environmentally friendly energy; for promoting culture and tourism in the Danube region. He said Moldova must develop the river and railway transport, increase the sea freight transportation by 20% at least for a quick economic development till 2020. He said, that

***"Danube is the main artery of the EU countries cooperation, which will facilitate the integration of Moldova in the EU"*¹¹.**

To find out to what extent the promise had been kept, the authors of the paper have undertaken a search for internet-based data on projects related to the involvement of Moldova in the implementation of EUSDR. Only 2 projects had been detected. Project RADAR is tackling the differences in road infrastructure safety levels between western and eastern EU countries. It will contribute to improving knowledge and capacities of all involved stakeholder in the Danube region to successfully address the road infrastructure safety. The second project is DA-SPACE. It pilots a model of open innovation lab in which companies, public authorities, universities and the civil society can create fundamentals for innovation together with young talents. The DA-SPACE labs promote a cross-disciplinary and transnational cooperation among different stakeholders able to generate new solutions and nurture the entrepreneurial skills of all the actors involved.

The failure of Moldova to catch up in the Strategy implementation is not a one-way street. This fact had been realized recently, and **"Danube Financing and Capacity Building Dialogue"** had been organized from 26 to 27 October 2017 in Chisinau by the Ministry of Agriculture, Regional Development and Environment of the Republic of Moldova with funding from Austrian Development Cooperation, the Coordination of Priority Area 10 "Institutional Capacity and Cooperation" of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region and the Foster Europe Foundation.

¹¹ EU strategy for Danube region provides help for Moldova, December 16, 2010, // <https://www.moldova.org/en/eu-strategy-for-danube-region-provides-help-for-moldova-214991-eng/>

Conclusion

Now, when European Commission reduces its financial assistance and redirects support to projects that have a direct, positive impact on Moldovan citizens, time has come to unlock the potential of EUSDR. The EU Strategy for the Danube region has a key role to play. Soft projects of people-to-people cooperation have the capacity to impact mind sets, cyber security projects may disclose anti-EU propaganda, skills development project may back new professional routes, culture and tourism projects can create loyalties, based on discoveries of natural and heritage attractions, educational institutions may take the lead in disclosing advantages of liberal democracies. The examples may be numerous, but the end goal is to use soft power to keep citizens of Moldova along the Danube, the main artery of the EU countries cooperation.

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Stefan Ditrih

Inland Waterway Transport and Sustainable Development

*Stefan Ditrih, LL.M. is an Assistant Lecturer at Law Faculty in Novi Sad, University Business Academy in Novi Sad, Serbia
stefan.ditrih@pravni-fakultet.info*

Abstract:

International transport has always been a catalyst to development and progress. Relying on traditional transportation system (road and air) has stretched the resources and the environment to the breaking point. The pollution caused by road transport is becoming a huge problem threatening to throw the entire shipping industry out of balance. As in other branches of industry, transport has also seen a wave of sustainable development movement. A switch to environmentally sound, safe and efficient transport methods is slow but present. Due to the combination of technical advancements and natural elements inland waterway transport is becoming a point of interest for the international community. Advancing this underdeveloped sector could prove to be part of the solution and a step closer to sustainable transport and development. The purpose of this paper is to explore the state of inland waterway transport in Europe, from both legal and practical point of view.

Key words:

waterway transport, sustainable development, European Union, multimodal transport

Introduction

In recent years sustainable development has become an idea that has put itself in the center of discussion and planning for the future. The term "sustainable development" is used in the broadest sense related to commercial activity, service and production, and even as a lifestyle. It is connected with circular economy, high quality products, ecologically sound practices, green economy, and future foreword thinking. Keeping that in mind, we could define sustainable transport as transport that is safe, high quality, affordable, easily available, eco friendly, economically sound and that it contributes to local, national and international development.¹ The vision of cleaner and safer means of transport and development of sustainable transportation means in Europe is present not only among the scholars but also among big transportation companies across the continent. The domination of road transport has shown many shortcomings, such as, air pollution, noise pollution and traffic jams in populated areas.

Compared with road transport, the inland water transport has many perks. It's cheaper, safer, and most importantly has less of an impact on the environment. Although, the fastest, air transport uses specific kind of energy that is a massive air pollutant, while sea transport is risky, since sea faring ships have to carry large quantities of oil and other types of fuel, thus risking spillage and potential environmental disaster. The biggest danger for the environment is transport of toxic materials and radioactive

¹ See: Transport for Sustainable Development in the ECE region Economic Commission for Europe, Commission on Sustainable Development, 2010

waste, during witch, if the accident occurs, the consequences for the environment are immeasurable.

It is obvious that every type of transport pollutes air, water and soil in one way or the other, but levels of pluton are much different with different types of transport. Hence the international community is insisting in developing underused types of transport such as inland water transport.

The importance od transport was outlined in the White Paper on Common transport Policy 1991², which signifies a turning point in transportation policies of the EU, because with it the transportation activity became an activity of special interest for the EU that is meant to be developed and regulated on the supranational level. One of the goals set out by the White Paper is overcoming the domination of road transport and creating the framework for development of transportation systems in line with sustainable development.

In 2001 the European Commission accepted the updated version of the White Paper, called Transport Policy for 2010-time to decide³. In this document the problems of the European transport systems are clearly outlined. According to this document some of the problems are: uneven development of different transportation systems, the domination of road transport, and the need to closely connect different transportation systems and removing bottle necks in transport. The Policy sets out sixty measurements to be put in place in order to gradually solve these problems by 2010. Development of inland water transport and of the railway transport are set as priorities.

² COM (92) 494

³ COM (92001)370

In 2011 the European Commission adopted another document called White Paper 2011-Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area-Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system.⁴ This document envisages forty concrete steps in creating a viable transportation network. The primary goal set out by the Paper is reduction in fossil fuel consumption and reduction of greenhouse effect gasses emission. That is why the Paper is suggesting a shift to production of vehicles that could run on biofuel and other renewable energy sources. The 2011 Paper also points out the importance of adapting and upgrading the transformational infrastructure together with the rest of the industry.

In this, latest, White Paper, special attention is given to environmental issues posed by transportation. A vision of competitive and long-lasting sustainable transportation system is set out. With it the EU has set a goal of cutting carbon emissions caused by transport by 60% by 2050. And once more inland waterway transport is marked as underused and as the possible solution to some of transportation problems.

In all of the latest international documents sustainable development is lauded as the way of the future and sustainable transport or transport for sustainable development is definitely a big part of it. The EU has adopted a series of rules and regulations on transport and transportation systems and policies, all with the goal of achieving a unified, environmentally safe and viable transportation system in the Community.

Inland Waterway Transport

Inland waterway transport has been attracting more and more attention by the international community, so there is no major international documents or development strategies that don't mention the advantages

⁴COM /2011/144.

and development mechanisms for river and canal transportation systems. Inland waterway transport as safer, economically sound and cleaner when compared to other types of transport has become a logical next step in transport development. In Europe there is more than 30.000 km canal and river waterways that connect major industrial hubs and areas. Since historically major cities and industrial hubs and trade centers have been situated along river banks so there is already a built-in geographical advantage to inland waterway usage. When transporting heavy loads, metals, construction materials, industrial goods and industrial waste, especially in shipping containers that could be stacked on top of each other, there is no better way of transport when we compare the amount of cargo to energy consumption. Apart from Rhine, Danube, and the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal there is a vast network of smaller rivers and canals connecting cities and industrial hubs. The advantageous position of river ports that are often situated in the center of the European trade routes are providing an opportunity for intermodal transport, combining inland waterway transport with road, railway and maritime transport systems.

Despite of natural advantages this type of transport is heavily underused. Inland waterway transport takes only about 7% of entire European transportation system, while road transport takes up 75% of all transport on the continent.⁵ One of the reasons for the low usage of waterway transport is the fact that only half of the EU member states has interconnected waterway usable for transport. However, in some EU member states, like Benelux countries and northern France waterway transport takes up 43% of all transport in the region. The Benelux region is a prime example how investing in waterway infrastructure can bring

⁵ UNECE Transport Division Inland Water Transport, <http://www.unece.org>

benefits to the entire transportation system. Something that is falling short in the rest of Europe.

However, in the last decade there have been steps taken to modernize and upgrade the waterway shipping fleets across Europe. Shipping companies have invested in creating state of the art information and communications systems, like the introduction of the RIS system. RIS system is a unified information system that provides real-time information on waterways, traffic, ships itinerary, docking ports along the way, and other information important for waterway transport. The entire RIS service is accessible via Internet. With the introduction of RIS service, the accessibility to information is vastly improved, which in turn effects the efficiency and safety of inland waterway transport.

One of the biggest incentives of inland waterway transport is its low price, which is the lowest in among all transportation methods, as much as 100% cheaper than road transport. This low price is achieved by a combination of factors, such as, natural river flow and the size of the ships compared to trucks and freight trains. Another advantage is low and organized river traffic. There are no traffic jams and gridlocks like in road and even railway transport. Most rivers are navigable 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Furthermore, the percentage of accidents is much lower in river transport than in other modes of transport which makes this type of transport safer than other methods. Maybe even most importantly, environmental footprint of transportation ships is lower than that of long haul trucks. Advancements in technology have led to eco-efficient engines that emit less harmful gases, and the shipping industry is expected to meet the standards set by the Kyoto Protocol.

Inland waterway transport is especially suitable for combination with other types of transport, even more so when goods are transported in shipping containers. That is why the importance of intermodal transport is

becoming more and more present in supranational documents. Because of the already existing infrastructure connecting shipping ports to roads and railways the inland waterway systems is slowly becoming the corner stone of intermodal transport, supported by EU measures of development. The idea is to turn major shipping ports into intermodal platforms connecting all types of transport.

Inland waterway transport in Europe can be divided into four major corridors. 1. Rhine and its tributaries (The Netherlands, Mid and West Germany, North Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Switzerland); 2. The East-West Corridor (North-East Germany, Poland, Czech Republic) 3. The Danube Corridor (South-east Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine); 4. North-South Corridor (the Netherlands, Belgium and France). The most developed region is the Rhine Corridor, accounting for 90% of all river transport in the EU. Due to heavy investing in infrastructure this area is also in the forefront of multimodal transport. Other corridors could follow this trend, if investments are made in the right way, since there is a lot of unused potential, especially in the Danube region.⁶

In other EU countries like Finland, Italy, Sweden, Slovenia, Greece... river transport is severely underdeveloped. Countries that are candidates for joining the EU have a chance to use inland waterways to speed up the integration process, since rivers are natural connectors of different regions. Interest in advancing the waterway transport system is especially important for Countries whose railway and road infrastructure is far below EU standards.

⁶ Jaseneo Marin, *Promet unutarnjim plovnim putovima*, Europsko prometno pravo, Zagreb, 2011, p. 187

The EU recognizes the importance of inland waterways not only through adoption of the White Paper, but also through series of EU directives aimed at development and expansion of this type of transport.⁷

Legal Framework for Inland Waterway Transport

Most important regulatory bodies that deal with harmonization and unification of regulations regarding waterway transport in Europe are regulatory bodies of the EU, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (CCNR) and the Danube Commission.

The European Union through its bodies regulates all types of transport within its jurisdiction. The goals of the EU transport policies are primarily directed towards creating a unified transportation system, but also towards sustainable development and environmental protection. Inland waterway transport and all the relations thereof are regulated by regulations, directives and decisions. There are many legal instruments regulating technical aspects, security measures, transportation of dangerous goods, and functioning of the inland waterway market.

One of the most important directives is the European Parliament Directive on harmonized river information services (RIS) on inland waterways in the Community.⁸ The purpose of this directive is establishing a framework for implementation and harmonization of information services across all waterways in the EU.

Also important is the Council Directive 96/75/EC which declares freedom of contract and pricing in inland waterway transportation services inside

⁷ Transport for Sustainable Development in the ECE region, UNECE, E/CN.17/2011/4.

⁸ Directive 2005/44 EC OJ L 225.

of the EU. Much like the Regulations (EEC) No 3921/91 and (EC) No 1356/96 which establish the right to cabotage and international transport operations inside the EU and in transit through EU member states.⁹

Since this type of transport has the lowest impact on the environment, there are many legal instruments that are connected to transport and environmental protection and transportation of dangerous goods that could have severe negative impact on the environment. In this area important legislature is the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 laying down technical requirements for inland waterway vessels¹⁰ and the Directive on the inland transport of dangerous goods.¹¹

The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) was founded in 1947 in Geneva, it encompasses 56 member states. UNECE has formed a special committee ITC - UNECE Inland Transport Committee to deal specifically with problems related to transport.

This Committee deals primarily with unification of technical and safety regulations that regulate inland waterway transport. The most important documents adopted by this organization, with regard to sustainable development are:

⁹ Cabotage, the right of transport services within a particular territory. In the case of inland waterway transport it refers to the right of a ship to perform transportational service within two ports in countries foreign in regards to the ship's flag state. Cabotage on the Danube is limited only to national fleets, while cabotage on Rhein is allowed only for EU and CCN member states, but in practice it is limited by many technical conditions. The right to cabotage for non EU ships is assessed for each individual case.

¹⁰ 2006/87 EC

¹¹ Directive 2008/68/EC (2008)OJ L 260

1. European inland waterway network: European Agreement on Main Inland Waterways of International Importance (AGN).¹² This agreement establishes internationally agreed upon network of inland waterways and ports and unified infrastructure and parameters for waterway transport. The established waterway network connects 37 countries from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains and it extends past the borders of the European region. Countries that adopt the AGN are obliged to build and develop their inland waterways and ports in accordance with unified parameters set out by the Agreement.
2. European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous goods by Inland Waterways (ADN) from 2000, last amended in 2017. All EU member states must harmonize their national legislation with ADN. ADN is the basis for national legislation concerning carriage of dangerous goods. National legislation cannot be in collision with the rules stated in the ADN, but it can be stricter.
3. Convention on the registration of inland navigation vessels from 1965
4. Convention on the measurement of inland navigation vessels from 1966
5. Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD)
- not yet in force

UNECE often cooperates with other institutions, such as United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and they formed an Agency for the development and regulation of multimodal door to door transport. Together with the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) it has participated in creation of uniform rules for multimodal transport documents.¹³

¹² ECE/TRANS/SC.3/2015/3-ECE/TRANS/WP.24/2015/12

¹³ ICC Publication 298

Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine

Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (CCNR) was formed in 1968 by adoption of the Convention of Mannheim. This agreement still governs the principles of Rhine navigation today. The member states are currently Germany, Belgium, France, The Netherlands, and Switzerland and its current seat is in Strasbourg.

This Convention regulates free navigation, equal treatment of ship crew, obligations of member states in maintaining the waterway etc.¹⁴

CCNR is comprised of delegates from member states. Regulations adopted by this Commission are about managing and maintaining free trade along the Rhine River in alignment with CEVNI.¹⁵ CCNR has also adopted rules on oversight of vessels on the Rhine River, licensing of ship captains, as well as, regulations of carriage of dangerous material on the river (AND-R Agreements)

The importance of this organization lies in the fact that under its control lies almost 80% of entire inland waterway goods transportation in Europe. Non-EU vessels have to get a permit from CCNR before they can navigate the Rhine.¹⁶ Since the greatest threat for the environment is the carriage of dangerous good the CCNR has drafted a Convention on Transport of Dangerous Goods by Water in 2003. This text was drafted in order to regulate and harmonize this important issue. The text is similar to Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of

¹⁴ The Convention has been amended by numerous protocols. Text available at: [http:// www.ccr-zkr.org](http://www.ccr-zkr.org)

¹⁵ European Code for Inland Waterways (ECE/TRANS/2007/3) which establishes the framework for inland waterway navigation in Europe, it contains rules of mostly technical nature.

¹⁶ Jaseneo Marin, Promet unutarnjim plovnim putovima, Europsko prometno pravo, Zagreb, 2011, p. 187p. 183.

Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD) that has already been adopted by UNECE but was never put in force due to high limit of liability.¹⁷ The new Convention was better suited to protect injured parties, and among other things, it contained provisions on large scale damages, catastrophic damages, and formation of mitigation funds for catastrophic damages. The model used when drafting this Convention were conventions on maritime law to fill in the gaps of the CRTD, which doesn't contain provision on disasters and catastrophic damages.

Danube Commission

The Danube Commission is an international intergovernmental organization established by the Convention regarding the regime of navigation on the Danube signed in Belgrade on 18 August 1948.¹⁸ The main objectives of the Danube Commission's activity are to provide and develop free navigation on the Danube for the commercial vessels flying the flag of all states in accordance with interests and sovereign rights of the Member States of the Belgrade Convention, as well as to strengthen and develop economic and cultural relations of the said states among themselves and with the other countries. The Member States of the Danube Commission are the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Bulgaria, Hungary, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Romania, the Republic of Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Ukraine and the Republic of Croatia. Since 1954 the Commission has its seat in Budapest.

¹⁷ ECE/TRANS/32.

¹⁸ For more information see: <http://www.danubecommission.org>

The Belgrade Convention guarantees free navigation on the Danube River, with the exception on cabotage.¹⁹ Each member state is obliged to maintain the waterway within its borders.

Unlike the regulations adopted by the Rhine Commission, which have mandatory strength, regulations adopted by the Danube Commission have the strength of a recommendation (soft law). In other words, each member state can decide whether to incorporate the Commissions decisions in its legal system or not. Recommendations adopted by the Danube Commission mostly cover the scope of nautical issues, technical propositions for vessels, environment protection, and water pollution due to river traffic. AND-D Agreement regulates carriage of dangerous goods on the Danube.

In order to create a unified European waterway system cooperation between these organizations is needed. That is why the Danube Commission, Rhine Commission, UNECE and European Commission have worked together on many projects. In 2001 working together these organizations adopted the Rotterdam declaration-Pan European Conference of Inland waterway transport which sets out the goal of creating and developing harmonized European inland waterway transport system, ensuring free navigation and transport, equal treatment for all subjects who use the waterways and ensuring safe and environmentally friendly inland waterway transport.²⁰ The conclusion of the Pan-European Convention were that there are still many legal obstacles in creating a unified European waterway system. Limitations of port usage, taxes, certifications, different technical propositions in different countries are just some of the problems addressed in the conclusions. Some limitations arise

¹⁹ Cabotage on the Danube River falls under regulation of the country where the transport is being performed.

²⁰ ECE/TRAN/122

from national some from international legal documents. These problems should be overcome by harmonized regulation of the Pan-European inland waterway system.

After the Rotterdam Declaration a series of documents was adopted with concrete solutions to problems of international waterway transport.

One of the most important documents to arise from this cooperation is the Pan-European vision for efficient and sustainable inland water transport adopted in 2010.²¹ The goals set out by this document are further harmonization of inland waterway transport regulation, broader inclusion of interested countries (not just EU member states) in decision making process and project realization. Some concrete measurements are: modernization of river fleets, expanding and rebuilding infrastructure, and inclusion of small and medium enterprises in this industry, usage of new technologies and new labor policies to bust employment in this sector.

The International Sava River Basin Commission

The International Sava River Basin Commission (ISRBC)²² has been established for purpose of the implementation of the Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin (FASRB). Member states are Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purpose of this Commission is establishment of an international regime of navigation on the Sava River and its navigable tributaries, which includes provision of conditions for safe navigation on the Sava River and its tributaries, establishment of sustainable water management and undertaking of measures to prevent or limit hazards.

²¹ ECE/TRANS/SC.3/2010/4

²² For more information visit: www.savacommission.org

Documents of Sava Commission mostly regulate private law connected to contractual relations and liability in transport. Since the all previously mentioned regulation has a direct impact on sustainable development at this moment, we will not dive deeper into legal documents adopted by Sava Commission, although this Commission plays an important role in harmonization of private law connected to inland waterway transport.

Multimodal Transport and Economic Viability

Multimodal transport is a type of transport where a single shipping unit (shipping container) is used to transport goods, but the types of transport change without loading and unloading the goods every time the change between types of transport is made.²³ The main purpose of this kind of transport is reduction of overall costs of shipping, efficient and eco-friendly usage of shipping methods.

With usage of multimodal transport maximization of all available transport methods is used, thus avoiding the dominant road transport, which causes biggest pollution in transport industry. Since the transport industry is struggling to keep up with the development of commerce, relying strictly on road transport has proven not only costly and ineffective, but also devastating to the environment. That is why multimodal transport has becoming a point of interest for many countries and international organizations. EU has set the goal to faze out 30% of short distance road transport and switch to more eco-friendly options by 2030, and 50% by 2050 respectively.²⁴ These goals can only be achieved by harnessing the full potential of waterway transport, new technologies and multimodal

²³ European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) Terminology on combined transport, 1993.

²⁴ European Commission (EC), White Paper. Roadmap to a Single -European Transport Area -Towards a competitive and Resource Efficient Transport System, COM (2011) 144 final, 2011.

options along the shipping lanes. With multimodal thought on mind new approach is needed to current logistic efforts. Reshaping the logistic network in no easy task, and it has to be done simultaneously on national and supranational level.

Financing the multimodal transportation network is a multilevel process that could be problematic for countries with rundown infrastructure, since new and adaptable shipping terminals have to be built in order to accommodate this kind of transport. Countries that have already started implementing multimodal plans (Germany, Austria, France, and Belgium) highlight the importance of joint ventures between public and private sector as an only option for financing these costly projects.²⁵

Investing in entirely new infrastructure (multimodal terminals, dams, signalization, and eco-efficient vessels) can seem like a daunting task, especially for smaller countries. However, when we factor in energy consumption and pollution investing in waterway and multimodal transport systems seems like the only viable option in the long run. High cost of air and road transport are becoming more and more onerous for both the environment but also for the existing infrastructure.²⁶

Conclusion

By the very nature of rivers and canals, which transcend borders and regions, to achieve sustainable development in the transport industry cooperation between different entities, countries, international institutions, private sector, is a key factor. With the introduction of electric cars and trucks some of the pollution problems of the road transport could

²⁵ Tadić, S. R., Zečević, S. M., & Milenković, D. M. (2017). Intermodal transport treatment in developed and developing countries. *Tehnika*, 72(6), 897-902.

²⁶ See József Rohács & Gyozo Simongáti (2007) The role of inland waterway navigation in a sustainable transport system, *Transport*, 22:3, 148-153

be solved, but still the problem of limited and expensive infrastructure remains. Traffic jams and gridlock are becoming our new normal, and that needs to change. The downside of waterway transport is that it's too slow for today's fast paced economy. It's also underdeveloped, whereas the road and air transport systems have seen massive improvements in recent decades. Moreover, waterway transport can never work alone, it has to be combined with other types of transport to achieve efficiency. That's where we need to start thinking outside of the box and start implementing a seamless and continuous multimodal transport system.

International community has taken steps in ensuring the existence of adequate legal framework for sustainable transport systems. The EU has recognized transport problems and defined abovementioned solutions as a stepping stone towards sustainable development and transport of the future. Environmental implications of the transport industry cannot be ignored, and strong and decisive action is needed in this field. Mostly ignored and underdeveloped inland waterway transport is shaping up to be a logical solution and a next step in the eco-friendly revolution of industry. Public-private partnership in this area could prove more than beneficial, not only, when financing is in question, but also in exchanging of ideas and know how in the shipping industry. The waterway transport network has a long way to go to catch up with other transport methods, but that doesn't mean it's not worth investing in when pros and cons are weighed in.

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Tijana Stanisavić

From Ulm to Banat – The Beginning of German Migrations to Banat

Tijana Stanisavić, M.A. Department of History, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Niš, Serbia. tstanisavic@hotmail.com

Abstract

The beginning of German migrations to Banat resulted in an elaborate process of transformations of this region with the consequences visible even today. There were three different waves that German population adopted by entering Banat, sc. *Schwabenzüge*. Those migrations were conducted by the government starting with the beginning of the eighteen century and they represented the foundation of Banat's upcoming modernization. The last twenty years in Germany have been defined by more intensive researches considering migration of Germans to Eastern and Southeastern Europe, but unfortunately, researches in Serbia have not made that progress.

The aim of this paper is to help understanding the early German migrations to Southeastern Europe, especially to Banat, and to avoid stereotypes and prejudices that are presented during the 20th century.

Key words:

Danube Swabians, Migrations, Habsburg Monarchy, Banat, 18th century

Zusammenfassung

Zu Beginn des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, gab es drei von der damaligen Regierung eingeleitete Einwanderungswellen (Schwabenzüge) in die Banat-Region. Mit der deutschen Migration begann dort ein Transformations- und Modernisierungsprozess, der bis heute sichtbar ist. Die Forschungsanstrengungen in Deutschland der letzten 20 Jahre zur Migration von Deutschen nach Ost- und Südosteuropa fand bisher wenig Beachtung in Serbien, wo erst heute begonnen wird, die damalige Entwicklung und deren Auswirkungen auf die Region näher zu untersuchen.

Das Ziel dieser wissenschaftlichen Arbeit ist es, die Anfänge der deutschen Migration in die Banat-Region zu erklären, ohne Stereotypen und Vorurteile zu bestätigen, die sich vor allem im 20. Jahrhundert entwickelt haben.

Schlüsselwörter:

Donauschwaben, Migrationen, Habsburgermonarchie, Banat, Donaulauf, 18. Jahrhundert

The Austrian-Turkish war, which occurred from 1716 to 1718, and the liberation of Belgrade as the '*Balkan Gate*',¹ was designated with the Austrians territorial expansion. A new border was established on the rivers Sava, Drina, West Morava, Timok and Danube.² Those areas had a big strategic and economic potential, which needed to be used according to principle

„*Österreich über alles, wann es nur will*“.³ This war was the crucial moment for changing the multiethnic environment of Southeastern Europe and represented a starting point for national migrations of a larger extent.⁴ Their model was a settlement of Banat, which was considered to be the crown Habsburg's territory from 1718 to 1778. Two individuals should be noted as crucial for first organized migratory wave of Germans to Banat: Prince Eugen of Savoy and Count of Mercy. They contributed to the realization of sc. *Habsburg Project* and settling of Province Banat.

Those areas were devastated and depopulated, described as poorly settled wilderness, covered with mud and swamps. The main aim was their repopulation and economic recovery. The project of settling Banat which

¹ H. Hantsch, *Die Geschichte Österreich*, Bd.2, Graz-Wien-Köln 1955, 112

² According the *uti possidetis* principle, the Habsburg monarchy gained the Banat with Temesvar, the southern part of Syrmia, northern Serbia including Belgrade, the area from the Drina River as far as the confluence of the Timok and Danube Rivers, a tiny belt of Bosnia along Sava River and the region west of the Olt known as Little Wallachia, in: N. Samardzić, *The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718. An Introduction*, in: C. Ingrao, N. Samardzić, K. Pešalj (Eds.), *The Peace of Passarowitz 1718*, Purdue University Press 2011, 9-38, 16.

³ H. Hantsch, *Die Geschichte Österreich*, 64-65.

⁴ C. Ingrao, *The Habsburg-Ottoman Wars and the Modern World*, in: Ingrao, Charles, Samardzić, Nikola, Pešalj, Jovan, *The Peace of Passarowitz 1718*, Purdue University Press 2011, 3; N. Samardzić, *The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718*, 27; K.P. Kraus, *Ansiedlung als Prozeß. Deutsche Kolonisten in der Herrschaft Boly*, in: Beer, Mathias, Dahlmann, Dittmar, *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ursachen-Formen-Ergebnis*, Stuttgart 1999, 291-316, 291.

started in beginning of the eighteenth century resulted in creating ethnical diversity of this area which led to a rich cultural interaction.

German movements toward Southeastern Europe in the eighteenth century need to be seen as a part of one bigger migratory process which was presented as a migration by land. German demographic movements in the eighteenth century are characterized as movements conducted by land (*Trockenauswanderung*) or by sea (*Amerikaauswanderung*).⁵ Migrations by land were larger in their extent according to the hypothesis that ca. 40% from almost half a million people who left Germany in the eighteenth century went to South America.⁶ The Habsburg monarchy considered Southeastern Europe as a colonial alternative and one of the

Lands of prosperity was Hungary, which was described in the following sentence: "You may look upon Hungary as a new world".⁷ Migrations by land were placed in two ways: south-north and west-east. Regions populated towards west-east included also the territory of Southeastern Europe and following historical-geographical territories: Eger-Tokaj (*Bergland*), Baranya

(Schwäbische Türkei), Syrmia-Slavonia (Syrmien – Slawonien), Bačka (Batscherland), Banat (Banat), Satmar (Sathmar und Transtysten).⁸

⁵ M. Beer, *Die ,trockene Auswanderung'. Eine thematische und forschungsgeschichtliche Einordnung*, in: Beer, Mathias, Dahlmann, Dittmar, Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ursachen-Formen-Ergebnis, Stuttgart 1999, 9-24, 13.

⁶ J. Black, *Eighteenth Century Europe 1700 - 1789*, Macmillan History of Europe, London 1990, 24.

⁷ I. Parvev, Southeastern Europe as a Factor in German History, 1699-1829, in: P. Mitev, I. Parvev, M. Baramova, V. Racheva (Eds.), *Southeastern Europe between Karlowitz and the Peace of Adrianople, 1699-1829*, Berlin 2010, 24, 20; J. Black, *Eighteenth Century Europe*, 23

⁸ J.V. Senz, *Geschichte der Donauschwaben: von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Wien 1994, 13.

The migrations were conducted with three different waves of German population toward Southeastern Europe, each of whom was named by ruling sovereign:

- *Karolinische Schwabenzug*, during the reign of Charles VI (1711-1740)
- *Teresianische Schwabenzug*, during the reign of Maria Theresa (1740-1765)
- *Josephinische Schwabenzug*, during the reign of Joseph II (1765-1790).

Should be noted that one wave of migrations was unfairly left out even it represented the beginning of movement conducted during the reign of Leopold I.⁹ The migrations mentioned above started soon after the Peace of Karlowitz was signed. They were larger in extent and organized by government. This *Leopoldinische Schwabenzug* started the process which did not last in continuity for the next hundred and fifty years.¹⁰ It needs to be mentioned that there is no unique period designation of those migratory waves. The accepted one is given in the following chronological frames of population movements:

- 1723-1726 – *Karolinische Schwabenzug, under the Charles VI*
- 1763-1772 – *Teresianische Schwabenzug, under the Maria Theresa*
- 1782-1787 – *Josephinische Schwabenzug, under the Joseph II.*¹¹

⁹ O. Feldtänzer, G. Wildmann, *Donauschwäbische Geschichte*, Bd. 1: Das Jahrhundert der Ansiedlung: 1689-1805, München 2006, 37.

¹⁰ M. Antolović, *Немци у Јужној Угарској у XIX веку. Прилог историји Немаца у Јужној Угарској*, Зборник Матице српске, бр.79/80, Нови Сад 2009, 283-202, 184.

¹¹ J. Wolf, *Ethnische Konflikte im Zuge der Besiedlung des Banats im 18. Jahrhundert. Zum Verhältnis von Einwanderung, staatlicher Raumorganisation und ethnostrukturellem Wandel*, in: M. Beer, D. Dahlmann (Eds.), *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ursachen-Formen-Ergebnis*, Stuttgart 1999, 337-366 340 There are suggestions in historical science that next periodization is more acceptable: 1723-1726, 1765-1771, 1774-1788, in: S. Seitschek, H. Hutterer, G. Theimer, *300 Jahre Karl VI 1711-1740. Spuren der Herrschaft des "letzten" Habsburger*, Begleitband zur Ausstellung des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, Wien 2011, 120.

This classification does not include individual and migrations organized by local nobility, which were noted mostly in the first half of the eighteenth century.¹²

The Danube Swabians or *Donauschwaben* is the name given to first German groups that came from Swabia region and settled down in the Middle Danube region during the reign of Leopold I. This name lasted during the following migratory waves and exists even today. Although, the German settlers in this area were from different parts of Germany, they all accepted the name that was already established.¹³ The term *Donauschwaben* was the result of an academic research of German population in Southeast Europe. The term's creation is attributed to *Robert Sieger* in 1920, when he was head of the Department of Geography at the University of Graz, but the term is mostly attributed to *Herman Rödiger* in 1922. Rödiger popularized the term with intention to describe those Germans in Southern Europe. He was also able to popularize the term as the editor of *Der Auslandsdeutsche*, which was the journal of the *Auslandsinstitut's* in Stuttgart.¹⁴

There are certain facts that there were eight hundred migratory actions towards contemporary Vojvodina between 1711 and 1780.¹⁵ For Banat those facts specify sixty-three migratory actions between 1714 and 1792.¹⁶

¹² K. P. Krauss, *Deutsche Auswanderer in Ungarn. Ansiedlung in der Herrschaft Bóly im 18. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart 2003, 31.

¹³ P. Lyon, *After Empire: Ethnic Germans and minority nationalism in interwar Yugoslavia*, Maryland University 2008 (unpublished doctoral dissertation), 7.

¹⁴ P. Lyon, *After Empire: Ethnic Germans and minority nationalism*, 7.

¹⁵ З. Бере, Скица промена етничког састава становништва на тлу данашње Војводине 1526-1910, *Истраживања* 15, Нови Сад 2004, 105-125, 114

¹⁶ . Cretan, D. Tornosoc, J. Woudstova (Eds.), *Identity and multiculturalism in the Romanian Banat. Identité et multi-culturalisme dans le Banat Roumain*, Méditerranée N.110 (2008), Bulgarie-Roumanie 2008, 17-26, 18.

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The areas of west, south-west and south Germany were designated as territories from which a large amount of population left. Those territories could be identified with contemporary German federal republics: Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Saarland, Rheine-Palatinate North Rheine-Westphalia and Hessen. It should be noted that the first migratory waves were characterized with sporadic migrations from Saxony, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Silesia and Styria.¹⁷ Areas mentioned above were threatened by devastating French attacks which resulted in constant fear of new attacks. They also took a big desolation in The Thirty Years war, but even though, they recovered quickly.¹⁸ In the second decade of the eighteenth century the situation on the West German border became more stable, but the question of how those attacks affected the border region and density of population needs to be asked. Simultaneously, we should not omit mentioning the obvious increase in population.¹⁹ This was common not just for territories mentioned above but also for the entire

¹⁷ L. Szita, *Die Einwanderung deutscher Lutheraner nach Südtransdanubien im 18. Jahrhundert*, in: Beer, Mathias, Dahlmann, Dittmar, *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ursachen-Formen-Ergebnis*, Stuttgart 1999, 137-144, 139. Austrian and Bohemian territories were mostly out of this process, according to previous war devastation (1618-1648, 1683-1699), in: V. Dabić, *The Habsburg-Ottoman War of 1716-1718 and Demographic Changes in War-Afflicted Territories*, in: C. Ingrao, N. Smardžić, J. Pešalj (Eds.), *The Peace of Passarowitz 1718*, Purdue University Press 2008, 191-208, 198.

¹⁸ Baden-Württemberg and Swabia recorded 450 000 people in 1618, and 62 000 in 1639. The situation in Trier, Mainz, Koln and Lorene recorded only 150 000 people in 1698, in comparison with ca. 800 000 in the end of 15th century, in: H. Herrschaft, *Das Banat. Ein deutsches Siedlungsgebiet in Südosteuropa*, Berlin 1942, 77-78.

¹⁹ H. D. Löwe, *Deutsche Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa im 18. Jahrhundert. Ergebnisse und neue Fragestellungen*, in: Beer, Mathias, Dahlmann, Dittmar, *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ursachen-Formen-Ergebnis*, Stuttgart 1999, 427-444, 431

Europe, especially after 'Krisse des 17 Jahrhunderts'.²⁰ One of the best examples is Baden-Württemberg which recorded a high growth of population starting with 428 000 in 1734 that reached 620 000 in 1790; the population in Palatinate was doubled between 1750 and 1790.²¹ One of the sectors that were affected by this growth of population was industry which lacked available resources and one of the consequences was unemployment, high cost of life and poverty. The lack of social protection and basic means of subsistence could lead to a bigger problem that eventually could affect the government, also to increase social differentiation. This is why the government conducted different ways to restrict its risks.²² This leads to the conclusion that government and citizens had the same interest. At the same time people who migrated from villages to cities contributed to an already present lack of employment. Although there were more attempts to divide the main reason that caused migrations into several aspects, economical and demographical situation needs to be seen as one complete image. The image of the entire Europe was seen as *The image of limited good*,²³ characterized by the one who lost and the other who won. That was the risk that the German migrants were willing to take by leaving their native

²⁰ The last stage was in austro-turkish war 1683-1699, after which is recorded the continuity of increase of population E. Bruckmüller, *Sozial-Geschichte Österreichs*, Wien-München 1985, 219.

²¹ Black, *Eighteenth Century Europe*, 1. Average population density in the beginning of the eighteenth century in those areas was 30 people per sq. km, in: W. Petz, *Auswanderung aus Bayern ins Königreich Ungarn im 18. Jahehundert*, in: Ungarn – Jahrbuch 26 (2001/2003), Ungarisches Institut München, München 2003, 33-72, 36.

²² G. Fertig, 'Mann müßte es sichschie fremd vorkommen lassen'. Auswanderungspolitik am Oberrhein im 18. *Jahrhundert* in: M. Beer, D. Dahlmann (Eds.), *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ursachen-Formen-Ergebnis*, Stuttgart 1999, 71-108, 85

²³ G. Fertig, *Auswanderungspolitik am Oberrhein*. 86

countries. This enabled the human potential for improvement of population policy in Habsburg monarchy.

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Soon after the decision of the *Comissio Neo Acquistica*, which regarded Banat's migrations, a new function was created. The agents had as its task locating potential migrants and informing them about possibilities to settle in Banat. They were getting the permission directly from the sovereign although some of them worked without it.²⁴ One of their tasks was also to interpret the contracts that settlers should accept, managing routes and maintaining good relations with local authorities. Agents were one of the main factors that represented the government.²⁵ Hajós near Baja (Hungary) was the first place that was settled due to the work of agents.²⁶ In an attempt to gain trust of potential migrants they offered certain privileges: according to the *Instruction* from Vienna for *Administration of Timisoara* (23rd June 1719), every individual would get some land, tax immunity for three years, cheap building material, workmanship and tools, and the foundation of a local church. They attracted colonists with promises of land and tax exemptions, personal and religious freedom. Every good agent should have some qualification, such as language skills, personal skills and religious suitability. *Johann Franz Albrecht Craußen* and *Jochan Franz Falk* are worth mentioning as agents whose significance for the settlement of Banat was impressive.

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²⁴ J.V. Senz, *Geschichte der Donauschwaben*, 57.

²⁵ T. O'Reilly, *Agenten, Werbing und Reisemodalitäten. Die Auswanderung ins Temeschver Banat im 18. Jahrhundert*, in: Beer, Mathias, Dahlmann, Dittmar, *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ursachen-Formen-Ergebnis*, Stuttgart 1999, 109-120, 110. ²⁶ W. H. Peterschagen, *Die Ulmer Donauschiffe*, 22.

The river Danube, as *the main artery of Europe* which was one of its epithets,²⁶ had a big significance for the Habsburg monarchy as a factor of her cohesion.²⁷ It was the main water road with multiple importance, not only traffic and trade, but also for both, the economical and cultural development of regions along. As Austrians entered the Czech territory German population from Swabia used Danube as an essential way starting from 1622/23, when this type of movements was conducted for the first time.²⁸

In the whole process of migration, the important task of transport was entrusted to substations (*Werber- und Speditionsbüro*) in Mainz, Würzburg, Regensburg, Neuburg, Ehingen and in Worms, as one of the most important.²⁹ The starting points of the migrant's road were Ulm and Regensburg. Since the sixteenth century Ulm had been not only the beginning of the river road along Danube, but also an important point for trade with East and Southeastern Europe.³¹ The 1664 was the year when transport along the Danube was created and existed following the same pattern as today.³⁰

²⁶ Д. Поповић, *Срби у Банату- историја насеља и становништва*, Београд 1955, 15. *Fluvius Europae* is also one of the epithets which indicates its importance, in: J. Мргић, *Дунав – Скица за картографски портрет једне реке*, у: Ђорђе Костић (ур.), *Дунавом од Бездана до Београда*, Београд 2012, 217-224, 217.

²⁷ C. Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1618/1815*, Cambridge University Press 2000, 6

²⁸ W. H. Peterschagen, *Die Ulmer Donauschiffe und das Geschäft mit der Auswanderung. Mit besonderem Blick auf den Beginn der Auswanderung durch Ulm in die habsburgischen Länder im Jahr 1623*, in: M. Fata (Ed.), "Die Schiff stehn'schon bereit". Ulm und die Auswanderung nach Ungarn im 18. Jahrhundert, *Forschung zur Geschichte der Stadt Ulm*, Bd.13, Ulm 2009, 21-30, 23.

²⁹ O. Feldtänzer, G. Wildmann, *Donauschwäbische Geschichte*, 160-161. ³¹ Б. Бешлин, *Насељавање Немаца у Војводину*, Нови Сад 2006, 22.

³⁰ H. Fassel, "Es geht ins Paradies". *Ulm und die Donauschwaben in deutschen Reisebeschreibungen*, in: M. Fata (Hg.), "Die Schiff stehn'schon bereit". Ulm und die Auswanderung nach Ungarn im 18. Jahrhundert, *Forschung zur Geschichte der Stadt Ulm*, Bd. 13, Ulm 2009, 93-118, 98.

Considering the fact that distance between Ulm and Belgrade was more than one thousand kilometers along, the river route was accepted as the more cost-effective one. As means of transport they used boats and ships, sometimes even rafts. After the arrival to a substation, migrants were boarded into ships named *Zillien/Schwabenzillien* that could fit four hundred people, but also into small ships named *Ulmer Schachtel* that were built according to model from Middle Century that were typical *Swabian* ships, flat shaped that could fit 20, 80 Or 150 passengers.³¹

The organization of migratory movements to Banat was effective, with specified duties for each institution. Every wave of migrations was conducted according to an accurately determined schedule starting from spring on exactly specified date. People would leave the meeting point and moved towards Vienna where they would stop by Roseau. Due to certain sporadic incidents this station was avoided with the beginning of the reign of Maria Teresa. The trip duration from Vienna to Banat was almost two weeks. One of the difficulties was that not many people could afford renting a ship to get to Pest from Vienna. After arriving to Pest they would get options either to continue their trip to Timisoara or to stay right where they were. This dilemma was caused by the lack of money and low level of organization, but that was improved during the reign of Maria Teresa, when the road sector from Pest was institutionalized.³² Finally, at the end of their trip to Timisoara they got under the jurisdiction of *Administration of*

Timisoara whose duties were determined with the *Instruction* of *Hofkammer* from 1723.³³

³¹ *Ulmer Schachtel* were made to be used only once, after what their material had been used in other purposes, in: Б. Бешлин, *Насељавање Немаца*, 25.

³² T. O'Relly, *Agenten, Werbing und Reisemodalitcten*, 115.

³³ F. Milleker, *Die sreste organisierte Kolonisation des Banats unter Mercy 1722-1726*, Bela crkva 1923, 6.

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The ethnical majority of settlers in Banat were Germans, with minor groups of people from Italy, France and Spain, who were settled down mostly in bigger places. Among them a big majority was devoted to catholic religion. Only small groups belonged to the Protestant Church and those were coming mostly from Hessen.³⁴ They came from various regions and spoke various dialects.

First German settlers were soldiers and officers who were conducted in war (1716-1718), and not long after, the migratory wave brought craftsman, merchants, farmers, but also doctors and even actors. Settlers mostly belonged to the middle class and what is more important, they were capable of labor. One of the main goals of government was to give priority to those who accepted and were willing to accomplish the goal of population policy.³⁵ One of the orders was to keep away the potential settlers who were characterized as unsuitable according to their criminal history or potential, poverty and homelessness, or promiscuous behavior.³⁶ The question is what led people to leave their native countries and settle into unknown areas and those were *push-factors*, personal interests, social situation or policy system.³⁷ New countries were presented as "*land of flowing milk and honey*", with lot of privileges and every kind

³⁴ As we can see, Banat was not much attractive for them, in: I. Auerbach, *Einzelwanderung nach Südosteuropa*, in: M. Beer, D. Dahlmann (Eds.), *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ursachen-Formen-Ergebnis*, Stuttgart 1999, 193 – 208, 193.

³⁵ H.D. Löwe, *Deutsche Migration*, 428; S. Seitschek, H. Hutterer, G. Theimer, *300 Jahre Karl VI*, 121-122.

³⁶ T. O'Reilly, *Agenten, Werbung und Reisemodalitäten*, 115.

³⁷ R. Tuchtenhagen, *Religiöser Dissens, Staat und Auswanderung nach Osteuropa im 18. Jahrhundert*, in: M. Beer, D. Dahlmann, (Eds.), *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ursachen-Formen-Ergebnis*, Stuttgart 1999, 145-162, 160-162

of freedom. Movements were organized individually or in groups, and conducted before, during or after arrival into *'the promised land'*. It is interesting to mention that there were women who traveled individually.³⁸ It is not certain what was their main reason to travel, but it doubtlessly indicates the high level of social mobility and the absence of prejudices that they were only 'housewives'.³⁹

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The period following the Peace of Passarowitz in Banat was determined with the process of establishment of the Habsburg's rule and the settlement of German population. The forthcoming period was period of peace, stability and economic development. The authorities of Banat had invited not only Germans, but also Serbs and other nationalities to settle down in Banat, but the Germans were especially favored by the government. The Banat was settled by more than fifteen nationalities, with Germans as the largest element.

A new administration was characterized with incoming German settlers. Banat, as a depopulated and almost deserted area began with cultivation, which enabled an economical development. The recovery of the agrarian economy led the way in draining swamps, clearing forests and employing new techniques and crops. The German settlers influenced not only the ethnic patchwork of this region, but also the fortification and urban development. The same period was defined as the time of emergence of Baroque in Banat, which was the symbol of West-European civilization and culture at the time. This was caused by the population policy of the Habsburg monarchy and German migrations. This can lead us to conclude

³⁸ H.D. Löwe, *Deutsche Migration*, 431;

³⁹ S. Kienitz, *Weggehen ohne anzukommen. (Aus-) Wanderungerfahrungen von Frauen in mikrogeschichtlicher Perspektive*, in: M. Beer, D. Dahlmann (Eds.), *Migration nach Ost- und Südosteuropa vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ursachen-Formen-Ergebnis*, Stuttgart 1999, 121 – 137.

that Germans were factor of modernization of Banat, but were they? Did Germans, Serbs and Romanians do that working together, how did they interact and what were the results of that interaction?

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Kristina Radović

Public-Private Partnerships as an Instrument of Alternative Financing of Cultural Heritage in Serbia

*Kristina Radović, M. A., Danube Area Research Center, Novi Sad, Serbia
kirstina.tina.radovic@gmail.com*

Abstract

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have begun to be used, as an interdisciplinary approach to conservation of cultural heritage, in the late 1960s, within the context of urban regeneration schemes, when it became clear that not even the richest countries can afford, in their public sectors, to own, rehabilitate and maintain all of their heritage assets worth preserving. Soon, this instrument has begun to be used worldwide in cultural heritage projects, while fairly recently in archaeological rehabilitation projects.

The aim of this paper is to investigate why alternative sources of funding culture, respectively cultural heritage projects, haven't been introduced so far in Serbia and what are the obstacles and threats which could prevent its successful implementation, in order to ascertain whether this type of instrument could be successfully implemented in the current legislative and economical context in Serbia.

Key words:

public private partnerships, alternative financing, cultural heritage, Serbia

Resumé

Les partenariats public-privé (PPP) ont commencé à être utilisés, à la fin des années 1960, comme une approche interdisciplinaire de la conservation du patrimoine culturel, dans le contexte des régénérations urbaines, lorsqu'il est apparu que même les pays les plus riches ne peuvent se permettre, dans leurs secteurs publics, de posséder, réhabiliter et conserver tous leurs biens patrimoniaux qui méritent d'être préservés. Bientôt, cet instrument a commencé à être utilisé dans le monde entier dans des projets de patrimoine culturel, et tout récemment dans des projets de réhabilitation archéologique.

Le but de cet article est d'étudier pourquoi des sources alternatives de financement de la culture, respectivement des projets de patrimoine culturel, n'ont pas été introduites jusqu'à présent en Serbie et quels sont les obstacles et les menaces qui pourraient empêcher sa mise en œuvre réussie, afin de déterminer si ce type d'instrument pourrait être mis en œuvre avec succès dans le contexte législatif et économique actuel en Serbie.

Mots clés:

Partenariats public-privé, financement alternatif, patrimoine culturel, Serbie

1. Use of PPPs in the Field of Cultural Heritage

While there is no universally accepted definition of a public-private partnership, probably the most comprehensive one was given by the USA National Council for Public-Private Partnerships:

“A public-private partnership is a contractual arrangement between a public agency (federal, state or local) and a private sector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private) are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. In addition to the sharing of resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service and/or facility” (<http://www.ncppp.org/ppp-basics/7-keys>, 2.8.2016).

Public-private partnerships represent agreements made between the public and the private sector, and in the case of heritage with the presence of the third sector as well, with the goal to gather resources (financial, expertise) from different partners in order to deliver a service or a good of public character, but in the case of cultural heritage, it pertains usually to activities of conservation and rehabilitation, as well as management (Cheong, Macdonald 2014: 15). The cornerstone of successful partnerships is in-advance agreed-upon set of rules, which clearly define levels of financing, risks, responsibilities, governance and outcomes for each party involved, all the while committed to full transparency. It is important to remark that these agreements are not privatisation, since there is no transfer of ownership present and the accountability for the asset remains with the public sector (Ibid 2014: 16; UNECE 2008: 4). Usually, the roles are divided so that the public sector comes forth with an asset and a supportive environment (regulated legal framework, various incentives, guarantees etc.), the private sector with the investment capital and/or expertise, while the third sector can offer expertise as well, next to the local

knowledge and monitoring activities. Universal essential characteristics of PPPs in cultural heritage are long-term duration (in Serbia 5 to 50 years, with the possibility of extension), co-financing from the public sector, proportional risk sharing and an agreement with clearly defined rules and goals (Ibid 2014: 15; Cheong, Rypkema 2015: 24). There exist various types of PPPs, from which a concession, as a subcategory of a contractual PPP, is the most established form used in cultural heritage. Here, public offers a facility to the private sector, who operates it for the agreed period of time, and often builds and designs it. After the agreed period of time expires, the operation of the asset is transferred back to the public sector (UNECE 2008: 1). In order for a PPP to be successful, certain criteria has to be met, which are mostly tied with the good governance of the public sector.

In the last twenty years, the instrument of public-private partnership (PPP) first became increasingly used by governments in projects dealing with services traditionally delivered by the public sector, most commonly in core infrastructural projects dealing with water, energy, transportation, telecommunication etc. (Cheong, Macdonald 2014: 2). Great Britain is the first country to establish an all-encompassing state policy based on this logic, by launching The Private Financial Initiative (PFI) in 1992 (Peteri 2010: 9). This stemmed from the need of governments to more efficiently manage high costs and responsibilities (Ibid 2014: 2), or from their inability to provide financial resources, flexibility and/or technical capacity. In the late 1960s they began to be used for heritage conservation in urban regeneration projects, and slowly expanded its influence to a range of archaeological sites, buildings, landscapes, urban areas etc. (Macdonald 2011: 893). What makes cultural heritage PPPs different from those used in infrastructural and other projects is the inclusion of an additional partner, the third sector, whose role can be silent or official.

One of the main challenges that PPPs face is the feeling of distrust that the public and the private sector have amongst each other. The private sector is traditionally seen as only seeking profit, at the expense of quality, while on the other hand, the public sector is generally regarded as non-flexible, overly bureaucratic, often not transparent and sometimes corrupt (Cheong, Macdonald 2014: 26; GHF 2010: 54). For this reason, there are several widely accepted principles, which could provide the basis of a successful PPP: participation, decency, transparency, accountability, fairness and efficiency (UNECE 2008: 13-14). So both partners should agree upon a set of rules, established jointly in advance, which clearly define levels of financing, risks, responsibilities, governance and outcomes for each party involved, all the while committed to full transparency (Ibid 2014: 26).

Another prerequisite for the success of a PPP is an environment supportive of this type of instrument, in terms of policy and marketplace. According to UNECE, there are three phases through which every country, that is officially introducing this instrument, goes through:

1. Government is defining policy framework, starting to build the marketplace and develops a small number of projects (where most countries are situated, including Serbia)
2. Governments are publishing policy documents regarding PPPs, refining delivery models, establishing dedicated units and continuing to foster the marketplace
3. A full comprehensive system of PPPs is established, with refined models and a thriving market (only United Kingdom and Australia)

Many countries are still struggling with the implementation of this instrument, because of their need to develop institutions, processes, procedures and expertise of PPP deliverance, in other words with building

Kristina Radović:

Public-Private Partnerships as an Instrument of Alternative Financing of Cultural Heritage in Serbia

governance. Private investors get discouraged by this institutional uncertainty, characterised by prolonged periods of reaching closure, the lack of flexibility in risk-sharing and many projects being cancelled with losses (UNECE 2008: 6-9).

In Serbia, PPP has its own official definition under the *Law on Public-Private Partnerships and Concessions*, which states:

“The public-private partnership is a long-term cooperation between a public and a private partner for the purposes of providing financing, construction, reconstruction, management or maintenance of infrastructure and other facilities of public interest and provision of services, of public interest, which may be contractual or institutional” (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 88/11, article 7).

Before this Act was passed, PPP projects in Serbia were largely unsuccessful, since only four out of five concessions agreements on a national level have been finalised, while on the local level they have been developed mainly in the area of waste management (Vojnović, Piuk 2014: 3). Some of the rare examples of successful PPPs in Serbia are the private transportation service and water supply and sewerage in Belgrade, and parking services in Kikinda (Brdarević, Pavlović-Križanić 2010: 129, 136). This low success rate of PPP agreements was caused by complicated and prolonged procedures for awarding concessions and by the lack of unified regulatory framework of this area. The new Act, harmonised with EU standards, was passed with the aim to resolve these issues and improve current regulations, in order to stimulate the development of this instrument in Serbia (Ibid 2014: 3). Furthermore, the timeframe has been regulated, with the duration of 5 to 50 years (Article 8), which is an increase from the previous maximum of 30 years. This duration of the agreement is considered most suitable to attract investors in projects from which are

expected lower return rates, but there were those who argued that placing any time limit for concession projects might ward off the private sector of investing in long-term projects (Ibid 2014: 11). Moreover, a mandatory provision of the PPP is risk sharing, where its allocation between the public and private partner should depend on their ability to manage it (Ibid 2014: 19).

One of the issues that has not been resolved up to this day is the one of transparency of PPPs in Serbia, caused by the still non-existent Public Contracts Register. Question of transparency is regulated within article 74 of the *Law on Public-Private Partnerships and Concessions* of Serbia, which states that "public contracts shall be recorded in the Public Contracts Register" and that it "shall be public" (Article 74, paragraph 1 and 3). To this day, this Register has not been established. This issue was already been discussed in public, and it raises questions and concerns about the transparency of these types of co-operations and their legitimacy (Radojević 2015; Šabić 2014). This is an important legal instrument which was in Serbia used mostly in construction work (ports, roads, public parking), public transportation, exploitation of natural resources, public utility activities etc. but not once in the area of cultural assets, especially for the conservation and rehabilitation of cultural heritage.

2. Cultural Heritage as an Economic Asset

For a long time, ideas of a non-economic character of culture has been present in Serbia, emphasizing the role of the state in governance of culture (Drača Muntean, Mikić 2014:145). But this was the perspective which was common worldwide until very recently. Using culture, or cultural heritage (archaeological sites and its materials, knowledge etc.), as an impetus of national or local economy has been regarded as wrong, since their use for economic development, the explicit use of their economic

value (ability to generate revenues, jobs, investments etc.), is a non-traditional use opposed to their values as cultural assets (Burtenshaw 2014: 48). This is highlighted by Burtenshaw and Gould, who point out that "archaeology and heritage are not sufficiently recognized as assets that can contribute to social and economic development" (Burtenshaw, Gould 2014: 8). While there are those who completely oppose using cultural heritage as a source of income and profit, there are others, like Netzer, who believe that "the greatest success in heritage preservation can occur when the heritage element is in actual use, and is capable of generating revenue to pay for its preservation" (Netzer 1997: 4). Economic reasons could be the ones attracting certain groups and stakeholders to invest and preserve cultural heritage (Burtenshaw 2014: 52), but the positive contribution of archaeology and heritage to national economy and local communities, as economic assets, are much less discussed (Burtenshaw, Gould 2014: 3). Some researchers point out different economic dimensions of cultural heritage, one of them being its capability to generate returns in profits, incomes and jobs, due to people spending time and money visiting heritage sites (Burtenshaw 2013: 81). Another one is it being one of the elements of the economic development, with a considerable role in development projects (Loulanski 2006: 56). Furthermore, economic contribution of archaeological sites to tourism, regeneration and branding is well known and accepted as some of the benefits of heritage (Burtenshaw 2014: 50).

There has been a shift in thinking about development, as not only as a pursuit of economic, but as well as of environmental, social and cultural goals, which are vital parts of sustainable human development (UNDP 1994). Increasingly, culture is appearing centre-stage, as an important aspect of sustainable development (Loulanski 2006: 53). This is evident from numerous documents issued by international organizations like

UNESCO, Council of Europe, World Bank etc. – *Culture in Sustainable Development* (World Bank/UNESCO 1998), the *Hangzhou Declaration* (UNESCO 2013), *Cultural heritage as a strategic resource for a sustainable Europe* (COE 2014), the *Namur Declaration* (COE 2015) and many more. The potential of culture and cultural heritage to be a catalyst and an engine of socio-economic development is becoming increasingly recognised by cultural workers and policy makers (Loulanski 2006: 51). Global Heritage Fund points out that global heritage sites “are one of the most important economic assets of sustainable development, for poor nations and their people”. Communities can directly benefit from their economic impact, reflected in long-term employment, income, new infrastructure and other social investments. They recognise the correlation between investment in the protection and conservation of heritage sites and the economic growth, followed by improved standards of living (GHF 2010: 8).

Probably the main contribution of archaeology, as an economic asset, is to the tourism sector, respectively the cultural tourism sector, which is a vast global industry and economic engine for many countries in the world (both developed and developing) (Burtenshaw, Gould 2014: 5). It has even been considered by some that heritage is the single most important resource for international tourism (Burtenshaw 2013: 82). In 2010, as stated by the Global Heritage Fund, one-third of all international tourism was related to cultural heritage sites, with over 50 of them having revenues of more than 100 million US\$ annually, while worldwide heritage tourism has been increasing for 8 to 12% yearly, doubling and even tripling visitation and revenues of many sites every ten years (GHF 2010: 8).

Despite being a huge income generator, tourism has been heavily criticised, because of its often-degradable impact on heritage assets. This is caused primarily by the low level of reinvestment from governments and

Kristina Radović:

Public-Private Partnerships as an Instrument of Alternative Financing of Cultural Heritage in Serbia

tourism-related businesses, which are benefiting from tax revenues and business profits, turning their heritage sites into “cash-cows” (GHF 2010: 33).

In Serbia this branch of tourism is underdeveloped, despite huge potentials and the increase of tourist visits by 13% this year, in comparison to the same period of last year (January-June), as well as an increase of 15% of domestic tourist visits (<http://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/srbija-ocekuje-vise-od-25-miliona-turista-u-2016-godini/vxhje7z>, 4.8.2016). The main issue is the unsystematic tourism exploitation of cultural heritage assets, next to the absence of investment made in conservation, presentation or valorisation of heritage (Dragičević-Šešić, Mikić, Tomka 2015: 31). This is reflected in a low percentage, of only 6%, of the domestic tourists who state cultural-historic heritage as the reason for their visit, while 13% state it as additional content of their visit (TOS 2016). Right now, there is a small number of immovable cultural monuments that are equipped for tourist visitations and even a smaller number of them are generators of domestic tourists, since the majority of the visitors are coming from the local population. Exceptions to the rule are Viminacium, which became an archaeological theme park after numerous revitalisations and restructurings, and Gamzigrad, which got included in the World Heritage List in 2007 (Drača Muntean, Mikić 2014: 157). The tourism sector, which is rapidly growing, looking to develop tourism products based on cultural tourism, has not been satisfied with the management of cultural heritage sites by the responsible institutions, which is why tourism sector opts for different solutions. Good example is a public enterprise, created in 2011 as a “Visitors Centre – Museum of Lepenski Vir”, whose role is to manage this prehistoric archaeological site, which was until then managed by the National Museum in Belgrade (Ibid 2014: 151).

3. Current Legal Framework in the Field of Cultural Heritage in Serbia

All activities that are connected with cultural heritage in Serbia are based on a wide array of laws and regulations, beginning with the Constitution of Serbia whose several articles refer to culture, as well as with the new *Law on Culture* passed in 2009, but principally on the Law on Cultural Goods from 1994. There are other laws which directly or indirectly regulate cultural heritage activities (*Law on Endowments and Foundation, the Law on Scientific Research, Law on Local Self-Government, Budget System Law, Law on Planning and Construction, Law on Cadastre and Land Registration, Law on Ratification of the European Convention for the Protection of Cultural Heritage, Law on Tourism* etc.).

Law on Culture, as an umbrella law regulates the system of financing institutions, programmes and projects, through open-calls, has been heavily criticized by cultural workers, for being overambitious, unnecessary detailed and for colliding with existing legislation. From the beginning, the law was inapplicable, either because it contradicted already existing legislation, or because it contradicted established practices of conducting cultural activities (Vukanović 2011: 14, 15; <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/clashing-laws>, 24.8.2016). From an organisational and technical aspect, it does not allow implementation of innovations in activities concerning cultural heritage. (Injac, V. et al 2010: 4-5). In 2008, a preliminary draft of a new Law on immovable cultural heritage has been published on the website of the Ministry of culture, with the idea that the public could submit their suggestions, comments and remarks (<http://www.seecult.org/node/28092>, 24.8.2016.), and was online until the end of 2011. It consisted of 192 articles, and it regulated "research, study, protection and use of immovable cultural heritage as well

as conditions and methods of conducting activities concerning research, study, protection and use of immovable cultural heritage” (Vukanović 2011: 20). It is unknown when, or if, this law will come to pass.

Protection of cultural heritage is based foremost on legal resolutions from 1990s, when transitional reform initiatives were prevented due to the discontinuity caused by the abolishment of the self-government system. Furthermore, these laws are outdated and in part collide with the regulations which were adopted afterwards. For example, the new *Law on Culture* is in opposition with the *Law on Cultural Goods* on the question of the status of the subjects of protection. In the latter, bodies specified as responsible for those activities are only institutions of protection (article 10), while the former law allows other subjects, like “endowments and foundations, companies and entrepreneurs registered for conducting activities in the sphere of culture and other legal entities and subjects in culture” (article 73) (Injac, V. et al 2010: 6). Furthermore, when it comes to the *Law on Planning and Construction*, protection of cultural heritage, through spatial and urban plans, does not oblige including measures of protection in planning documents, just the obligation of obtaining the opinion. This causes plans, which obtain a negative opinion from the service of protection, to be accepted, nevertheless. *Law on Cadastre and Land Registration* does not envisage exemption from costs for cadastre data necessary in the procedure of declaring immovable cultural goods, while the *Law on Planning and Construction* foresees this exemption. Moreover, the *Law on Public Procurement* treats conservation and restoration works the same as any other construction work, while *Tax Law* does not allow any reliefs for owners or users of cultural goods, for investing in their protection (Hešković 2012). The only tax provisions pertaining to cultural heritage is the *Law on Profits of Legal Entities*, which entitles them to 5% deduction of income in one fiscal year, to donations

made to culture, in the case of cultural heritage for production, prevention and research of cultural values and heritage. This deduction is not considered as incentive in practice. New incentives were not created, while all donations have a 5% gift tax, which represents a huge obstacle (Dragičević Šešić, Mikić, Tomka 2013: 53). Basic conditions for creating more efficient partnerships between the business sector and culture are the revitalisation of the Serbian economy and legal provisions (Ibid 2013: 66).

Most importantly, a lot has changed when it comes to theory and practice of cultural heritage activities, as well as in socio-political environment and legislation. These changes concern the term cultural heritage itself, as well as the extended responsibility for its condition to every citizen (Нешковић 2012). The law still does not recognise the term immaterial heritage, even though there exists a Centre for Immaterial Heritage since 2012, nor digitalisation, while the topic of underwater archaeology is omitted. Moreover, some of its provisions and bylaws are not being followed. The law's regulations are concerned mostly with protection of heritage, while the activities pertaining to the public (interpretation, presentation, animation) are greatly overlooked (Injac, V. et al 2010: 6). Acceptance of international obligations, through ratification of international legal acts such as various conventions and charters, is still only formal and is not implemented in Serbian legislation (Нешковић 2012), like the introduction of new categories of cultural heritage (Drača Muntean, Mikić 2014: 148). Finally, the *Law on Cultural Goods* itself is too comprehensive and complicated, as well as unclear and incomplete, from many aspects, including the aspect of regulation of archaeological excavations. It is necessary to produce new, contemporary laws (*Law on Cultural Heritage* as well as the new systematic *Law on Cultural Goods* and an individual law on immovable cultural heritage), which would be correlated and up to

date with current theories and practices in the international paradigm of integral protection of immovable cultural heritage, as well as with other laws affecting cultural heritage. This would guaranty efficacy and efficiency, and ensure development of activities of protection, as well as of presentation and interpretation (Injac, V. et all 2010: 6; Нешковић 2012).

4. State of Cultural Heritage System in Serbia

Protection of immovable cultural heritage is first and foremost the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture and the Sector for Cultural Heritage Protection within, and it implies the activities of 14 different institutes for protection of cultural monuments (IPCMs), with the National Institute of Protection being in charge of cultural goods of great and exceptional importance (Drača Muntean, Mikić 2014: 149-150). The primary problem is the decentralisation of the sector of protection of immovable cultural heritage, carried out in 2002. With this move, the previous network of institutes of protection, consisting of the central and territorial institutes, was divided, bringing territorial institutes under the jurisdiction of the local authorities, without a previously created mechanism of financing their activities (Нешковић 2012). This was supposed to solve the problem of a large portion of territory not being covered by heritage institutions (Injac, V. et all 2010: 8). However, this led to a disproportionate coverage of territories on part of certain institutes, where the number of municipalities for which they are in charge range from 5 to 35, with Institutes of Niš and Kraljevo covering the most. Institute of Niš is being responsible for over 400 monuments, while the Institute of Zrenjanin is responsible for around 60 (Drača Muntean, Mikić 2014: 150). A revision of the territorial jurisdiction of certain institutes is possible in the future (Dragičević-Šešić, Mikić, Tomka 2015: 29), while the network of

heritage institutions should also be legally regulated, in order to become organised and more easily manageable (Injac, V. et al 2010: 8; Нешковић 2012).

One of the fundamental issues of many cultural heritage institutions is the issue of the employment, or the lack of qualified staff, mostly conservationists in institutes (Нешковић 2012). There exist huge disproportions in the number of employees in heritage protection institutions, with around 550 people working in institutions dealing with heritage sites (Drača Muntean, Mikić 2014: 150). The average number of employees per institute in 2014 was 35, with the range being from 12 to 69, and of an average age of over 45 years. In certain institutes there is a lack of employees on all levels, while in others a lack of expert personnel is present (Drača Muntean, Mikić 2014: 150; Injac, V. et al 2010: 11). Research has shown that regional museum often changes their directors, who usually do not have experience in working at this type of institutions, and the great majority never had any education in the area of cultural management, which leads to inadequate internal organisation of these institutions (Injac, V. et al 2010: 13). Lack of personnel trained in preventive conservation, as well as lack of educational training, specialized marketing and PR services, animators, professional cultural managers etc. represents an important issue (Dragičević-Šešić, Mikić, Tomka 2015: 30). Due to absence of international cooperation and exchange of knowledge, ideas and information in the area of protection and conservation, since the 1990s, experts in the field were not able to further develop themselves and get in touch with innovative and advanced professional developments, making them unable to respond to new challenges of their line of work. This creates a huge gap in their professional development and insecurity, which further causes fear and resistance towards change (Injac, V. et al 2010: 12-13; Drača Muntean, Mikić 2014: 150). The system

of permanent education should be standardized for all experts in the field of cultural heritage and should include various aspects of cultural management (Injac, V. et al 2010: 13; Нешкових 2012), which is a deep rooted issue of higher education and is the responsibility of those in charge of educational reforms on a national level.

Last decade has been a period of stagnation in the work of institutions which are operating in the field of protection of immovable cultural heritage in Serbia, caused by economic, political and administrative problems, but also in a big way by insufficient funding (Dragičević-Šešić, Mikić, Tomka 2015: 30). Allocation of funds in culture is regulated by the *Law on Culture*, which instructs the Ministry of Culture to use open-calls for financing programmes and projects in culture, cultural heritage and media, which are open to both public and private institutions (Ibid 2015: 49). Major cultural institutions in Serbia are funded on the basis of their running expenses and planned projects. Public institutions usually regularly receive funding for operating expenses (salaries, building expenses, utilities), while for programming costs they are required to answer the open-calls for approval (Ibid 2015: 50). Decision-making in regard to open-calls was transferred to independent commissions. Through these calls a very limited amount of funds is distributed, only 10% of the budget of the Ministry of Culture in 2014, which would be enough if cultural organisations received money from other sources and if many of them were not as highly dependent on the Ministry, as they are (Drača Muntean, Mikić 2014:147; Dragičević-Šešić, Mikić, Tomka 2015: 6-7).

One of the biggest issues of the cultural heritage system in Serbia is financial, since it depends mainly on the direct budgetary funding of the state, in form of subsidies and grants. This kind of economic instrument of cultural policy is still dominant in Serbia, while financing from the European pre-accession funds and the private sector are rare occurrences.

Since open calls are not systematic nor with clear financial criteria, they do not have enough impact on the cultural heritage system, because of the minimal level of investment and absence of synergy between stakeholders. Programme budgeting does not exist, neither do strategic priorities in financing cultural heritage projects, which is why they are funded based on available resources in the current year. Furthermore, tendency towards quantity, rather than quality, of projects is recognised (Drača Muntean, Mikić 2014: 154; Ibid 2015: 28-29). Due to financial crisis, budgetary financing is uncertain, irregular and uneven, while strategic and multi-year financing does not exist. Most of the funding is used to cover operating expenses of the institutions, while the smallest part is allocated to programme activities (Ibid 2014: 156; Injac, V. et al 2010: 10).

5. Conclusion

For a while there is an increasing trend present of culture, respectively cultural heritage, occupying a central role in the socioeconomic development of society. This viewpoint of culture, as an instigator of social change and especially as an impetus of national or local economy, faced strong opposition by the so-called culturalists, those dealing with many aspects of culture. However, after many research and analysis, which indicated positive effects of culture, as well as with the development of the sustainability discourse, number of those opposed to using culture as a tool for achieving goals not pertaining directly to it, was decreasing. This influenced the shift in thinking about culture as generator of only cultural values, while in Serbia, the idea of non-economic character of culture has been long present, and still is. The notion that cultural heritage could not be profitable, especially in the context of Serbia, is still deeply rooted. Even though many are raising the question of (un)profitability of cultural heritage, caused by, among other things, the poor state in which the

Kristina Radović:

Public-Private Partnerships as an Instrument of Alternative Financing of Cultural Heritage in Serbia

majority of immovable heritage assets are in and the general disinterest of tourists, above all domestic tourists, to visit heritage monuments it could not remain unnoticed that those sites which are equipped for tourist visitation (Viminacium, Felix Romuliana, Lepenski vir, Brankovina etc.) are recording relatively high attendance rate, for our standards. Correlation between open and touristically equipped sites and the increase in tourist visitation indicates that there exists a cultural need amongst people, which is intertwined with their touristic need.

There are certain preconditions which are necessary to exist for partnerships to be introduced as official instrument of cultural policy in cultural heritage, and for its successful implementation. In Serbia, it could be said that only one of them is fulfilled, and that is the adoption of the *Law on Public-Private Partnerships and Concessions*, which would be the first step and the first obstacle, which is overcome. This puts Serbia still in the first phase of implementation, according to UNECE. Research has shown that at this moment, apart from the legal framework, there do not exist conditions for successful implementation of PPPs in cultural heritage in Serbia. What could be noticed is that there exists a causal link between the way the system of financing is functioning, based on the outdated legal framework, and the state in cultural heritage institutions, the physical state of immovable heritage assets and the level of development of cultural tourism in Serbia, all of which are factors influencing the environment in which the private sector would be expected to invest in.

The viewpoint of non-profitable character of cultural heritage and the fact that it cannot or should not generate profit, has made it dependable on state budgets in most countries in the world, on direct budgetary funding in form of subsidies and grants, while the state exercises its interventionist role. Even though protection of cultural heritage in Serbia is being continuously promoted as one of the highest priorities of cultural policy

(which actually mostly refer to sacral heritage) and taking into the account the fact that it's protection is conditioned by the Constitution, on levels from the government itself to citizens, positive changes and reforms in the field of cultural heritage are rare and stagnant. Cultural goods represent a non-renewable resource, whose values and potentials are being degraded all the while no measures are taken for its integral protection and presentation. With the effects of the recent financial crisis, most of the countries are allocating less and less money to culture through direct support, which is showing a tendency to decrease even more in the future, including Serbia. For this reason, they have been more prone to experiment with systems of private support to culture, with the increasing use of public-private partnerships, which show positive and promising outcomes. Even though, as it was already said, the current socio-economic environment in Serbia is not suitable for implementing this instrument in the sector of cultural heritage, some initial steps could be taken in this direction, which could eventually lead to implementation of a certain type of PPP adapted to the particular Serbian context.

The government has not done much to promote PPPs, even though there exists a separate division within the Chamber of Commerce that deals with it, especially not in the fields of culture and tourism, which is reflected in the fact that not many people, even some experts, have not even heard about it, or very little. Currently, what is needed is to increase the visibility of the PPP as an instrument, by launching a campaign which would have as a goal to raise the awareness amongst cultural workers, and the third sector as well, about the possible benefits of pursuing these agreements, which would entail trainings and workshops led by those who are qualified in this area and who can share their positive experiences. This would have as a result cultural worker who have the knowledge and the know-how to approach the private sector and initiate the first phase, the dialogue. At

the same time, an overall reformation or improvement of the many areas of the system of protection and management of cultural heritage should be undertaken. The most urgent is the adoption of the new legal framework, after which the reorganisation of the network of heritage institutions and introduction of new system of financing could ensue. Of utmost importance would be to introduce incentives for private investment in culture in general, since without them, the private sector would not show interest in pursuing these agreements. Simultaneously, the third sector should be strengthened by including them in activities undertaken by the cultural sector, in order to foster cooperation and good will. Actions toward improved intersectoral cooperation should be undertaken as well, between the Ministries of Culture and Tourism, since it is clear that these two sectors are interdependent, and that the future of the cultural tourism depends on their relationship. Finally, the issue of transparency should be resolved by fulfilling article 74 of the *Law on Public-Private Partnerships and Concessions*, which stipulates the existence of the Public Contracts Register, which would give insight into all of the PPP agreements. This should be followed by introducing some kind of guarantees that would ensure that the agreed terms would be respected, regardless of the current political situation. Only then would that a certain level of security be provided. All of these requirements would need to be met so that a suitable environment for introducing public-private partnerships as an official instrument of cultural policy would be created.

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Kristina Radović:

Public-Private Partnerships as an Instrument of Alternative Financing of Cultural Heritage in Serbia

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Aleksandra Ždero and Aleksandar Rudić
**A Comparative Analysis of Gender Studies
Representation in the Faculties for Political Science
across the Danube Region**

Aleksandra Ždero, The Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Vienna, Austria, aleksandrazdero@gmail.com

Aleksandar Rudić, The Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Vienna, Austria, aleksandar.m.rudic@gmail.com

Abstract

Danube Region is a set of 14 different countries which differ from each other in many aspects like culture, political situation, and economic and scientific development. The motivation for our research is the problem in the representation of gender studies across the Danube Region. In this paper we limited the research to four countries of the Danube Region. In the following research study, we explored to which extent gender studies are included in the study programs of political science on four Faculties for Political Science in Vienna, Ljubljana, Belgrade and Sarajevo. The results show that gender studies are in a very weak position in Belgrade, Ljubljana and Sarajevo and that only Vienna has a good offer of gender related lectures and seminars and is clearly the trend-setter in comparison to the other 3 faculties.

Keywords: Danube Region, Political Science, Gender Studies, Serbia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia, Comparative Analysis, Gender Equality, Democracy

Sažetak

Dunavski region je set 14 zasebnih država koje se razlikuju u mnogim aspektima, kao što su kultura, politička situacija, i ekonomski i naučni razvoj. Motivacija za naše istraživanje je problem zastupljenosti rodne studija u Dunavskom Regionu. Ova studija se ograničava na četiri zemlje Dunavske Regije. U ovom radu istražili smo u kojoj meri su rodne studije uključene u studentske programe Političkih nauka na četiri Fakulteta u Beču, Ljubljani, Beogradu i Sarajevu. Rezultati pokazuju da su rodne studije u slabom položaju u Beogradu, Ljubljani i Sarajevu a da samo Beč ima dobru ponudu predavanja i seminara na temu rodne studija i jasno je da je u ovom odnosu Bečki Fakultet trend-seter.

Ključne reči:

Dunavski Region, Rodne Studije, Političke Nauke, Srbija, Austrija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Slovenija, Usporedna analiza, Jednakost Polova, Demokracija

Introduction

Over the several recent decades, gender studies became an important part of many scientific disciplines. Gender-related theories, most notably feminism, found their way into many humanities, such as social science, literature studies, art history and so forth. This trend is mostly visible in democratic states. This is no wonder since democratic systems strive for more inclusion and equal rights while gender studies raise awareness on past and present exclusion of women from many areas of society. Another recent trend is rise of democratic states. This is in part thanks to the fall of the Eastern block, which significantly increased the number of European states, most of which have elected to be parliamentary democracies. We are often witnessing that officials of these fresh democracies value elections and election results above all other democratic processes. However, quality of a democracy is not only indicated by transparency and regularity of elections, but many other factors as well, such as individual liberty, freedom of expression and media reporting and also the integrity and efficiency of education system. Indeed, education plays a large part in forming a democratic individual.

In the following paper we seek to explore to which extent gender studies are included in the study programs of political science. The countries observed are Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Slovenia, namely the political science institutes in Vienna, Sarajevo, Belgrade and Ljubljana. The selected countries belong to the Danube Region which is a region recognized by the EU with a special development strategy¹. Among the priority areas of development is "to develop the knowledge society

¹ Danube Region Strategy - <http://www.danube-region.eu/> 15.5.2016.

through research, education and information technologies”². One of the “milestones” towards creating this knowledge society is to “Analyze potentials to strengthen cooperation among education and research institutions in the Danube Region”³. Our paper will map the similarities and differences between these institutions and thus contribute to potential problem-solving with issues like quality of education, student mobility, compatibility of education, etc.

We operate under the assumption that the extent in which gender studies are included in curriculum indicates the level of democracy in the respective societies.

We shall start with a brief theoretical overview on gender and gender studies. Then we will establish a connection between gender studies and political science, as well as the importance of both. After that the main part follows in which we present our findings and proceed to analyze and interpret them. Finally, we end with a conclusion in which we shall try to place our findings into a larger context.

Our method of research is primarily comparative analysis, since we are comparing four faculties of political science in four different countries. In order to do that, we shall compare the syllabuses of each faculty. We will do this by observing the syllabuses available on the Internet and by requesting further information from the institutes themselves. We will present both sets of information together. Should there be any doubts in

² European Union Strategy for Danube Region - <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?qid=1525512432&uri=CELEX:52010DC0715>, 15.5.2016.

³ Roadmap of the Steering Group for EUSDR Priority Area 7, <http://groupspaces.com/KnowledgeSociety/pages/targets>, 15.5.2016.

the validity of the information, we would gladly provide our correspondence, after we have consulted our sources.

What are gender studies and why are they important?

In order to start any discussion on gender studies in education systems of the selected Danube countries, certain definitions should be presented. First and foremost, the concept of gender needs to be defined. It is a rare enough event when it seems that academia agrees on a certain point, especially in humanities. That seems to be the case with the very basic definition of gender. Authors agree that gender is a constructed social identity developed to distinguish from biological identity, which is sex. "The concept of gender was first developed to distinguish anatomical and reproductive differences between men and women from the social meanings and cultural practices that are associated with those biological differences"⁴. In other words, unlike the naturally pre-determined sex, gender is mentally constructed or "performed", in words of a leading gender theorist Judith Butler⁵.

However, as soon as we step away from this basic assumption, things get complicated, much to the likeness of many other social phenomena. As with sex, it is usually assumed that there are two genders, male and female. However, since gender is mentally constructed, and thus individual, it is not possible to confine it to this simple dichotomy. In 2014 Facebook introduced more than 70 gender categories to choose from when creating a profile. Although the interests of the social media giant were primarily commercial, in order to include as many people as possible, this perfectly

⁴ Williams, C.L.R. and Weber G.R. (1996) – *Sociology of gender*, p. 401; in: Kuper A. & Kuper J. – *The Social Science Encyclopedia*, Vol. I; Routledge, London and New York

⁵ *Ibid.*

illustrates what gender could be. Furthermore, there are authors, like the aforementioned Arendt, which claim that sex is also culturally constructed phenomenon and should not be viewed as a natural fact⁶. In this paper however, we shall stick to the “traditional” male and female genders.

Gender studies is more than just a discipline analyzing differences between genders. More importantly, it studies the relations of power created by this division. “In most societies, women and men are not only perceived as different, but are also differently evaluated, and these supposed differences in characteristics and capabilities justify the power differences between them”⁷. The most problematic factor in this perception is that it often happens unconsciously or unintentionally. In Serbia, a minister was fired after joking that he likes “kneeling (female) journalists”⁸ referring to the woman who was kneeling in front of him while waiting for him to give a statement. Another prominent minister, a woman and a chair of government commission for gender equality, pointed out in an interview that “women are doing politics in a manly way”⁹. Although it was probably not meant to be mean, the first statement is a reflection of the perception that there is nothing wrong in making sexist jokes against women. Both authors of this paper can attest to the every-day nature of this perception. The other statement, while probably intended to stress gender equality, also implies that the “manly way” of doing politics is the right way and that women have to adapt to that. While these

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Borgatta E.F. and Borgatta M.L. (Ed.) (2000) – Gender; in: Borgatta E.F. and Borgatta M.L.; Encyclopedia of Sociology; Vol. 2; Macmillan, New York

⁸ B92 - Prostatluk ministra Gašića / VIDEO (6.12.2015); in: b92.net; http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2015&mm=12&dd=06&nav_category=11&nav_id=1071449, 15.5.2016.

⁹ Katarina Đorđević (15.11.2015)- Žene vode politiku muški; in: Politika Online; <http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/343509/Drustvo/Zene-vode-politiku-muski>, 15.5.2016.

examples might be deemed as trivial and their critique as an overreaction, the fact is that many women have to deal with this on an every-day basis. Women are given certain gender-based roles, which in turn create social and political realities which translate into power. The importance of gender studies is amplified by the fact that these gender stereotypes are so obscure and taken for granted.

Furthermore, apart from studying genders and power, gender studies also have an emancipatory role for society. This is not to say that gender studies only aim at empowering women, but also raise general awareness about social, political, economic, cultural and personal problems facing women. At this point it is also important to note that different societies show different levels of readiness to recognize these problems, empower women or even allow them the same rights.

Gender studies programs in political science

Political science and gender studies have much in common. Both are interdisciplinary studies focusing on relations of power in a society and both are critical and emancipatory. While both focus on different areas of power relations, such as every-day politics, international relations, cultural studies, economy, etc., political science incorporates more factors than gender studies. For example, in international relations, gender studies would focus among other on gender roles, criticize the masculinity of the system, point to the lack of women representatives and so forth, while political science analyzes the roles of the states, hard and soft power capacities, current issues and similar. This difference in approach makes these two disciplines very compatible when combined. Indeed, some of the main theories on which gender studies are founded, such as feminism, are also an integral part of political science.

In our research we focus on the faculties of political science in Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Slovenia. We aim at discovering how important gender studies are in study programs of political science in the aforementioned countries. We shall concentrate on two parameters:

Firstly, gender studies as a separate teaching subject. The research question here is: is there a separate lecture on gender studies being thought on a regular basis as part of political science curriculum? The aim here is to see if the students have the possibility to gain in-depth knowledge about the problematic of gender.

Secondly, incorporation of gender studies into the subject of political theory. The question here is, are gender studies included in the syllabus of the lecture of political theory being? With this we seek to discover if the students are being introduced to the problematic of gender at all. We choose the subject of political theory because it is the cornerstone of political science as a discipline and as a study. Also, gender studies and political science share many theories, such as liberalism, Marxism, feminism, to name but a few, which means that they could be easily incorporated into one another.

At this point we want to elaborate why teaching gender studies at institutes for political science is important. We have already mentioned that both political science and gender studies have a critical and emancipatory nature. But what does that actually mean? This means that the interests of these disciplines are not purely academic, but that they strive to influence societies for their betterment. Many of the people who study political science will become analysts, journalists, diplomats, public servants and politicians, which are very influential positions especially in democratic systems. If they are introduced to gender problematic during their studies, they will be able to incorporate those principles into their

opinions and thus influence the society. If not, they might remain unaware of these problems and not work on them. As we noted earlier, gender-related problems, such as sexism, often happen without people really noticing that they are giving offence. Providing education on the subject should raise awareness about sexism and other issues. This is why we think that teaching gender studies in political science is important and why we are focusing on this issue.

Structural differences of faculties for political science

One of the major difficulties when comparing these four institutions was a significant difference in programs and methods of teaching. To a certain degree these differences are logical, because there are no universal standards on how political science ought to be thought. These differences, however, are often not trivial and because of that we will now first briefly describe the structure of the institutes before we compare them.

Department for Political Science at the University of Vienna is a part of the Faculty of Social Science, along with departments for Culture and Social Anthropology, Communication and Sociology. Duration of BA studies is 3 years – 6 semesters; MA studies 2 years – 4 semesters. There are no internal divisions, there is only one study of political science, but students can choose to specialize in different fields¹⁰.

Faculty of Political Science at the University of Belgrade is independent faculty which is responsible for the studies in political science, international relations, social policy and social work and journalism. These departments share many lectures and subjects. The

¹⁰ http://spl.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/spl21/Studentafeln/Studienplanpunkte_Bachelor_Politikwissenschaft_Juni_2011__150__30_ECTS_.pdf, 15.5.2016.

duration of BA studies is 4 years – 8 semesters; MA studies 1 year – 2 semesters. There are no further divisions within political science themselves¹¹.

Faculty of Political Science at the University of Sarajevo. Similarly, to the Belgrade institute, this faculty is divided into 5 departments: political science, sociology, security and peace studies, communication and social work. Unlike Belgrade, the duration of BA studies is 3 years – 6 semesters, and MA studies 2 years – 4 semesters. Unlike the two previous institutes, political science in Sarajevo offers several study programs, such as state administration and international relations and diplomacy¹².

Department of Political Science at the University of Ljubljana is a part of the Faculty of Social Sciences along with sociology, communication and cultural studies. The institute of political science has four sub-departments for theoretical political science, policy analysis and public administration, international relations and defense studies. Duration of studies is 4 years – 8 semesters for BA program and 1 year – 2 semesters for MA¹³.

Even this very rudimentary overview of the institutes indicates a striking difference in the BA programs at the University of Belgrade and University of Ljubljana which take 8 semesters to finish, and the Sarajevo and Vienna faculties where the duration of study is only 6 semesters. Consequently, the MA program in Belgrade and Ljubljana are 2 semesters, while in Sarajevo and Vienna they last 4 semesters. This questions the universality and effectiveness of the Bologna Process which aims to standardize education on a European level in order to encourage student mobility and workforce compatibility within the continent. During our studies in Vienna,

¹¹ <http://www.fpn.bg.ac.rs/node/6230> , 15.5.2016.

¹² <http://fpn.unsa.ba/bs/prvi-ciklus-studija/politologija/>, 15.5.2016.

¹³ <http://www.fdv.uni-lj.si/en/study/departments-and-chairs/department-of-political-science/chair-of-policy-analysis-and-public-administration>, 15.5.2016.

both authors met students from Serbia who had problems with enrolling in political science because the programs were different.

Another evident difference is the structure. All of the faculties deal with similar fields, such as sociology, journalism/communication and cultural studies, but the way they are organized is different. Although this might seem as more of a difference in form than substance, formal structure is also important for student mobility.

Studying flexibility is also a factor in which these institutes differ. Faculties in Belgrade, Ljubljana and Sarajevo have a fixed period when certain lectures are to be taken. For example, gender studies are offered in the second semester of sociology in Sarajevo and in fourth semester of political science in Belgrade. In Vienna on the other hand, students are free to choose for themselves in which semester they want to take certain courses, provided they have finished the introductory phase dealing with the elementary.

Gender studies as a separate lecture

In order to gain a better overview of how and when gender studies are being thought we have made a table presenting key information for comparison (Table 1). The information in the table was mostly gathered from study programs available on the Internet pages of these four institutes, but also through direct communication with the faculties.

Aleksandra Ždero and Aleksandar Rudić:
A Comparative Analysis of Gender Studies Representation in the
Faculties for Political Science across the Danube Region

Table 1: Lectures in gender studies at faculties for political science

Country/ City	Institution	In which semester?	Obliga- tory	Number of students per semester	ECTS	Lecturers gender	Title (original name)
Serbia/ Belgrade	Faculty of Political Science	4	no	~ 20	6	Female	Gender studies (Rodne studije)
BiH/ Sarajevo	Department of Sociology at the Faculty of Political Science	2	yes	-	6	Female	Sociology of gender (Sociologija roda)
Slovenia/ Ljubljana	Faculty of Political Science - Democracy and Governance Studies	Every third year	no	2008: 80 2011: 60 2014: 30	5	Female & Male	Women and Politics (Ženske in politika)
Austria/ Vienna	Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences	After completi on of the introducti on phase	no	Max. 400	3	Female	Gender and Politics (Geschlecht und Politik)

Even a quick look at the table indicates substantial differences between the study programs. Most importantly, gender studies are not a part of study program of political science in Sarajevo, but are a part of sociology, which is a part of the Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo. This is the reason why this row has been marked red. This is noteworthy because political scientists educated in Sarajevo do not have the opportunity to be introduced to gender studies at their faculty. It is important to note however, that this lecture is obligatory, not optional, as opposed to gender studies in political science at other institutes. Yet, although very similar, sociology is very different than political science in methodology and in

aims, which is why the presence of gender studies in the study of the former cannot compensate lack thereof in the study of the latter.

The Faculty of Political Science in Ljubljana offers a lecture on gender studies only every 3 years. Although the studies take 4 years to finish, which theoretically means that every generation does have a chance to attend the lectures, it is very likely that large number of students already finish most of their required exams and no longer need to take another one. Moreover, the information provided to us shows that, since 2008, the number of students visiting the lecture has been falling. However, we have also been informed that there has been a drop of number of students of political science in Ljubljana, so we cannot conclude if these decreasing numbers indicate a lack of interest or just a logical consequence of smaller number of students.

This leaves the Department of Political Science in Vienna and Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade as the only ones that offer gender studies at a regular basis, albeit not obligatory. A striking difference is in the number of attending students. A representative of the Belgrade faculty informed us that the number of students taking gender studies is approximately 20. On the other hand, Viennese department offers up to 400 places. In practice however, this number means that the limit is set by the number of places in the auditorium and the number of attending students is usually smaller than 400, but significantly larger than 20. The consequence of this disparity is obvious. Far more students in Vienna learn about gender studies, where they are evidently established as an important discipline, than their colleagues in Belgrade, where gender studies are more of a curiosity.

Not without relevance is the fact that every institute has a female professor of gender studies, apart from Ljubljana, where there are both male and

female professors. Considering that male professors make up majority at every observed institution, it could be concluded that gender studies are still considered somewhat of a female discipline, which of course has other implications.

It is noteworthy that gender studies are not obligatory at any of the aforementioned institutions, save for sociology in Sarajevo (which is a different case, as we have explained). Many of the students, indeed a majority, will probably not choose to take gender studies. This means that unless they are introduced to gender theories through some other lecture, they will not become aware of them. This brings us to our next point, which is gender studies as part of political theory.

Gender studies as a part of a lecture of political theory

As we have noted above, political theory is one of the cornerstones of political science as a discipline. For example, to a certain extent, its importance could be measured by the importance algebra has for mathematics. Theory introduces students to key terms, concepts and theories, which they will later use as tools for their analyses. Therefore, the importance of political theory is hard to overstate and that is why political theory is always obligatory lecture.

As we have mentioned above, none of the gender studies lectures are obligatory for students of political science. This means that, in order to expose students to gender theories, it would be crucial to include them in other lectures. As we have also explained at the beginning, gender studies are mostly founded on feminist theories which are also important element of political theories. That is why observing and comparing lecture programs of political theory is logical. In order to do this, we have analyzed the syllabuses of political theory lectures on all four institutions. Our aim is to see if gender studies or feminist theories are included in these

Aleksandra Ždero and Aleksandar Rudić:
 A Comparative Analysis of Gender Studies Representation in the
 Faculties for Political Science across the Danube Region

syllabuses. Again, in order to make everything more organized, we composed a table (Table 2) in which we have presented the main topics covered, as well as basic literature needed to complete the exam. We should point out that syllabuses give only a rough sketch of what is being discussed in the lecture and many topics come up without being shown in a syllabus. However, syllabus is like a wrapping paper for a lecture, which indicates what is inside and is the main indicator for students.

The table clearly shows that only Department of Political Science in Vienna covers feminism within its political theory course (marked red in the table). This is surprising considering that all institutes share many other themes discussed in political theory lectures.

Table 2: Main themes and literatures covered in the lecture of political theory

	<i>Belgrade</i>	<i>Ljubljana</i>	<i>Sarajevo</i>	<i>Vienna</i>
<i>Name of the lecture (original title)</i>	Introduction to the Political Theory (Uvod u političku teoriju)	Politics and the State (Sodobna politična teorija)	Contemporary Political Theories (Savremene političke teorije)	Theory History and Theory debates (Theoriegeschichte und Theoriedebatten)
<i>Topics discussed</i>	Historical development of political theory; political theory - definition, subject and methods, relationship with other science; policy term; nation state; concepts of countries: the rule	definitions of the place and role of political science in contemporary society divided mainly its connection to the maintenance and alteration of the democratic order; demarcations political science	Genealogy and structure of political theories; Subject and methods of political theory; overview of contemporary political theories: The state and structure of political theory;	Key political terms (society, government, constitution); use of political theories; Theories and social interests; Problems of the history of ideas; Social History of Ideas; Rule knowledge in antiquity, political education in modern times; The medieval

Aleksandra Ždero and Aleksandar Rudić:
A Comparative Analysis of Gender Studies Representation in the
Faculties for Political Science across the Danube Region

<i>Belgrade</i>	<i>Ljubljana</i>	<i>Sarajevo</i>	<i>Vienna</i>
of law, a democratic state, social state, totalitarian state; power, power and violence: definition and forms; forms of conquest and retention of government; political ideology; political parties; political culture; forms of personal power; theory of elites; democracy and democratization; politics and globalization	with other social sciences; theoretical concepts in a historical context; analyses of democracy; freedom; the rule of law; the will of the people; sovereignty; private property; social and political power; totalitarianism; the role and importance of political theory in political science; political science in political practice; different conceptual understanding of the relationship state (policy) - Science (profession) - public (civil society actors); ethical dimension of politics.	political theory in relation to other disciplines; concept of "theoria" – historical overview; philosophical definitions of "Modernity" (Aristoteles, Machiavelli, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Locke, Hobbes, Hegel, Kant, Comte, Marx, Popper, et al.)	feudal society and the reorganization of Christianity by the Roman Church; Reformation movements, early modern revolutions; Dawn of Modern Art by the liberation of labor and by liberating mental and manual labor; the birth of modern science; The reason political science by Thomas Hobbes and David Hume; establishment of a new political science in Central Europe; Paine and the Republican welfare state; The radicalism of the working classes in England; Marx and Engels; Hans Kelsen; Examples of political theories of feminism ; Comments on History and Theory of Political Science

Aleksandra Ždero and Aleksandar Rudić:
 A Comparative Analysis of Gender Studies Representation in the
 Faculties for Political Science across the Danube Region

	<i>Belgrade</i>	<i>Ljubljana</i>	<i>Sarajevo</i>	<i>Vienna</i>
<i>Basic Literature</i>	Dragan Simeunović, Uvod u političku teoriju, Institut za političke studije, Beogradm 2009; Dragan Simeunović, Teorija politike – rider, I deo, Nauka i društvo, Beograd, 2002; Dragan Simeunović, Novovekovne političke ideje u Srbiji, knj. I, Institut za političke studije, Beograd 2000.	Badiou, Alain: Kratka razprava o prehodni ontologiji; Očrt metapolitike » Publishing: Ljubljana : Založba » Žižek, Slavoj: Najprej kot tragedija, nato kot farsa » Edition: 1. natis Publishing: Ljubljana : Društvo za teoretsko psihoanalizo,	Stjepan Šimić, Teorija političke moderne, Zenica, 2000. Klaus von Beyme, Suvremene političke teorije, Stvarnost, Zgb, prema II njem.dop.izd. München 1974, K.Cavoški, Fil.otvorenog društva, lib.politfil. K.Popera, Nolit, Bgd.1987 V.Henis, Politika i prakt.fil., Nolit, Bgd.1983 K.H.V.Schluk, Pol.filozofija, Naprijed, Zgb.1977, pogl.o Tokvilu,	Johann Dvorák: Über Theorien des Politischen in der europäischen Neuzeit (Wien: Facultas 2014)

Overview of literature shows that the lectures in Belgrade and Vienna are based on the books by single authors, which are also lecturers. On the other hand, Sarajevo and Ljubljana use multiple sources to construct their political theory classes.

Conclusions, critiques and suggestions

In this paper, we have shown that gender studies are in a very weak position in Belgrade, Ljubljana and Sarajevo and that only Vienna has a good offer of gender related lectures and seminars and is clearly the trend-setter in comparison to the other 3 faculties. University of Vienna also offers a Master program in gender studies. Such a program is also

offered at the University of Belgrade, but we have been informed that it only has 9 students. This and the fact that Belgrade offers a regular lecture on gender studies indicates that it is striving to follow best practices of fellow European universities. Interest in gender studies in Belgrade is small however, but that cannot be solely university's responsibility.

Faculty for Political Science in Ljubljana is a very specific case. Based on our analysis, the Faculty has a research team that deals with gender-related issues with regular publications. Gender studies however are offered only every three years, which is very modest to say the least. Another critique point for Ljubljana was a lack of data availability. For all other institutions that were considered in this study we could find syllabuses online.

Faculty for Political Science in Sarajevo comes last, mainly because gender studies are not being thought at all at political science, but rather at sociology. One however, does not replace the other, even if the lecture is obligatory.

Without intention to justify the weak position of gender studies in Belgrade, Ljubljana and Sarajevo, certain factors need to be taken into account. First of all, there is a financial aspect to consider. Despite being underfunded itself, Department of Political Science in Vienna is probably the richest of the four, which means they can branch out their study and research. Other three institutions, especially in Belgrade and Sarajevo are in countries with struggling economies, which also limits the amount of funding for education and research.

Another important factor to consider is that Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Slovenia are very different countries with different current problems. With a pause during the World War II, Austria has the democratic system almost a century old, and since the time of the

Second Republic it has been a very prosperous country. This means that the political problems Austria faces are different than far younger democracies of ex-Yugoslav states. One of the burning issues in Austria is the inclusion of women into politics and economy and that is why gender studies have such a prominent role in the program of political science in Vienna. Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other hand is still a society plagued by ethnic divisions resulting from the Bosnian War. It is only logical that Bosnian society has issues it considers more pressing than gender-related issues and thus, political science focuses more on identity than gender studies.

Further, the fact that surprised us was the difference in programs among these faculties. All of these countries are historically and traditionally very close with many exchange possibilities. One author of this paper is from Serbia and the other from Bosnia and we both studied in Vienna which perfectly illustrates the point. However, with so many structural differences student and scientific mobility is hampered. This is very troublesome, because Danube Region could benefit from more collectiveness in tackling main problems, and academic cooperation could be the cornerstone of this problem-solving.

This research study presented preliminary results which could serve as a cornerstone for more comprehensive analysis in the field of gender studies across the Danube Region countries. Generations of future political scientists would surely reap the benefits of more integration among the Faculties. We see the potential in further research, which would consequently lead to more standardization, compatibility and cooperation among the Universities of the Danube Region.

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Aleksandar M. Gajić

Trajan's Bridge and the Danube River in the work of Count Marsili

*Aleksandar M. Gajić, Junior Researcher, PhD candidate, Department of History, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad, Serbia
aleksandarmgajic@gmail.com*

Abstract

This paper represents a review of the description of the state of Trajan's Bridge, at the beginning of the 18th century. A record of the state of this monumental construction, with certain drawings, has been made by the Italian count Luigi Ferdinando Marsili from Bologna, who took part in the military service of the Habsburg monarchy. Apart from the description of the remains of the construction itself, my idea, as of a historian, is to present count Marsili's versatile personality, with a special emphasis on his tendency for interdisciplinarity in the scientific sense, as well as his erudite skill combined with his unusual sense for description. It is important to take these traits into account when studying his monumental literary work "Danubius Pannonico – Mysicus", where the above-mentioned descriptions can be found.

Count Luigi Ferdinando Marsili was born on 20th of July 1658 in Bologna, as the third of six children. Since he belonged to a noble family, Marsili was raised and educated in accordance with all the privileges of his class. Amongst the best professors who have contributed to Marsili's knowledge and versatility, the names of his private mentors, the greatest Italian scientists of his time, should be mentioned: Marcello Malpighi (1628-1694), Geminiano Montanari (1633-1687) and Lelio Trionfetti (1647-1722), lecturers and professors at the University of Bologna.

Being of a restless spirit and increasingly interested in military and political topics, near the end of 1681, count Marsili joins the Austrian army. He becomes captured, in the capacity of an engineering officer, during the fights on the river Rába, next to the city of Győr, and spends the next two years as the companion of Merzifonlu *Kara Mustafa Paşa*, *during the siege of Vienna, in the Great Turkish War. After being liberated from slavery in 1684, he re-enlists in the Austrian army and he carries out a successfully planned siege of Buda, under his personal command, after which the city has found itself in the hands of the Christians, after 150 years of slavery.*

After the end of the Great Turkish War and the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, Marsili has become a commissar of the Habsburg monarchy and the personal representative of the emperor Leopold I in the works of the demarcation commission, during the formation of the demarcation line between the Habsburg monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. Next to his military abilities, as an exquisite erudite and natural scientist, he assisted Johann Christoph Müller, a military engineer, topographer and cartographer from Nuremberg, in creating a map based on Marsili's diary, which will be also used for producing his "*Danubius Pannonico – Mysicus*".

Marsili published his first research of the Danube in 1700 in Nuremberg, under the name *Danubius Operis Prodrromus*. *This work represents the original source and in the next 25 years, it will be significantly*

*complemented with additional data what Marsili has collected during the two decades of working in the Danube region. Since Marsili was carrying out a selection of the material he gathered in situ, directly on the spot, at first, next to his erudite personality, his capability of systematization comes to the fore. As is well known, transformation of travelogues into texts, in this case into atlases, represents demanding work for which sometimes years are required to be finished, which is why count Marsili has published his fundamental work in 1726, in Hague and Amsterdam, under the full name of *Danubius pannonico-mysicus: observationibus geographicis, astronomicis, hydrographicis, historicis, physicis perlustratus et in sex tomos digestus*. As can be seen from the title, this scientific synthesis is composed of 6 volumes:*

- In tres partes digestus geographicam, astronomicam, hydrographicam
- De antiquitatibus Romanorum ad ripas Danubii
- De mineralibus circa Danubium effossis
- De piscibus in aquis Danubii viventibus
- De avibus circa aquas vagantibus, et ipsarum nidis
- De fontibus Danubii. Observationes anatomicae. De Aquis Danubii et Tibisci. Catalogus plantarum. Observationes habitae cum barometris et thermometris. De insectis.

The first volume consists of geographical, astronomical and hydrographical data, mostly concerning the Danube micro-region. The second volume represents a collection of notes about ancient Roman archaeological sites along the Danube. Almost all fortifications, lookout towers, settlements, villae rusticae along the limes, the Empire's military defence system, are being analyzed. In the third part, Marsili reports on the mineral riches of the Danube. The fourth and fifth volumes describe the fauna of the Danube region, fishes and birds in the first place. In the sixth, final volume, the Danube's source, anatomical observations, flora,

Danube's tributaries, insects, barometric and thermometric studies of the air in the Danube region etc., are all being described.

When discussing the second volume of count Marsili's fundamental work, as well as the archaeological sites separately, we can freely say that the author pays special attention to the description of the remains and the construction of Trajan's Bridge, ie the Bridge of Apollodorus, over the Danube. Trajan's Bridge near Kladovo, constructed on 20 pillars and with an 1127m of width between the Dacian and Moesian coastal supporting pillar, out of which only 1071m over the river bed, has emerged in 104 in the north-south direction, with a turn of 8 degrees towards west, as a conception and architectural feat of Apollodorus of Damascus. The choice of the place for the construction of the bridge was conditioned by the natural features of the Danube in these parts since the river bed is very sandy and the Danube is pretty calm and shallow here. Immediate proximity of the Šimian Island has allowed the workers to first direct the flow of the river into one branch, by damming the Danube, to construct the pillars into the dried-out bottom and to repeat that with the other branch.

By using the technique of relocating the river flow, known in the early history of architecture as the accomplishment of Thales of Miletus during the Greek and Persian wars, Apollodorus finalized Trajan's Djerdap road with an impressive construction. Taking advantage of the low water level, Romans have dug a channel west from the center of today's Kladovo in order to dislocate the Danube from its previous river bed, directing its flow through the plain of Ključ, all the way to Mala Vrbica, 2 km downstream from the work site. The name *Pontes* - "bridges", in the depiction of the two bridges on the Trajan's Column, can be explained by this relocation of the Danube's flow. This has led the pioneers of Serbian archaeology, Garašanin, and Vasić, to hold the opinion that the second bridge could

lead above the river branch used to turn the Danube's flow at the moment of the construction of the Trajan's Bridge.

The bridge was constructed out of the rock, with arches high above the water, and portals located on the approaches on both sides of the Danube. The dimensions of the pillars are 18 x 34m, oriented with their length onto the flow of the river, with beamed additions on the front and backside, used to alleviate the pressure. Foundations of the pillars and portals were constructed out of very hard cement, made from gravel impressed into the mortar, above which rows of bricks are placed, while the core of the pillars consisted of mortar, paved with flat stones and bricks. The greater sturdiness of the Apollodorus's construction was achieved by using the "grill" - transverse and longitudinal beams placed through the core.

Trajan's Bridge was constructed in an incredibly short time span, from 103 to 105. This was the first bridge ever constructed on lower Danube, which is 800m wide at that spot, and for 1000 years it was known as the longest bridge ever made, and in record time, considering the construction technology of that time. The construction of this Danube crossing, as a great work of ancient architecture, was depicted on appropriate coins made in 105 and on the Arch of Trajan in Rome, where the scene of Apollodorus's handover of the bridge plans to the Emperor is displayed, which was later moved to the Arch of Constantine, while the other depiction shows a part of the construction itself.

There are four theories surrounding the bridge's destruction. The first, and least probable one is that it was demolished only 20 years after it was built, by the order of the Roman emperor Hadrian, which does not make much sense having in mind that the province of Dacia was under the Roman rule for the next 150 years. The second theory suggests that the bridge was demolished in the time of Aurelian, during the retreat of the Roman troops from the province of Dacia, while the third theory states that the bridge

has collapsed much later, due to the pressure of the Danube's flow. The last theory is that the rock, out of which the bridge was made of, has cracked under extremely low temperatures and strong winds on the Danube, together with the effects of the river.

In his seven pages description in Latin, count Marsili describes in detail the composition and construction of the pillars, as well as the material used during the construction. He has almost perfectly studied that composition, so he offers certain explanations in form of sketches and drawings.

Next to Trajan's Bridge, he mentions the wooded Constantin's Bridge as well, whose remains are not preserved to this day. Before the description of the remains of the bridge, a historical background to the construction of this monumental object is given, respectively the depiction of Trajan's invasion on Dacians. The main historical sources for the reconstruction of these events are the *Roman History* by Dio Cassius and *De Aedificis Justiniani* by Procopius, as well as numerous material sources such as coins or the depiction of the bridge on Trajan's Column.

In his description he focuses the most on explaining the space and the immediate vicinity of the bridge the so-called "biggest Danube cataract known as the *Demir gate*". As a matter of fact, the whole description of the natural features of the region comes from a letter sent to Marsili's friend, Bernardus Monfalcone, in 1714. Marsili notified him of about his accidental discovery of the bridge in the winter of 1689, when the Austrian army won several important victories over the army of the Ottoman Empire (battles at Paraćin, Niš and Vidin). Further in the text, Marsili analyses the composition of these 20 pillars, found in the flow of the Danube at that moment. He highlights the difference in the soil at one side, and then at the other side. He states the appearance of the fortification from the Romanian, and then from the Serbian side. In this exposure I won't go into much detail with the descriptions themselves and

the composition of the materials used during the construction of the bridge, but I will bring forth these facts in the paper itself.

On the other hand, to me as an historian, Marsili's perception of Danube as a geo-political element is particularly important, not only because it bore significance in the time of the count, but also in the times that preceded and, in the times, to come. Having in mind that Marsili was the first cartographer of the Danube and someone who has described in detail the whole water area from the mountain Schwarzwald, in today's Germany, until the emptying of Danube into the Black Sea, in today's Bulgaria. His approach to studying Danube is more than interdisciplinary and fascinating for the time he lived in and explored. As it was mentioned, he headed a commission in charge of demarcation of the borders of Srem in the middle of two empires after the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. His initial idea, suggested to the Austrian emperor Leopold, was to place the final boundary on rivers Sava and Danube, as the ideal place to control the flow of the goods and people. On the other hand, he suggested Danube as the boundary, having in mind first and foremost that once the Roman limes has stretched along the flow of the Danube, clearly separating Roman provinces from the barbarian world. In this case, Marsili considered the territory of Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, as the barbarian world, from the perspective of an Austrian officer, which was opposite from the situation in the Roman Empire. What is interesting is that before Marsili, Herodotus was the only one who tried to describe the whole flow of the Danube, with its tributaries.

At the very end, it was an ungrateful task to describe such a versatile personality as Luigi Ferdinando Marsili's and his scientific opus. As it was already mentioned, it is very difficult to make a collection out of everything that he has more than successfully gathered. It would be wrong to try and generalize his personality, as a scientist. But at this very moment, it is

extremely hard to separate his life from his work, since Marsili has dedicated his life to travels, which were the wheels of his research. Travelogues what originated from these journeys should not, in any case, be classified as literary works, which separates him as a traveler from the others. Furthermore, he gives an example to Felix Kanitz and Jovan Cvijić, of how a scientific travelogue should look like: without prose, poetry, reports, just statements of what was seen and discovered *in situ*. Nevertheless, his individual systematization will make many authors, from Vasić and Tasić to Sartori and Torok, proclaim him as a proto-oceanographer, proto-archaeologists, proto-biologist. The term "proto" found in each of these epithets speak about Marsili as a connoisseur and not as an expert of a certain field, and very often this term carries a negative connotation in the modern sense. My opinion is that Marsili was just a late scientist of the Renaissance, who has left the constraints of thematic and conceptual research, by trying to walk the steps of Leonardo da Vinci, René Descartes and Francis Bacon (1561-1626), hand in hand with Newton and Halley, and has given a new, multidimensional perspective on life and science, proving that interdisciplinarity is much more pragmatic and useful than the constrained views of an scientific discipline. As a final remark about Marsili, it could be said that the universality of his works is an outcome of the universality of his personality.

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PROJECT PROPOSALS
OF THE DANUBE SCHOOL 2018

Blagovesta Tsenova, Aleksandra Toroman, Josip Humjan **Enhancing Knowledge of the Danube Region**

Blagovesta Tsenova holds a master degree in European Studies and Region Cooperation from BRIE, University of Ruse, Bulgaria

Aleksandra Toroman holds a Master of Laws degree from the University of Novi Sad, Serbia

Josip Humjan is a postgraduate student of History and Information and Communication Sciences at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Zagreb, Croatia

We live in a time when most people have no time, will or understanding for certain problems or detecting importance in their surroundings that they need to preserve or use in some way. Organized education of population that is no longer part of the education system is problematic because on most of those people the state no longer has influence in context of education, moreover those people have already built their system of values in life and they often do not look good upon attempts of correcting those same values. This does not mean that those people should be completely excluded from educational strategies, but that they are a more demanding project. Part of the population still within the education system is sufficiently young to accept the impact on their value system - whether it is a correction of the existing ones or the building of entirely new values. This situation is present in almost all countries of the world, which of course includes the Danube region as well. Although this

region has a whole range of problems that require attention, which by type and intensity vary from one extreme to another, depending on the country of the region, one of them is common for all of them. It is about belonging to the Danube region whose potential is underestimated not only by the states and their institutions, but also by the population of these countries. The aim of this project is to present the Danube region in a way that is interesting and fun for young people (and those who feel that way).

The main focus of this paper is to solve the problem of lack of knowledge about the Danube region and its meaning for younger population by using the tool that most young people are familiar with and that is accessible to them - video games. Since no researches on usage of video games in the Danube region exist as well as the level of knowledge about that region, we conducted a short research of our own in Ulm. We asked the participants two questions: first was „How much did you know about the Danube region when you were in school?“ (with possible answers: Nothing, Little, Moderate, Much and Almost everything), and the second „Have you played video games when you were in school?“ (with possible answers: Never; Not frequently, Sometimes, Frequently and Almost every day). Most of the participants answered that they did not know much about the Danube region but that they had played video games frequently. These results show that video games are the ideal tool for disseminating information in the Danube region: they are widespread and entertaining. The problem of valuing the Danube region is so complex that it is legitimate to ask whether we are even aware of the problem as a whole. Although the problems in different countries of the region are sometimes quite the opposite of one another, the main problem is inadequate coordination of the Danube region countries, which is paradoxical because they have common borders, intertwined past, culture(s), trade and other links and are either part of European Union or want to become a member. The question of insufficient linkage and lack

of perception of being a part of the Danube region creates specific problems and prevents or hinders problem solving and achieving co-operation. This applies primarily to decision-makers, but indirectly to the entire population, which can encourage (or exert pressure) on decision-makers or directly engage in various projects. Solving these problems necessarily requires long-term planning, determination and coordination during implementation, which is problematic in practice. "Conventional" methods of education, above all primary and secondary schools, do not mention the Danube region as such - it is mentioned, but in some other context that is generally limited to state borders. Such an approach cannot solve these problems. Various types of other methods of education do not supplement (or correct) school programs - this also applies to parents who themselves are unaware of the importance of the problem, and the question is how much they are able to convey such knowledge. Given the fact that educational system does not pay enough attention to the problem and implementation of programs that would correct those mistakes would be a logistical and a financial effort, it is important to transfer important knowledge through video games that are relatively cheap and almost accessible to everyone. As part of this project we will create a video game called The Danube Thrones with the aim of solving the problems of the lack of knowledge of the Danube region. The game itself would be based on knowledge of the history, culture, sport, geography, etc. of the Danube region. Playing involves all the countries of the Danube region and not just selected ones. Questions will be made in an interesting way to make the game more fun and easier. Some of them would also be related to the links between countries (eg what is the connection between Serbia and Croatia? Nikola Tesla). There would be several levels of questions, depending on the player's previous knowledge. The game itself would be available for free online - in this way it would be easiest to reach the largest number of potential users. This game will allow you to play with your friends, with players from other countries in the

Danube region, and there will be a rank list. Although the focus of promotion and games will be in the virtual world, we will try to connect it with local educational institutions (libraries, cultural centers etc) that could further encourage gaming.

ConQUIZtador is an intellectual online strategy game created in 2002 in Hungary. The game is a battle between three opponents on the map of each country. So far, the game has existed in Hungarian, German, French, English, Bulgarian, Russian, Romanian, Serbian, Czech and Italian. Each language has the map of a particular country.

Our proposal is to create ConQUIZtador for the Danube Region - The Danube Thrones. In this way we will create a modern educational solution that meets the interests of the new generation and will raise the knowledge of students of history, geography, culture, traditions, sport of the states of the Danube region.



The Danube Thrones game field will be the map of the Danube Region. Players will enter into battle for territories and correct answers will provide them with more territory and more points.

The battles are four types: blitz (fast game) in the common room or in the friends' room, a long game in the friends' room or in the duel room. The difference is in the number of territories, opponents, circles, and the influence of different indicators over the player's authority.

The outcome of the game depends on answering questions from different areas of knowledge for a certain time. There are two types of questions. Optional are questions with a choice between four given responses. The other kind is the familiar question, where the answer is necessarily expressed by some number. In the second type of question, besides the maximum approximation to the correct answer, the time for which the answer is given is also taken into account. Each of the districts (territories) has a certain value. This value can be changed during the game. The winner is the player who has the most points (values) and land.

Questions are approved by questions administrators. They are sent by players on a voluntary basis. Each of them goes through a triple check - from two different question managers and finally - from the game admin.¹

The Danube Thrones game will be an innovative gaming educational approach that will allow students to gain knowledge about the Danube Region while having fun. The video game will stimulate children's desire to become better by learning more facts and gaining more knowledge about the countries of the Danube. In this way, curiosity will be cultivated among young children in the region. The Danube Thrones will raise the common knowledge of students about the Danube and will help adults also increase their knowledge. The game will be a attraction for the whole family.

¹ <https://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/ConQUIZtador>

Children love to play video games, so educational video game is the way we can reach their desire for more knowledge.

The Danube Thrones will bring together players of different nationalities, with different knowledge, with different interests, but with the common goal of gaining more knowledge about the Danube region. The game will unite the cultural differences. Thanks to the questions that will be part of the game, the participants will understand how many things they have in common. At the same time, they will learn the specific features of each country and what each Danube people identifies.

The Danube region is a vast territory, and people living in the region do not feel that they belong to it. It is the game that is one of the solutions that can increase the feeling of belonging to the Danube region.

The game will provide a "territory" where the inhabitants of the Danube region meet, exchange information, get acquainted, create contacts, learn together, and establish connections with other Danubian peoples.

The Danube Thrones is aimed at students who are over 10 years of age. It is necessary for the student to have basic knowledge about his / her country. Adults and parents also have the opportunity to participate as participants and to increase their knowledge of the region in which they live. On the other hand, they can encourage children to play an educational game. Using the Danube Thrones parents can spend more time with their children, learning together with them.

The next target group of the project are teachers and educational institutions. The game is suitable for implementation in the school environment and used as an innovative teaching approach. An integrated classroom can be created, and each student in a class should be a participant or the whole class to play as one team.

The best day to release the game is 29th of June - International Danube Day.

1. Promotion

In order to make the project successful, special attention should be given to promoting and drawing attention to the project. First of all, the advertising of the event should pay attention to target groups of potential project participants. As mentioned above, the target group is generally the entire adult and young population (over 10 years), in particular parents with small children, as well as teacher in schools, education institutions and ministry of education. Speaking about the target group of parents, it is necessary to organize promotion in schools, kindergartens, libraries. You can do this in the following ways:

- Speeches at schools of specialists involved in the project;
- Publications on Facebook pages of educational institutions of information about the event;
- Posters and flyers in schools, kindergartens, government offices.

In the case of school, it is also necessary to conduct work, both with regard to the placement of leaflets and posters, and with regard to establishing communication through schools with other education institutions. It is necessary to attract attention of other education institutions to the action.

The most important issue is directly advertising and providing easy access to information about the event. We are planning to use social-media approaches, in particular community building. The idea is to involve people who are interested in teaching-children issues, as well as people related to education, to local authorities. This includes several steps, such as creating a group and event on Facebook, interacting with local celebrities in social networks, sharing posts about the event with hashtag (#TheDanubeThrones). In addition, for sure, classical methods such as TV,

radio, and press will be used. It is planned to connect professional designers to create a logo and design a venue for the action.

2. Sustainability

It is very important to keep the sustainability of this fair. Host cities are expected to be extended not only through the Danube bank, but within the Danube Region itself. The countries of the Danube Region are planning to be involved into this project during several years.

Also, it is necessary to extend number of cities and countries. It can be done by increasing number of game promotion during the year.

Every year it is going to be new versions of the video game and miscellaneous adaptations. Furthermore, every day and every minute will be new questions made by people from Danube Region. Also, there will be correct answers checked by organizations.

The main point is to renovate the project conception, ways and solutions. Moreover, to use various promotion approaches. This Danube School idea can give a start to the countries in other corners of the world and therefore resolve educational problems which effect especially young children in different countries.

3. Expected budget

The question of financing the event always depends on the time and place of the event. My colleagues and I identified three main areas of expenditure: organizational committee, marketing, direct costs related with the project. The organizing committee is supposed to include three people; each of them will be responsible for a certain direction. Directions of work: checking correction of questions and answers every day, search for sponsors, finding people who are going to play the game and

motivation for young people. Marketing expenses include a pay to attracted designers (logo and event design), cost of advertising on TV, radio and in the press. All other promotional activities the project team plans to implement on their own. Direct costs related with project include salaries for design expert (including work on look of the game itself), programming expert (including work on organization of the site and how it will work), accounting costs and law costs (since we need to register our firm and to speak with people who made Conquistador to buy some sort of patent).

Below is the table of expected costs.

TITLE	UNIT COSTS	UNITS	TOTAL (EUR)
Organization	2,000.00 €/Person	3 People	6,000.00 €
Marketing	5,000.00 €	1 Event	5,000.00 €
Direct Project Related Costs			
<i>Salary for Design Expert</i>	20.00 € / hour	2 workers for 160 hours	6,400.00 €
<i>Salary for Programming Expert</i>	20.00 € / hour	1 worker for 160 hours	3,200.00 €
<i>Accounting Costs</i>	20.00 € / hour	1 worker for 120 hours	2,400.00 €
<i>Lawyer Costs</i>	500.00 €	Hours in year once	500.00 €
TOTAL (EUR)			23,500.00 €

Radmila Arambašić, Nataliia Osipova and Annika Thöt
**The Danube Youth Radar: Putting Student Research in
the Spotlight**

Radmila Arambašić, B.Sc. is a Student of Geodesy and Geomatics Engineering, Master Academic Studies, University of Novi Sad, Serbia. rada.arambasic@gmail.com

Nataliia Osypova, M.A. in Political Science, PhD student of Donetsk National University, Ukraine. nataliia.osypova@gmail.com

Annika Thöt M.A. is a European History graduate from the Humboldt University of Berlin, currently working in an online newsroom and as a scientific assistant at the Neubrandenburg University of Applied Sciences, Germany. thoet@web.de

1. The Crisis of Student Research

In 2016, the German magazine “Der Spiegel” published a conversation one of their writers had overheard on a train. It took place between two students, one of them stressed out due to rapidly approaching deadlines, while the other smilingly shared the secret of his thoroughly relaxed composition. Having heard the rumour that most professors did not even read most of their students’ work, he had set out to prove the theory by gluing the center pages of his own paper together with a strand of hair.

Upon return, said trap had still been in place, prompting the student to lose interest in writing high quality papers altogether.¹

Yet the writing productivity of students has drastically increased in the wake of the Bologna reform. Depending on the respective subject, young academics draft well over two dozen essays and papers during the early stages of their university career but only a meagre minority of these often-innovative works ever see the light of day. Instead, they languish in dark university basements, or worse, a professor's dustbin. The remainder of students not yet discouraged by the fact they are writing for an audience of as little as one or two people, who are willing to break this cycle, hardly find themselves in a more promising situation. They face the high obstacles and the often complicated as well as time-consuming process of renowned peer-review-papers and other platforms only to find their work rejected merely due to the lack of immanent academic titles and standing.

This presents a serious dilemma for young scholars, as publications are not only the very heart but also the currency of academic dialogue. We believe that this process should not start as late as at the doctoral stage, but instead be an integral part of every academic training. We therefore propose a project to break this vicious cycle of growing discontent in order to raise the level of academic literacy and enable students to publish their work, thus saving innovative ideas and thorough research from oblivion. The Danube Youth Radar is an online platform for students and young academics conducting research on Danube related topics, open to research from every field of study and academic level. Besides reaching out to students, we also wish to encourage professors and teaching

¹ Sarand, Larissa (12.08.2016): Studenten-Geständnis. Profs lesen Hausarbeiten doch eh nicht – oder? In: Der Spiegel. URL: <http://www.spiegel.de/lebenundlernen/uni/hausarbeiten-professoren-lesen-die-arbeiten-nicht-richtig-a-1106177.html> [22.11.2018].

assistants with a similar background to support and suggest the publication to their protégés.

2. Platform Features und Project Structure

Having received a good grade on an essay or paper on any Danube region issue, the student is encouraged to translate their work into English as it will then reach the broadest possible audience. A literal translation is not necessary, shortened versions of longer papers or theses will be accepted. To lower publishing hurdles but simultaneously keep adequate academic standards, students will be required to hand in a reference from a professor or teaching assistant familiar with the author and his work, vouching for both quality and relevance of the submission. The students will then be able to hand in their work along with a short biography and contact details via website. A student coordinator located at a chosen university will then check the submission for formal errors and upload it to the platform.

While our core interest lies in providing young academics with the opportunity to publish their research, the Danube Youth Radar is far from a static, unilateral medium. Instead, we wish to encourage dynamic participation in the arena of public intellectual discourse by continuously broadening the website's functions, depending on both demand and resources. Potential features include social functions, such as private messaging or commentary sections, subpages for job and scholarship opportunities, book reviews, event calendars, research proposals or the publication of artwork and non-academic literature aimed at young scholars hailing from or researching the Danube region.

Initially, the project will be under the aegis of a single university which will provide the necessary infrastructure and technical equipment as well as

employ the student coordinator. Locating the platform within the university network allows us to access existing structures and funding schemes to a maximum extent. With growing success, we wish to decentralise the project by creating additional student coordinator posts at other faculties in the region. It is therefore necessary to establish a strategic network consisting of universities which specifically target the Danube countries in their core programmes, are willing to promote the platform among their students and eventually agree to provide additional resources. Furthermore, it is essential to connect with multipliers that can promote or even financially support the project, ranging from research institutes and cultural organisations to political foundations, teaching facilities, EU-programmes and media outlets.

3. Benefits

The benefits evoked by the Danube Youth Radar are manifold and tackle a wide variety of issues.

Give students a voice and improve career prospects

As the platform is designed to showcase student research and cater to specific needs of young academics, their gains are the most apparent. It provides them with an opportunity to disseminate their outstanding work which would have otherwise gone to waste, while at the same time learning about the publishing process by continually evaluating, rethinking and rewriting their work. Weiner and Watkinson assessed the results of a US-wide Student Research Journal at Purdue University and found a positive impact on student success as well as “professional identity; confidence with and understanding of their subjects; knowledge of the research process; [...] understanding of scholarly literature; [...] critical thinking ability”, with well over 90% of the students confirming the

benefits of early publication activity. They also argue that the “published articles will be tangible evidence of achievement, valuable for their future careers”.² Publications become increasingly important even for young scholars, not only securing them a PhD or postdoc-position, but also improving their chances of winning scholarships or limited spots in advanced study programmes. The Danube Youth radar helps them acquire these credentials for their résumé, thus improving their career prospects in the long run.

Further interest in academic careers and connecting young scholars

Several studies indicate that having learned the “nuts and bolts of scientific publishing” early in their academic life, students are more likely to publish research post-PhD as well as choosing a scientific career path in the first place.³ Furthermore, as Deonandan et al. suggest, publications by their peers attract students’ attention,⁴ thus furthering the circulation of innovative ideas and connecting young scholars on the basis of

² Weiner, Sharon A./Watkinson, Charles (2014): What do Students Learn from Participation in an Undergraduate Research Journal? Results of an Assessment. In: *Journal of Librarianship and Scholarly Communication* 2, 2, 3ff; see also: Ho, Adrian K. (2011): Creating and Hosting Student-Run Research Journals. A Case Study. In: *The Canadian Journal of Library and Information Practice and Research* 6, 2, 2; Bauer, Benjamin J. et al. (2009): Learning through Publishing. *The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics*. In: *PS. Political Science & Politics* 42, 3, 565ff.

³ Mervis, Jeffrey (2001): Student Research: What is it good for? In: *Science* 293, 1614; Pinheiro, Diogo/Melkers, Julia/Youtie, Jan (2014): Learning to Play the Game. Student Publishing as an Indicator of Future Scholarly Success. In: *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 81, 18; Bauer et al., 565; Weiner/Watkinson, 9; Cox, Michaelene/Kent, Jaimie M. (2018): Political Science Student Journals. What Students Publish and Why Student Publishing Matters. In: *PS. Political Science & Politics* 51, 4, 805.

⁴ Deonandan, Raywat/Patel, Premal/Winterbottom, Robyn (2012): A student-run peer-review journal. An educational tool for students in the health sciences. In: *Adv Med Educ Pract.* 3, 1-5.

common areas of interest. Ultimately, the Danube Youth Radar serves as a connectivity hub, enabling its users to connect and establish their own professional network, which is deemed indispensable in a globalised world.

Improve quality of writing and strengthen supervisor-student relations

Students are not the only target group profiting from the Danube Youth Radar. By encouraging students to publish their work with the support of a supervisor, we also hope to tackle another problem currently compromising academia: Studies show a dramatic lack of professional guidance during the writing process, causing almost nine out of ten students to feel ill prepared for composing papers altogether.⁵ We believe that the opportunity to make their research publicly known will both act as an incentive for young scholars to improve the quality of their papers and a means of intensifying the professor-student relationship.

Enhance visibility of departments and further Open Science

Being associated with the Danube Youth Radar also enriches the respective university's portfolio as it enhances the visibility of universities, departments and their research areas. Furthermore, as Open Science and the democratisation of knowledge are increasingly becoming the norm in a globalised world, we wish to trigger a more transparent discussion of research findings as an alternative to the academic Ivory Tower and enable

⁵ Unknown author (20.08.2015): Neun von zehn Studenten haben Angst vor der Hausarbeit. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Hochschulanzeiger. URL: <http://hochschulanzeiger.faz.net/magazin/studium/neun-von-zehn-studenten-haben-angst-vor-der-hausarbeit-13756533.html> [30.11.2018].

everyone, regardless of their background and resources, to access a wide range of information.

Showcase Danube region as an entity and adapt to current issues more quickly

Yet, the value of the platform goes way beyond the ability to promote academic research. At least since the endorsement of the EU strategy for the Danube Region in 2011, a variety of projects and organisations have been put into effect to strengthen and promote the macro-region as an entity. Consequently, giving the area a dedicated publication organ, helps fulfil this goal by prominently connecting interdisciplinary knowledge from all 14 countries as well as serving as hub of synergism for fresh and innovative ideas that may well be translated from paper into policy. By doing so, the Danube Youth Radar tackles the flaw in the rigid and traditionally slow journal system. Mainly focused on small-scale research and fitted with lower publishing hurdles, the platform can generally adapt to readers' demands and current developments in the region much more rapidly.⁶

Enrich the academic publication system

Undergraduate publications in particular have been met with harsh criticism in recent years due to an increase in workload, higher pressure on faculties and supervisors and especially the lack of quality control.⁷ However, we argue that the positive arguments presented thus far

⁶ See also: O'Neale Roach, Jason (2001): Making our voices heard. Why student journals are crucial. In: *Croatian Medical Journal* 42, 1, 68.

⁷ Gilbert, Scott F. (2004): A Case Against Undergraduate-only Journal Publications. Feature: Should Students Be Encouraged to Publish their Research in Student-Run Publications? In: *Cell Biology Education* 3, 1, 22f; Jungck et al., John R. et al. (2004): Undergraduates: Do Research, Publish! Feature: Should Students Be Encouraged to Publish their Research in Student-Run Publications? In: *Cell Biology Education* 3, 1, 25; Mervis, 1615.

outweigh any negative connotations. We fully acknowledge that the Danube Youth Radar is not a substitution for peer-review publications. Instead, we wish to offer an addition to the existing structures and give diligent young academics the recognition they deserve.

4. Marketing

In order to help the project succeed, special attention should be paid to advertisement. A promotional plan is a valuable marketing tool when it comes to launching a new service or platform. Therefore, it is necessary to have a strategy that comprises the creation of a corporate identity, the development of a stable and extensive network of partners and multipliers and a sustained budget plan that keeps the costs low by using already existing structures.

Create a corporate identity

It is of great importance to present digital identity across different platforms and creating a recognizable logo is one of the key elements of the advertisement. Logos are not just an identity for a project, brand or business, they are also the first things that come to mind when someone sees or thinks about the name or what it represents. Therefore, by using a logo on the university and faculty pages, the Danube Youth Radar website itself, social media accounts and on flyers and posters, would help students to instantly identify the platform. For the needs of the project, a



Figure 2: Project Logo

simple, yet striking logo has been created, which metaphorically represents a radar searching across the Danube region, i.e. a radar detecting and showcasing student research that would otherwise remain hidden (Figure 1).

Develop a network of partners and multipliers

Having a good network of online partners, who will help in the promotion of the project, is a great benefit. Different associates are especially valuable in helping to tell the project story and spreading information on how students can take part in the Danube Youth Radar. In our case, partners are universities all over the Danube Region, as well as different student and nonprofit organisations, which support the idea of sharing academic works and theses of young students and professionals from all over the world. Cultural and political organisations as well as media partners are to be considered as multipliers, too.

Keep costs low by using existing structures

A key narrative deployed by the European Commission, especially in the early stages of framing the macro-regional strategies, is the three no's: no new EU legislation, no new EU institutions, and no new EU budget should be used to provide direct and immediate support to the respective areas. As such, macro-regional strategies build extensively on existing frameworks and financial resources, as does our Danube Youth Radar.

When it comes to the promotion of the project, logistics can be divided into two promotional strategies: offline and online marketing. There are intersections between the two, making the advertisement very effective. The offline marketing would include posters, flyers, business cards - which may seem old fashioned, but still prove to be highly impactful promotional tools even in the digital age. The offline strategy also includes the personal

representation at University fairs, which allows direct contact with students and other target groups.

On the other hand, a large part of online marketing would consist of advertising on university and faculty websites and through different academic newsletters. Additionally, digital platforms are now where people are spending their time and social media is a widespread, inexpensive form of online business promotion. Facebook is by far the most popular social media platform in use today, but also Twitter, and Instagram can be effective in reaching students. Not to forget LinkedIn - a social network service mainly used for professional networking. Besides that, online advertisements on these platforms increase the visibility of the Danube Youth Radar and attract the attention of many young students worldwide.

5. Budget

Another key factor for success is a realistic budget for our project. It is essential to find a way to reduce expenses. This can be achieved by relying heavily on existing facilities, personnel and infrastructure of the chosen lead university. Thus, it is not necessary to hire external staff for managing the project as the coordinator will be recruited among the student body. Preferably, yet not obligatory, this should be someone with knowledge of the Danube Region and its specialties (e.g., from Political Sciences or International Relations Departments). The approximate salary is estimated at €237.80 per month, roughly based on the median wage for student research assistants in Germany, however, the costs in other countries may vary and must be adjusted accordingly once the main university is chosen. As we expect a low submission rate during the initial phase of the project, the working hours have been limited to 10 hours/week, effectively creating a part-time position which reaches the annual total of €2853.60.

The second biggest expense is the online promotion. It is important to spread word of the Danube Youth Radar online and offline. The main channels for advertisement shall be social networks, university and faculty homepages as well as thematically related websites, such as providers of scholarships, grants, internships, etc. As for social networks, it is sufficient to place advertisements biannually in accordance with the end of semester and term dates. Around this time, the highest output of student work is to be expected and by heightening the visibility of the Danube Youth Radar, we wish to have a positive impact on the number of submissions. The campaigns will initially cost €1560 per year. Most of the sum is to be spent on Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram and Google Search System. Partner universities' and faculties' newspapers and websites as well as selected academic newsletters should help in spreading information free of charge via external links.

The Branding is equally important – for the creation of a logo for The Danube Youth Radar as well as corresponding elements for a corporate website, stationary and merchandise items, a designer will be hired for approximately €100. Offline promotion includes leaflets and business cards which are estimated at a €100 for 1000 leaflets and €50 for 100 business cards annually.

As the project is centered on an online platform, the establishment of our own website is crucial. While relying on university servers and webspace, the initial setup will cost €500. Moreover, without maintenance (€100 per year) this website will not be able to work properly. In addition, it is necessary to pay for domain name and hosting approximately €30 once a year.

Launching the project means promoting the idea of the Danube Youth Radar among universities and partners, establishing new contacts, networking, etc. To achieve this, the student coordinator will be required

to eventually visit the chosen contacts. Their travel expenses are estimated at €150 per trip. We anticipate at least ten business trips annually, culminating in a budget of €1500 per year. Extra costs may occur. €100 will be planned for additional purposes.

The costs of the Danube Youth Radar total just under €6894 in the first year. Two years are needed to create a sustainable project. The project second year will cost € 6393,60 (minus expenditures on website creation). Accordingly, we need at least €13287,2 to set up the Danube Youth Radar project. Throughout the initial set-up period, the project needs to be closely monitored and the results constantly evaluated to enable strategy changes and eventually the aforementioned expansion of both platform features and geographical range.

Radmila Arambašić, Nataliia Osipova and Annika Thöt:
The Danube Youth Radar: Putting Student Research in the Spotlight

	<u>Expenses</u>	Unit/Year	Total
<u>Staff</u>	237,80€	12	2853,60€
Promotion Online	390€	4	1560€
Branding	100€	1	100€
Promotion Offline	0,10€	1000	100€
	0,50€	100	50€
<u>Website Creation</u>	500€	1	500€
Website Maintenance	100€	1	100€
Website Hosting and Domainname	30€	1	30€
<u>Travel Expenses</u>	150€	10	1500€
<u>Other Administrative Expenses</u>	100€	1	100€
Total Year 1			6893,60€
Total Year 2			6393,60€

Figure 3 Budget

With this manageable budget, we aim to initiate a unique project that tackles several issues at once. We believe that by creating the Danube Youth Radar as a platform for talented young scholars to publish their early research, we also encourage a more inclusive regional identity that is thus far absent, yet vital for the bright future of all respective countries.

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Marko Radić, Ana Momčilović, Iulia Ishanova, Stefan
Ditrih

The ReDanube Project

Marko Radić holds an MA in History from the University of Zagreb, Croatia.

Ana Momčilović, Ph.D. student at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering in Niš, University of Niš, Serbia, momcilovic.ana.92@gmail.com

Iulia Ishanova, cross culture communication trainer, English teacher, Yekaterinburg, Russia


Stefan Ditrih, LL.M., Assistant Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University Business Academy in Novi Sad, Serbia

1. Idea

A recycling and educational centres with overflow waste barriers on the Danube River

The project idea consists of two parts. The first part is a transnational network of recycling facilities, based on overflow waste barrier, with the goal of establishing the basic sustainable development principles in the Danube region. Cleaning one of the biggest European rivers from plastic waste makes a direct impact on the ecological systems along the Danube, as well as the Black Sea. The complementing part of the project is to build up both educational and research facilities serving as a vehicle for the sharing of ecological values. Connecting the regional schools in a network

enables the center to hold various educational activities: legal, political, ecological and heritage. Annual competition for innovators and designers would further improve the impact of the center and its connection to the local communities. A mobile app would serve to connect all the participants in social network for sharing knowledge, statistics and people. A coordinating transnational body would organize the promotion and transfer between the centers.



2. Problems

One of the most dangerous disasters in ecology is water pollution. Due to inadequate disposal of waste a lot of plastic waste reaches the sea by rivers. Some plastic is concerned to originate from shipping, but a significant amount is carried into seas by rivers. According to the article "Science for Environment Policy": European Commission DG the researchers during 2010 – 2012 estimated that 4.2 tons of plastic reach the Black Sea via the Danube per day¹. It is 1 533 tons every year, not

¹ Environment News Alert Service, edited by SCU, The University of the West of England, Bristol
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/research/newsalert/pdf/377na1_en.pdf

concerning macro and micro-plastic particles and litter from downstream countries. Harmful micro-plastic particles are highly available to species that are likely to mistake them for food.

To prevent plastic from ending up in the ocean an optimum solution has to be developed to tackle the problem on land. Toxic substances contained in the plastic affect every ecosystem along the way.

3. Goals

The establishing of the waste barrier and recycling facility is intended to recycle the plastic waste retrieved from the Danube River. Educational and search facilities aim to promote ecological values and share knowledge, ideas and experience along the Danube region. What is more, it will support youth mobility, identity formation and circular economy.

4. Target Groups

This project is going to involve different groups of people:

- All the people living in the Danube region can contribute in Saving Danube region ecology. This project is going to encourage citizens of all ages to participate in rescuing Danube region waters.
- Local communities should bear a hand in building recycling, educational and research facilities to short the period in the project realization.
- Elementary- and high school children are the main audience participating in social and educational network.
- Professionals in such fields as design, science, ecology, play an important role to share their knowledge and experience.

5. Budget Plan

Capital costs: 221.000 country (Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania)

Operational Costs: 77 EUR per ton of waste

Wages for the project duration (36 months): 8 to 10 people

	Capital Investments (€)	Operational Investments (€/ton)	Amount (103 t/per year)
Recycling	$y = 5.000 \cdot x^{0.8}$	$y = 700/x^{0.3}$	$1 \leq x \leq 15$

6. Project Phases

This is a multiphase project. There are complex issues of cleaning the Danube river flow throughout the Danube region, and building a shared ecological value system along the Danube takes many years to establish

- Phase I.: installation and launch of the overflow waste barrier and the recycling facility
- Phase II.: acquiring the statistical data, sharing the information between the participating regions, recognizing the problems and the opportunities for respective countries
- Phase III.: setting up of the educational facilities and the educational network
- Phase IV.: connection of the established facilities and the buildup of a transnational community

7. Promotion

In order to make the idea come true we must keep up some ways.

First, we should organize lobbying campaign targeting the school network and the Ministries of Education.

Second, the local school network is going to be set up. It will help school children to be aware and keep in touch in teamwork.

Third, we tend to organize summer schools for school children, an annual competition for young artists and an annual innovation competition connected to the school network.

Finally, we will start social network application for the participating countries, as they all concern into the project.

8. Sustainability

As the project can take many years to be realized due to its multiphase and the complex establishing of facilities, we need enthusiastic young generation, who can continue the business and make it prospective. There must be some profits for youth to encourage them being involved. The most important ones are job positions. The more facilities are built, the more young professionals are employed and interested in developing them.

Jelena Ristic, Loredana Surdu, Dimitri Eskidarov

The "Danube Friend"

Jelena Ristic, Law Student at the Faculty of Law, University of Novi Sad, Serbia, and an English teacher, jelenar7x@gmail.com

Loredana Surdu, PhD is a Curator at the National History Museum of Romania, surdu.loredana@gmail.com.

Eskidarov Dimitar Nikolov is international logistics expert and graduate from Ruse University, Bulgaria

Introduction

In today's world when everything we need is one click away, people tend to be out of touch; with the world and consequently with themselves. We always look for new ways to stay in touch, to meet new people and to be 'in the loop', so to speak.

"Danube Friend" would help do exactly that. This platform would work as a meeting point between people who would like to travel to the Danube region and people who live in the regions. Simply put, the platform would work as a place where one could find a tour guide and a friend without difficulties.

Justification – is Danube Friend something you need?

Say you'd like to visit a country you've never visited before. The first thing you're probably going to do is - research. You'll try to find as much information as you can about that country and the specific city you'll be visiting. However, once you get there, you'll realize that the research can only get you so far. If you'd like to get a good beer or a nice homemade meal, you'll find yourself overwhelmed with choices. Each promising exactly what you want, but you can't know for sure, until you try it out, right?

Now, imagine you have a friend in the city you're visiting. In such cases you know you can relax and enjoy the trip. Because there's nothing better than a local taking you around to see the sights. Not only the historical or cultural landmarks, but also the urban and gastronomical ones. That friend will take you to the local pub he or she visits every other weekend with friends and they just know the beer is the best.

With Danube Friend you will have a buddy in every city in the Danube region. You'll have someone to show you the good places, so you don't have to wander around and spend priceless hours searching. Additionally, you will have a potentially long-lasting friendship and be able to return the favor one day.

The idea focuses on creating a practical solution to more than one critical aspect of the development of the Danube Region:

- The first aim is promoting **TOURISM** – a local guide (who would not charge money and would love to show others around on a voluntary basis) would not only be able to present you the official history, geography, culture and cuisine of the place, but also the local customs, the day-to-day life aspects that one would not see in a normal travel. This aspect would encourage tourism by making it accessible and fun

for a wider range of people (mainly young people who are able to use the internet and who are also curious to try new things; however, the elder categories are not excluded).

- The second aim is preventing **BRAIN DRAIN** –acting as a tour guide for visitors would help the local people interact with their own culture and traditions in a different manner, one that would encourage them to be more active in the civil aspects of their own societies due to simple and direct interaction with people from other countries/regions.
- The third aim is **ATTRACTING NEW (QUALIFIED) WORK FORCE** - making the tourists familiar with the city and open to job/investment opportunities in the region or even moving to the region that they decided to visit.

Who can use it?

The short answer is – everybody.

Really, that is the only answers. As long as the person is of legal age, he or she would be free to use the services of the "Danube Friend".

How does it work?

The first step is to make a profile on the website.

This platform would encourage traveling and cultural exchange without a defined purpose as academic/job exchange (Erasmus+ type) and would not imply a need for additional funding for participants

The people that would be interested in participating (as visitors) would have to fill in a registration form (no credit card information or private information)

The people who would be interested to participate as guides also have to fill in a registration form with clear accent on their favorite fields (ex. Gastronomic specialties, Local History, etc.)

The purpose of the registration forms is to introduce yourself to the other users and for our system to match you with locals of similar interests and provide you with the best suggestions. As for the questions, they would be added on a rolling basis; but some include:

- Where do you want to go?
- What is the purpose of your trip?
- Are you travelling alone?
- Length of the trip
- Preference regarding accommodation
- Preference regarding host
- Special requests
- Do you have any disabilities?
- And many more...

Additionally, both sides will be encouraged to film the whole experience. Each quarter those videos would be used as materials for a short documentary movie. The movie would be used for promoting the program.

Implementation and timeframe

The platform would have its physical base in Serbia, and it would be available to all the countries that are part of the regional organizations mentioned above.

There will be 8 administrators, working in two shifts to deliver the best customer support for the users. Two of those would be IT administrator, each for one shift, to solve any potential glitches that might arise during

the excitement of the platform. Together with three supervisors, who would take care of the logistics and paperwork that might arise in the meantime.

For the guides of the countries that share the Danube River Basin there will be a possibility of acquiring a volunteer certificate upon request (under the legislation of each country).

Regarding the timeframe, the project would last 30 months in total. The first six months will be dedicated to the preparations. That includes setting up the offices, resolving the legal matters and constructing the website. Afterwards, 1-3 months will be spent on promotion, the launching of the website and fixing potential bugs. Once that is resolved, the "Danube Friends" will be officially up and running.

Promotion

The promotion would be performed through different social networks, namely:

- Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and others and Setting up a YouTube account, where occasional livestream would be held;
- Email newsletter;
- Brochures and leaflets;
- PR's appearances on local TV stations and radio stations;
- Adding "Danube Friend" to the event calendar of major tourist organizations.

Additionally, as previously mentioned a major promoting tool will be the documentary based on the footage from the "Danube Friend" participants.

Partners

Some of the initial partners would include:

- Travel agencies;
- Local TV stations;
- Regional, national and local authorities;
- Local NGOs
- As well as major universities from participating countries.

Budget

		Amount	Unit	Duration (months)	Total
Salaries	Platform Admin.	1.000 €	8	30	240.000 €
	General Admin	1.500 €	3	30	135.000 €
	PR manager	1.500 €	1	30	45.000 €
Rent and office	Renovation and office mat.	50.000 €	1	1	50.000 €
	Rent + bills	2.000 €	1	30	60.000 €
	Domain	100 €	1	1	100 €
	Maintanance	50 €	1	30	1.500 €
Promotion		2.000 €	1	30	60.000 €
TOTAL					591.600 €

HERAUSGEBER*INNEN

Paul F. Langer ist Doktorand an der Deutschen Universität für Verwaltungswissenschaften in Speyer, wo er insbesondere an Forschungsprojekten zur Digitalen Transformation arbeitet. Er studierte Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Freiburg (B.Sc.) und der Universität St. Andrews, UK (M.Sc.). Nach Einblicken bei Siemens, der Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) der European Energy Exchange (EEX) und einigen Institutionen mehr, gründete und leitete er in Deutschland und Uganda verschiedene Unternehmen und Institutionen (CONCIVIS, DENK GLOBAL! und balmyou). Seit 10 Jahren arbeitet er zudem als Projektreferent für die Europäische Donau-Akademie an donauraumspezifischen gesellschaftspolitischen Herausforderungen. Zusammen mit Gerhard Mayer hat er in diesem Kontext 2014 die Danube School-Reihe initiiert und koordiniert sie seitdem.

Prof. Gerhard Mayer, geboren 1952 in Ulm/Donau, Studium der Mathematik, Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Philosophie in Tübingen und London. Seit 1980 leitet er bis heute ein mittelständiges Familienunternehmen. Nach Tätigkeiten an der Universität Hohenheim (1981-83) über 30 Jahre Erfahrung in der Lehre an der Dualen Hochschule Baden-Württemberg und seit 1995 an der Hochschule Neu-Ulm (HNU). 2003 Ernennung zum Honorarprofessor, von 2000-2007 Vorsitzender des Hochschulrates, seit 2013 Vorsitzender des Kuratoriums der HNU. Er ist Gründungsmitglied und Gesellschafter der EDA gGmbH, Vorsitzender des Akademierates (seit 2010) und hat die Entwicklung des Netzwerks von Danube Schools maßgeblich vorangetrieben. Die Danube Schools 2014-2018 standen unter seiner Leitung.

Tanja Salzmann-ReiBer ist Doktorandin und Lehrbeauftragte am Ludwig-Uhland-Institut für Empirische Kulturwissenschaft der Universität Tübingen. Sie studierte Empirische Kulturwissenschaft, Erziehungswissenschaft und Politikwissenschaft in Tübingen und Sevilla und forscht derzeit über transnationale Projekte im Donauraum. Zudem ist sie Geschäftsführerin des Jugendwerks der AWO Württemberg in Stuttgart und koordiniert dort verschiedene Projekte für junge Erwachsene, unter anderem im Donauraum. Seit 2017 arbeitet sie freiberuflich zudem als Projektreferentin im Bereich Danube Schools für die Europäische Donau-Akademie.